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Abstract
Government often imposes social and environmental regulation on business to protect
public interests. Alternatively, firms may collectively and voluntarily take on social and
environmental responsibilities, which is frequently known as “industry self-regulation
(ISR).” However, in the context of this qualitative study, neither of these two alternatives
proved efficient.
I study the management of the Municipal Hazardous or Special Waste (MHSW)
programs in Ontario, in which post-consumer household materials such as residual paint
and dry cell batteries were collected and managed. According to the concept of the
circular economy, preventing and/or re-entering waste into the product stream is key to
solving global resource unsustainability, and this aim requires innovative business
solutions. As my historical study of the period from 1981 to 2018 demonstrates, after
business failed to voluntarily and consistently self-regulate to address used products, the
government mandated waste management with a stringent regulation. Rather than
spurring innovation, this prescriptive regime provoked escalating stakeholder conflicts.
Ultimately, however, a hybrid regime evolved that married government regulation with
ISR and kickstarted business proactivity and innovation. I study this regime to answer the
central question: How can business and government coordinate their actions to realize a
circular economy?
Based on this analysis, I propose a specific hybrid model in which business and
government coordinate their actions by iteratively interacting to set rules and enforce
them through five core practices. I compare this model with the pure models of ISR and
government regulation to understand how it can address their respective shortcomings,
such as business avoidance and underperformance, and how it can spur proactivity.
Further, grounded theorizing enables me to identify four salient tensions that characterize
this model: decoupling versus integration, control over means versus ends,
harmonization versus distinctiveness, and as the outcome of the model, compliance
versus proactivity. To secure proactivity and innovation, these tensions must be aptly
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balanced. The model can be useful in similar contexts that present urgent socioenvironmental problems but little chance for the formation of collective actions with
innovative outcomes—a common situation in many circular economy initiatives.

Keywords
Hybrid Regulation, Collective Action, Industry Self-Regulation, Circular Economy,
Resource Loops, Tensions, Post-Consumer Waste
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Summary for Lay Audience
Business is increasingly deemed responsible for its social and environmental impacts. To
address these impacts, government often imposes regulation on firms to protect public
interests. Alternatively, firms may collectively and voluntarily take on social and
environmental responsibilities and “self-regulate.”
One of the emerging responsibilities of business is to manage the impact of postconsumer materials on the natural environment, usually known as waste. New
approaches, such as the circular economy, put emphasis on the importance of finding
innovative solutions to return used materials to production and consumption lines, rather
than merely disposing of them. However, because managing waste is costly, firms may
not voluntarily take this responsibility. Further, to collect and manage used consumer
products, firms may need to work collectively, but collaboration is uncertain. As a result,
government intervention is required. Nonetheless, in such new areas, it is unknown how
government regulation can foster collaboration across firms to yield innovative solutions.
I study the management of the Municipal Hazardous or Special Waste (MHSW)
programs in Ontario, in which post-consumer household materials such as residual paint
and dry cell batteries were collected and managed. My historical study of the period from
1981 to 2018 demonstrates that both of the above alternatives (i.e., government
regulation and self-regulation) failed to provide the expected results, especially the
needed innovation to realize a circular economy. Ultimately, however, a hybrid regime
evolved that married government regulation with self-regulation and kickstarted business
proactivity and innovation.
Based on this analysis, I propose a specific hybrid model in which business and
government coordinate their actions to make sure the intended outcomes are achieved.
This model can be useful when firms are expected to cooperate to address a new business
responsibility, but they are not motivated to do so. The model can also resolve many
shortcomings of conventional government regulation and voluntary self-regulation.
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Glossary of Terms and Acronyms
Authority

Resource Productivity and Recovery Authority (RPRA); an
organization introduced by the Resource Recovery and Circular
Economy Act, 2016 to uphold the monitoring and enforcement
of the Act upon the termination of Waste Diversion Ontario
(see below).

Industry Funding
Organization (IFO)

A corporation that is designated for a waste diversion program
(Resource Recovery and Circular Economy Act, 2016). An IFOs is
funded by industry to fulfil the expected responsibilities on
behalf of its members.

Industry Stewardship Plan

A plan for the management of a designated waste operated by,
or for the benefit of, one or more stewards who are designated
in respect of that waste (Waste Diversion Transition Act, 2016).

Municipal Hazardous or
Special Waste (MHSW)

waste that consists of municipal hazardous waste or municipal
special waste, or any combination of them, whether or not the
waste is owned, controlled or managed by a municipality, as
defined in Ontario Regulation 387/16.

Recycling

Refers to any operation by which materials are reprocessed
into products, materials or substances, whether for the original
or other purposes. It includes the reprocessing of organic
material but does not include energy recovery and reprocessing
into materials that are to be used as fuels.

Steward

A person designated in respect of municipal hazardous or
special waste under the Waste Diversion Transition Act, 2016,
and its relevant regulations and rules. This term often refers to
individual firms and may include but is not limited to brand
owners, first importers, and manufacturers.

Waste Diversion Ontario
(WDO)

A non-Crown corporation established under Waste Diversion
Act, 2002, to “develop, implement and operate waste diversion
programs for designated wastes in accordance with this Act
and monitor the effectiveness and efficiency of those
programs.”
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Chapter 1
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Introduction
More than any other segment of our society in Ontario, the activities of
private industry have focused public attention on the dangers of
imperfect waste management practices. […] Corporate enterprise is
faced with—and must confront—the sometimes conflicting
considerations of profit maximization and the public welfare. […] [A]s
a generator of waste, industry must be held accountable for the
handling and treatment and/or disposal of that waste. (Ministry of the
Environment, 1983: 5)

In 1983, when the above statement was made in a proposal known as Blueprint for Waste
Management in Ontario, regulators hoped that it would persuade business to voluntarily
take an active role in managing post-consumer materials and develop innovative
solutions to reduce, reuse, recover, and recycle waste. Nevertheless, in the context of this
study, it took about three decades until signs of the expected proactive business responses
appeared, and even then these business actions were not purely voluntary. Indeed, neither
government persuasion (1980s and 1990s) nor its coercion through imposing regulation
(2000s) caused the expected proactivity and innovation. However, in the early 2010s, a
regulatory regime evolved that included elements of both government regulation and
voluntary self-regulation by firms, which started to yield proactive outcomes.
This research aims to study a group of consumer waste management programs in Ontario
to gain insight into this hybrid model and how it works. In this way, the current study will
advance our understanding of how business and government can coordinate their actions
to generate proactive business solutions when both voluntary self-regulation by business
and government regulation are unlikely to produce the innovative solutions needed for
social and environmental problems.
In this chapter, I prepare the ground for this exploratory journey. In doing so, I first
outline how business has historically been preoccupied with mere acquisition and

1

transformation of natural resources, and how disregarding consumed (and limited)
resources impacts the natural environment and society. I then explain how, to solve this
problem, new approaches such as the circular economy call for innovative solutions to
address the entire material loops (e.g., by re-entering waste into business operations).
However, these approaches require active involvement from collectives of firms, and
business might have little or no incentive to voluntarily adopt such costly practices.
Therefore, the classical solutions, such as conventional forms of industry self-regulation
(ISR), may not generate the needed proactivity. Similarly, formal government regulation
may also fail to spur costly proactivity by firms who are typically preoccupied with profit
maximization. Accordingly, after describing this research gap, I explain how I studied a
hybrid model that can fill this gap to help realize a circular economy.

1.1 Business and Material Resources: A Broad Perspective
Society is becoming increasingly sensitive to the negative impacts of business on the
natural environment. Business is recognized as one of the major actors that can help or
hinder sustainable development—that is, development that meets “the needs of the
present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their
own needs” (WCED, 1987: 43).1 A core practice by which business influences
sustainable development is material resource acquisition and transformation, until the
final product or service is delivered to consumers. Nonetheless, what is perceived by
firms as a “final” product is not the final state of material resources in the broader
ecological and social systems. The material phases before and after resource acquisition
and transformation have been largely neglected by most firms, leading to environmental
harm and resource overconsumption. As a result, the products and services that we
currently produce and consume require the regenerative capacity of 1.6 Earths (WWF,
2016). Clearly, this situation is far from sustainable. Moreover, it hinders
“intergenerational equity,” which is a tenet of sustainable development.

1

I use the word “sustainability” as a general term to refer to the state in which sustainable development is
practiced. I may also use “business sustainability” when the emphasis is particularly on the role of business
in sustainable development.
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Both business practice and theory have historically developed based on this limited view
of entire material cycles. Management theory, for example, is mainly built upon the
assumption of unlimited natural resources. Even those management scholars who have
addressed resource constraints did not tackle the limits of material resources in the macro
perspective. For instance, based on industrial economics literature, lack of access to a
resource may create barriers to entry for new entrants not because of the planet’s limited
regenerative capacity, but because of proprietary access of industry incumbents to a
specific resource (Porter, 1980). Similarly, the resource-based view of the firm argues
that firms can achieve sustained competitive advantage by utilizing resources that are
valuable, rare, inimitable, and organized (Barney, 1991); yet even these rare resources are
usually non-material assets that are exclusive to the firm. In contrast, assets such as
common raw materials are abundant and accessible to all rivals. Firms consume these
seemingly limitless resources to create and capture value and the boundary of a firm has
been conventionally limited to the provision of products and services, not what occurs
before and after it (Davis, 2017).
The limited attention of business to material cycles is arguably due to the fact that
business and society operate on different levels. However, the cross-interaction of these
levels is now under more serious scrutiny by various actors (Geels, 2011). As such,
growing attention is being directed to business’s role in the overconsumption of resources
and the post-consumption phase of materials. In the dominant “take, make, waste” model
of doing business, used resources return to nature as “waste” (i.e., undesirable materials
that should be jettisoned, and are often left to the care of society-level actors such as local
governments).
Emerging models challenge this linear approach to resources. For example, the industrial
symbiosis approach suggests that separate industries can exchange materials, energy, byproducts, and waste materials, as a firm’s waste can be another firm’s input. This
synergistic approach can create competitive advantage when industries collectively
utilize geographic proximity (e.g., in eco-industrial parks) and design their business
models based on cooperative interactions to exchange input and output (Bansal &
McKnight, 2009; Chertow, 2000; Paquin & Howard-Grenville, 2012). Extended producer
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responsibility and product stewardship are two other approaches that expand the
responsibility of firms to include the post-consumer phase of products, deeming business
accountable for appropriate management of used materials (Kunz, Mayers, & Van
Wassenhove, 2018; OECD, 2016). Cradle-to-Cradle is another such methodology,
providing tools to consider entire material cycles in the design and manufacturing of
products (McDonough & Braungart, 2002). More recently, the circular economy has been
introduced as an exhaustive concept that synthesizes various pre-existing approaches and
tools, including those mentioned above, to close resource loops (European Environment
Agency, 2016).

1.2 The Imperative of the Circular Economy
The circular economy approach suggests that it is necessary to decouple economic
growth from environmental degradation and resource depletion, and that in doing so, we
must close resource loops and transition to a circular society (Lieder & Rashid, 2016;
Murray, Skene, & Haynes, 2017). This approach is associated with a variety of distinct
pre-existing concepts and proposes an aggregation of several strategies to extend resource
life cycles (Merli, Preziosi, & Acampora, 2018). Those who develop these strategies,
such as the Ellen MacArthur Foundation, highlight the capacities of existing tools and
knowledge in prolonging resource cycles.
The concept and models of the circular economy aim to keep biological and technical
materials, components, and products at their highest utility and value in their most
extended life cycle (Bocken, Olivetti, Cullen, Potting, & Lifset, 2017; Geissdoerfer,
Savaget, Bocken, & Hultink, 2017). In contrast to the “take, make, waste” approach, a
circular economy aims to close the loop, namely by designing out waste and pollution
and converting waste into food for other processes (Ellen MacArthur Foundation, 2013).
The sharing economy, remanufacturing, reverse logistics, and recycling are among the
most common approaches in the utilization of the concept.
As the idea of the circular economy has evolved, it has attracted different stakeholders,
especially government and business, each with their own agenda and interpretations
(Lieder & Rashid, 2016). The concept is being used increasingly to draw attention to the

4

critical problem of resource scarcity and the imperative of closing resource loops. The
core message of this concept is arguably the most important issue of this century and
could help humankind cement sustainable development.
Thus, realizing the circular economy is imperative—but exactly how to achieve that
realization remains an ongoing question. Indeed, most research on material loops is
practical and applied, concerned with technical issues that require deploying engineering
and operational tools, such as life cycle analysis or material flows (Blomsma & Brennan,
2017; Merli et al., 2018; Reike, Vermeulen, & Witjes, 2018).2 Many scholars have drawn
attention to the need for studying the diverse social, political, legal, cultural, cognitive,
and ethical aspects of closing resource loops (Blomsma & Brennan, 2017; Boons &
Howard-Grenville, 2009) at different macro, meso, and micro levels, using both
quantitative and qualitative methods (Hoffman, 2003). Some theoretical aspects of the
circular economy have received limited scholarly attention, such as socio-cultural
dimensions and institutions (Fischer & Pascucci, 2017; Moreau, Sahakian, van
Griethuysen, & Vuille, 2017), or the role of stakeholders (Kunz et al., 2018). Still, as
Walls and Paquin’s (2015) review of research on industrial symbiosis reveals,
organizational perspectives on material loops remain fragmented and many questions are
still unanswered.
This thesis aims to tackle one of these gaps in management theory. Before explaining this
gap, I first offer some background information regarding the empirical context of my
research, which will help to better frame the knowledge gap and the exact research
problem that this research addresses.

1.3 The Context, Motivation, and Study
In Canada, the need for business’s involvement in managing consumed materials came to
the attention of the public and regulators as early as the 1980s. For instance, in 1983, in
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An exception might be the research on sustainable business model innovation, which includes studies that
deal with resource loops; yet, this area still remains largely unexplored. For a review, see Bocken, Short,
Rana, and Evans (2014) and Urbinati, Chiaroni, and Chiesa (2017).
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the Ontario, the Ministry of the Environment published a proposal, known as Blueprint
for Waste Management in Ontario, that called for cooperation between the government,
municipalities, industry, and public in this regard. Later, in the mid-1990s, the Canadian
Paint and Coatings Industry, persuaded by the provincial government of British
Columbia, instigated programs to collect and manage residual coating material from
consumers. Through events like these, waste management was gradually deemed a
responsibility not only of the government, but of business too.
The response from business, however, varied—and continues to vary—significantly
across different jurisdictions. In some provinces and industries, such as in the abovementioned industry in British Columbia, the member firms shaped collective actions by
establishing ISR regimes (Barnett & King, 2008; King, Prado, & Rivera, 2012; Lee,
2009) and coordinating their actions to manage post-consumer materials. In contrast,
most industries in Ontario avoided actively and consistently taking on such responsibility,
except for a few industries that established short-lived programs for consumable
containers and packaging materials (e.g., single-use soda cans).
Motivating businesses to manage post-consumer materials is difficult for several reasons.
On the one hand, such programs add the weight of further operations onto firms. The
costs of these operations can impact firms’ financial competitiveness, especially when
firms are not harmoniously involved in such initiatives across geographical regions.
Moreover, most firms cannot collect their used products individually—historically, such
operations have been done by aggregating all similar consumer waste, regardless of their
producers. Thus, transferring the responsibility of managing everyday post-consumer
materials to producers would often require them to act collectively. This characteristic
makes waste management distinct from the many firm-level environmental
responsibilities of business, and helps to explain why a collective action was not
voluntarily undertaken by most industries in Ontario. In the absence of a shared will and
readiness for cooperation to adopt a collective action to collect and manage waste, such
an initiative is unlikely to be embraced by average individual firms.
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Business’s avoidance of voluntary self-regulation ultimately led to the imposition of a
regulatory regime by the Ontario government. Nonetheless, the collective nature of waste
management that called for aggregation of materials resulted in new problems, as
translating it into individual firm-level mandates was difficult. As a result, the regulatory
regime that the government designed proved inefficient. Far from exhibiting the
proactivity and innovation needed to solve the bigger problem of used materials, firms
merely focused on minimal compliance with the costly regulation.
This research is motivated by the observation that both voluntary and mandatory regimes
(i.e., ISR and government regulation) were tested and failed in yielding the desirable
outcome of transferring the responsibility of used products to business in Ontario in a
way that results in innovative solutions to close material loops. Voluntary solutions by
business failed because in the absence of a common will to collaborate with other firms,
the needed collective action was not fulfilled, except in a few isolated cases. Government
regulation also failed because, in that complex multi-stakeholder context, it could not
define firm-level actions that were both efficient and led to innovative solutions for the
extensive consumer waste in different industries. Hence, the problem of business
solutions for waste remained unsolved for more than three decades.
Further motivating this study was the fact that after several years of contradiction among
business, government, and other stakeholders, the regime evolved in a way that instances
of proactive business actions were noticeable. This proactivity was a harbinger of
innovative solutions that have started to return various types of waste to resource loops,
rather than disposing of them. For instance, a few firms sought new solutions to upcycle
used tires to more valuable playground mats, or to develop new products from lowquality residual paint. My investigation in the field demonstrated that the resultant regime
blended some elements of government and self-regulation. This research aims to study
this regime.
To this end, I have studied the so-called Municipal Hazardous or Special Waste (MHSW)
program in Ontario, including nine broad material groups that fall under the same
regulatory regime and constitute materials such as coatings, solvents, and pressurized
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containers. This group is important for two reasons: (1) some of the first representations
of proactive business involvement emerged from this program, and (2) the group includes
various programs for different materials, and this helps me to explore the repetitive
patterns based on which the evolved model operates and develop theory. By focusing on
this phenomenon, I was able to define an inductive qualitative study and collect extensive
data from interviews with different key members in all stakeholder groups, as well as
observations, available public data, and some internal documents. I initially studied the
history of the consumer waste management programs in Ontario (1981 to 2018) to better
understand the nature of the evolved regime, and as the ultimate goal of the research,
investigated the patterns and characteristics of the regime that can result in proactive
business actions.
The study makes several practical contributions, as it can help businesses and regulators
to make informed decisions and manage the transition to a circular economy more
effectively. As an illustration, since the inception of the MHSW program,3 about 10,000
tonnes of residual materials have been collected each year in Ontario in the paint and
coatings material group alone, which has had a significant environment and financial
impact. Indeed, most of resources we consume are converted to different forms of waste.
Hence, given the limits of material resources, any solution for the transition to a circular
economy is a driver of sustainable development (Millar, Mclaughlin, & Börger, 2019).

1.4 The Theoretical Positioning and Knowledge Gap
Based on the motivations and goals outlined above, this research is positioned squarely in
the field of ISR. In self-regulatory regimes, as a form of collective action by business, a
group of firms (generally referred to as “industry”) set rules to coordinate their actions to
meet a collective responsibility, such as environmental protection (Baron, 2016; Gupta &
Lad, 1983; King et al., 2012). ISR can take various forms (for a taxonomy see King et al.,

3

The MHSW program is one overarching program that covers a number of smaller subprograms for
different MHSW materials. Therefore, in this thesis, I will use “the MHSW program” to refer to the whole
regime and “MHSW programs” to refer to diverse embedded cases within the overarching program.
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2012). The field of ISR has benefited from many outstanding studies, ranging from the
collective actions studied by institutional, behavioural, and political economists (most
importantly, Elinor Ostrom), studies in policy and law, and a number of works in
business and strategy. Yet, unexplored gaps and grey areas remain. Those gaps that
pertain to this research are outlined below.
First, ISR is often known as a proactive strategy for firms that aspire to higher goals than
compliance with formal requirements. Rather than avoiding and resisting regulations,
such firms respond to social expectations even before government regulation commands
the same (Gupta & Lad, 1983; Rivera, Oetzel, Deleon, & Starik, 2009). Nevertheless,
scholars have noticed that ISR can become a self-serving measure by business to forestall
regulation and protect business from stakeholders like regulators and environmental
activists by adopting minimal actions (Barnett & King, 2008; King & Lenox, 2000). In a
broader sense, many studies on voluntary actions for environmental protection have
failed to find evidence that participating firms demonstrate better environmental
performance than non-participants (Borck & Coglianese, 2009; Darnall & Sides, 2008;
Rivera & de Leon, 2004). Therefore, given that the circular economy (like the studied
waste management programs) calls for proactive involvement of business to explore
innovative solutions, it remains unknown what type of self-regulation can secure
proactivity and innovation. This question is of critical importance, because the alternative
to self-regulation—that is, government regulation—is even less likely to lead to
proactivity, as firms frequently respond to such regulation with minimal compliancebased actions and “pinhole seeking”.
Second, ISR and government regulation are often viewed as substitutable alternatives—
one would obviate the need for the other. Further, some scholars have warned policy
makers that intervention in voluntary collective actions can crowd out participation and
harm the outcomes (Frey, 1994; Ostrom, 2000a). Yet, both management and policy
literature have long acknowledged the influence of government on self-regulation in one
way or another (Gunningham & Rees, 1997; King et al., 2012; Reeson & Tisdell, 2008).
Still, the blurry boundary between the two alternatives has remained underexplored in the
self-regulation literature. In contrast, many policy scholars have emphasized the
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advantages offered by innovative combinations of the two alternatives (Rubenstein, 2011;
Sinclair, 1997). Arguably, such combinations are particularly important when firms resist
voluntary self-regulation, as is the case in this study, and demands that we explore how
government regulation can drive self-regulation that results in innovative solutions
towards a circular economy.
My collected data from the MHSW program revealed that both of these gaps can be
addressed via the studied phenomenon: not only were self- and government regulation
ultimately blended and their actions coordinated towards the same goals, but also, after
several decades of avoidance and contradiction among the actors (business, provincial
government, municipalities, service providers, etc.), instances of proactive business
actions began to emerge. This thesis aims to investigate this phenomenon and answer the
broad question: How can business and government coordinate their actions to realize a
circular economy?

1.5 Findings and Contributions
By exploring the patterns among different practices in the MHSW programs, I propose a
model which I call “hybrid regulation,” that involves both government and business in
both rule setting and enforcement—the two stages of a regulatory regime. This hybrid
model can resolve the problems of either alternative, such as business avoidance of selfregulation, free riding, information asymmetry, underperformance, and minimal
compliance with rules rather than developing innovative solutions. Due to these common
problems, which are widely recognized in the literature, aiming more of either of
government regulation or self-regulation can hardly trigger a circular economy. Instead,
the solution can be found in innovative mixes of the two, such as the proposed model.
Further, to understand the characteristics of this model, I use a grounded theorizing
approach (Strauss & Corbin, 2008), which reveals that the marriage of two alternatives is
characterized by four tensions. At the outcome level, an ongoing tension between
compliance and proactivity is salient. Three other tensions also shape the characteristics
of the model: decoupling versus integration, control over means versus ends, and
harmonization versus distinctiveness. I have identified the underlying mechanisms that
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sustain these tensions, which will be explained in detail. I argue that these tensions are
constructive, and that the hybrid model requires the tensions to be managed in balance.
This research is important for several reasons. Theoretically, it represents a case which is
currently deemed extreme (Hällgren, Rouleau, & de Rond, 2018) but seems to be an
emerging and growing model. This model extends the field of self-regulation.
Conventional forms of ISR and government regulation have shortcomings, especially
with respect to producing truly proactive outcomes when doing so is costly. However, the
heightening magnitude, urgency, and complexity of environmental issues demand urgent
solutions. As such, efficient coordination mechanisms to respond to a taxing collective
responsibility of business, such as closing the resource loops, remain underexplored. On
the one hand, voluntary self-regulation is costly and might not be shaped organically; and
even if business takes action, it might not lead to the innovative results expected. On the
other hand, government regulation in such a new field may hinder innovation by
establishing command-and-control regimes and setting compliance-based requirements
on individual firms. The proposed model can prevent such problems.
Moreover, studies on group efforts for sustainability often assume that participants, such
as firms and government, are cooperative. This study, however, investigates a context
with minimal collaboration among firms, governments, and stakeholders, where firms do
not shape a self-regulatory regime, nor do different actors collaborate to help the
consequent government regulation succeed. My findings suggest that achieving a circular
economy is possible in the absence of organically shaped cooperative relationships; in
fact, a confrontational relationship that is defined aptly and managed continuously can
also generate the expected outcomes. This finding is particularly important for
sustainability challenges which require urgent measures to be taken by business.
Formation of collaborative relationships may take many years, and our present
environmental situation does not afford the luxury of long-term norm-based institution
formation processes that engender such collaboration. When firms are unlikely to take
proactive and timely self-regulatory regimes, a hybrid model can deliver better outcomes.
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This thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I review the literature to frame the
research question. In Chapter 3, I explain the specific context for my research (i.e., the
MHSW programs in Ontario) and the research process. In Chapter 4, I develop the case
narrative that reflects how the programs evolved over nearly four decades, which is
relevant for comparing the hybrid model with the two conventional alternatives (ISR and
government regulation). Chapter 5 explores the dualities and ongoing tensions that
characterize the hybrid model. In Chapter 6, I explain the hybrid model and discuss the
pertinent theory. Chapter 7 explains how this research contributes to our knowledge
about collective actions that can facilitate the circular economy and other collective
responsibilities of firms in general, its contributions to practice, the limitations of this
case study, the proposed future research, and conclusions.
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Chapter 2

2

Theoretical Overview

In Chapter 1, we noticed how firms have historically been preoccupied with mere
acquisition and transformation of raw materials, disregarding the higher-level resource
cycles in the natural environment, and how society’s expectation of business with respect
to closing resource loops has surged in recent years. When a new set of expectations
emerge in society, business may adopt different actions to align with these expectations.
In a conceptual endeavour, Rivera et al. (2009) categorize these strategies in six groups.
At the highest level of cooperation, business responds to societal-level expectations by
adopting independent self-regulation and taking leadership in environmental protection
proactively; such a response is beyond compliance as there is no policy to comply with
yet, and the action is taken on a voluntary basis. In contrast, the other five business
strategies are business responses when regulation is already imposed, or at least
impending. These five strategies include acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance,
and finally, manipulation as the most resistant strategy, where business aggressively
challenges the environmental policy (Rivera et al., 2009). Put differently, business can
either voluntarily and proactively respond to emerging societal-level expectations, even
before government policy mechanisms are activated, or it can play with government
regulation in one way or another. Each of these approaches might be taken by an
individual firm or by a group of them (i.e., an industry).4
When a collective of firms responds to emerging expectations, members need to
coordinate their efforts among themselves. In this chapter, I review the literature on how
business coordinates and responds to societal and environmental expectations. Research
has explored such collective responses in the form of voluntary collective actions and
industry self-regulation (ISR), analyzing how the collective efforts are shaped and how
the incumbents coordinate among themselves. Furthermore, although these strategies are

4

Following the tradition of the literature, the term “industry” is used here to refer to a collective of firms
that shares specific interests and commonalities in the context of discourse. I may also use “the industry” to
refer to a particular group in the context of this study.
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generally built on the explicit or implicit assumption of proactivity (i.e., the voluntariness
of the self-regulatory regimes), the literature has also acknowledged that exogenous
actors may intervene in these actions in various ways and at various stages. I review the
literature on such interventions as the starting point of this phenomenon-driven research.

2.1 Conventional Collective Actions to Protect the
Commons
Those entities, such as individuals or groups, that share an interest may choose to pool
their resources, set rules, and take actions collectively to serve their collective interest
(Olson, 1965). Collective actions arise when the efforts of two or more actors are
required to accomplish an outcome (Sandler, 2015). Collective action may also preserve
the collective good: one which, if provided to one group member, cannot be withheld
from any of the other members (Oliver, 1993; Olson, 1965). If one entity’s use of a
collective good precludes the others’ use, the collective good is known as “rivalrous.”
Such goods are generally known as “common goods” or “commons,” and include goods
like fisheries or public parking lots. These common goods might be regulated by
governments, but they can also be managed by people negotiating rules through
traditions, norms, and practices (Ostrom, Gardner, & Walker, 1994). If collective goods
are not rivalrous, they are typically labelled as “public goods,” a category which include
items such as roads, educational systems, and legal systems (Apesteguia & MaierRigaud, 2006; Helfrich, 2012).
Collective actions control common goods, as short-term self-interests generally fail to
satisfy collective interests. Using common resources will benefit the single entity at the
costs to the collective, resulting in “the tragedy of the commons,” one type of market
failure (Hardin, 1968, 1994). Collective actions can prevent these failures and thus, have
been long studied by researchers. As Oliver (1993) discusses, many formal models of
collective action seek to build on independent actions that ultimately change the broader
landscape in an evolutionary process. Those studies of collective action that address
common goods deal with concepts such as reciprocity, achieving benefits, and free riding
(Ostrom, 1990, 2000b, 2010a; Ostrom et al., 1994).
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Collective action is a broad concept that has been studied in a variety of fields. Collective
actions can be used by collective protestors to achieve social change in the form of social
movements (e.g. Schneiberg, King, & Smith, 2008; Sine & Lee, 2009), by entrepreneurs
to gain socio-political legitimacy or shape a favourable regulated environment (Gurses &
Ozcan, 2015; Lawrence, Hardy, & Phillips, 2002), or by industry associations to promote
and protect members’ agendas (David, Sine, & Haveman, 2013; Greenwood, Suddaby, &
Hinings, 2002). Among these broad areas in the literature, the focus of this research is on
those actions taken by industry members—that is, members of a group of firms that share
an interest, even if they do not belong to one formally established “industry” or do not
include all members that share the same interest. This specific type of collective action is
known as ISR (Marques, 2017)F.

2.2 Industry Self-Regulation
ISR is a coordinated effort to set the rules of business by firms in an industry (Berchicci
& King, 2007; King et al., 2012), typically done by an industry-level (as opposed to
governmental or firm-level) organization (Gunningham & Rees, 1997), such as an
industry association (Héritier & Eckert, 2009). Self-regulation is an institutional
complement to existing government regulatory processes (Gupta & Lad, 1983). As a
subset of collective actions, ISR is still a somewhat broad concept. With respect to what
is being regulated, industry can regulate market entry (e.g., professional licences
mandated and coordinated by industry-level organizations, such as medical councils),
establish standards for uniform operations (e.g., safety standards), or, in specific contexts,
set rates (e.g., harmonized prices) (Gunningham & Rees, 1997; Gupta & Lad, 1983). In
recent years, with increasing social and environmental concerns, self-regulatory regimes
mostly revolve around such concerns (Baron, 2016).
This research focuses on those actions that are taken in response to a collective
responsibility (King et al., 2012). Collective responsibilities exist when business imposes
externalities on other stakeholders by inefficiently using communal resources without
paying for them. Often, the rights of these common goods are not clearly defined and
protected (Helfrich, 2012); therefore, firms exploiting them can breach the rights of other
stakeholders or pose a harm to society. The response of business to these collective
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responsibilities should be inclusive across the industry, because all firms share them. In
practice, however, not all self-regulations are inclusive. For instance, in one form of selfregulation known as “certification programs,” some firms opt to participate to signal their
superior performance and enjoy specific benefits almost individually (e.g. Blackman &
Rivera, 2011).
Self-regulation can be a preventative strategy: in response to the externalities created by
business, stakeholders may attempt to impose the costs on firms, which may lead to
stakeholder sanctions such as campaigns led by environmental NGOs. By shaping an
action collectively, firms can take the lead and coordinate to avoid such costly sanctions.
Research has demonstrated that self-regulated firms are less likely to be targeted by
confrontational activists, as these firms are harder targets if a campaign is launched
(Baron, 2012; Gupta & Innes, 2014).
Self-regulation is also a strategy to forestall or impact potential government regulatory
regimes when new expectations are emerging. As noted, scholars have identified various
strategies that firms may employ to take the lead, collaborate with policy makers, or resist
the public policy or its formation process (see Hillman, Keim, & Schuler, 2004 for a
review). Self-regulation is basically known as a cooperative tactic that proactively
surpasses the expected compliance level (Rivera et al., 2009). Nevertheless, this
“proactive” tactic might be utilized to pre-empt or weaken stringent government
regulation (Darnall & Sides, 2008; Johnston, 2006; King et al., 2012) or be influential in
forging future regulations (Delmas & Terlaak, 2001; Lee, 2009).
A well-identified trigger of ISR is catastrophic past events. For example, in the context of
the chemical industry, the Responsible Care program was formed after a tragic accident
in a Union Carbide facility killed approximately 10,000 people in Bhopal, India (Fauchart
& Cowan, 2014; Rees, 1997). Industry, as a whole, receives considerable benefits by
establishing voluntary programs. The positive outcomes often spill over to all of the firms
in a given industry, even if some have not participated in the program (Lenox, 2006).
Conversely, a negative event for one firm in the industry can result in less harm for the
others, such as less reduction in stock prices of other firms (Barnett & King, 2008).
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Upon introduction of a self-regulatory regime, individual firms may opt to participate for
various reasons. Participation demonstrates member firms’ responsiveness to stakeholder
wants, which helps reputation-sensitive firms protect their social licence to operate
(Gunningham, Thornton, & Kagan, 2005). Participating in some of these programs can
secure access to technical assistance for individual firms (Khanna, 2001), reduce the cost
of compliance, or create producer benefit (Blackman & Rivera, 2011; Maxwell &
Decker, 2006). Voluntary actions may even create competitive advantage for firms when
public awareness about environmental protection is noticeable (Arora & Cason, 1995).

2.3 The Outcomes and Effectiveness of Self-Regulation
Business argues that, compared to imposed government regulations, voluntary initiatives
are not only more efficient and less costly, but can also foster innovation and go beyond
the baseline requirements (King et al., 2012). Yet, empirical works do not always support
this thesis. For example, in a study on the Responsible Care program, King and Lenox
(2000) demonstrate that in the absence of an “iron fist” for sanctioning, participants did
not improve their environmental performance faster than other industry members did.
Howard, Nash, and Ehrenfeld (2000) assert that self-reporting by the firms participating
in Responsible Care merely reflected those firms’ internal standards, which may not
conform with expected standard practices and institutional norms (see also HowardGrenville, Nash, & Coglianese, 2008). Similarly, in the context of ski recreation facilities,
Rivera and de Leon (2004) observe that participants of a sustainability voluntary
program, despite acquiescing to respond to institutional pressures, were more likely to
achieve lower ratings in third-party environmental assessments compared to nonparticipants.
Overall, although voluntary environmental initiatives are diverse, empirical works have
found that those actions that are not monitored by third parties and lack performance
standards have not enhanced firms’ social and environmental performance (Borck &
Coglianese, 2009; Darnall & Sides, 2008; King & Lenox, 2000). Barnett and King (2008)
suggest that the ultimate purpose of such programs (e.g., environmental performance)
might have been misunderstood and replaced with disclosure of information about the
environmental performance of firms, but stakeholders may deem the information per se a
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benefit of the program. The advantage of collective initiatives to society improves upon
imposing tighter requirements and control mechanisms, such as third-party monitoring
and verification, public disclosure of the results, and sanctioning non-compliers by
expelling them from the program (King & Lenox, 2000; Lenox & Nash, 2003). Still,
enforcement is the Achilles’ heel of conventional ISR (Héritier & Eckert, 2009).

2.4 The Many Shades of Voluntariness
The literature on collective action and ISR generally assumes that such actions are shaped
voluntarily. For instance, in the so-called “green clubs,” as one type of self-regulation,
upon formation of the initiative by a firm (or group of firms), other impacted individual
firms, based on their heterogeneous motivations and incentives, follow independent cost
and benefit assessments and decide whether or not to join the club (Blackman & Rivera,
2011; Potoski & Prakash, 2013; Prakash & Potoski, 2007).
Furthermore, scholars studying collective action have warned policy makers about the
disadvantages of intervening in voluntary initiatives (Ostrom, 2000a). Evidence suggests
that when normative mechanisms shape and manage a collective action, external
regulation can “crowd out” the participation of actors. Such exogenous interventions can
impact intrinsic motivations and consequently harm the outcomes of the action (Beretti,
Figuières, & Grolleau, 2013; Frey, 1994; Montgomery & Bean, 1999; Ostrom, 2000a;
Reeson & Tisdell, 2008).
Nevertheless, purely voluntary actions by firms may not be as ubiquitous as expected. In
many cases, even if a collective action to protect the commons has been shaped
voluntarily, participation of individual firms is due to some form of external forces, such
as peer pressure. In collective actions with higher external forces, provisions might be in
place to resolve information asymmetry and identify free riders, followed by a type of
penalization mechanism for non-compliant actors. For these reasons, collective actions
are sometimes identified as “quasi-voluntary” (Ostrom, 2000a). External pressures
generally increase the costs of neglect.
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The same mechanisms apply to ISR. At the collective level, the literature has long
identified the role of costs, demonstrating that industries regulate themselves when the
cost of adopting a self-regulation program would be less than the externally imposed
costs from not undertaking self-regulation (Gupta & Lad, 1983: 421). At the individual
level, the same cost-benefit mechanism applies to a firm’s decision of whether or not to
join the existing self-regulatory program. External pressures, such as activists’ boycotts
and government regulation, are serious threats that urge or coerce firms to adopt ISR
(Baron, 2016; Egorov & Harstad, 2017; Maxwell, Lyon, & Hackett, 2000).
Arguably, when the costs of non-participation exceed a certain level, posing high risks to
firms, the nature of the program will become far from voluntary. Under such pressures,
some reluctant firms may resort to ceremonial adoption, adopting practices that are
decoupled from the firm’s core operations in a way that does not generate the ultimate
expected outcomes (Bromley & Powell, 2012). One example is the ceremonial adoption
of ISO 14000 standards (Boiral, 2007), where firms meet official requirements without
realizing the expected superior environmental performance (Arimura, Darnall, Ganguli,
& Katayama, 2016; Blackman & Rivera, 2011; Gamper-Rabindran & Finger, 2013). In
this way, ISR can become merely a low-cost response to exogenous pressures—a
response that decouples either self-imposed policy from practices, or practices from the
intended outcome (Bromley & Powell, 2012).

2.5 Government Intervention in Self-Regulation
Scholars have long noticed the ubiquity of exogenous intervention in self-regulatory
regimes, especially by governments (Gunningham & Rees, 1997; Huyse & Parmentier,
1990; King et al., 2012). In general, every regulatory regime constitutes two main
activities: (1) rule setting and (2) enforcement (i.e., deciding how compliance with the
rules will be monitored, controlled, and sanctioned, if necessary). Government may
influence or intervene in either of these stages in different ways.
Very few studies have delved into self-regulation in the government’s shadow (Egorov &
Harstad, 2017). In an early attempt to explore these interventions, Rees (1988) identified
three types of self-regulation based on government intervention. In voluntary self-
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regulation, government has no direct intervention. In mandated full self-regulation,
government sanctions and monitors the regulation from a distance, but completely
outsources both rule setting and enforcement to industry. Finally, in mandated partial
self-regulation, industry partially regulates itself; in other words, government
relinquishes either rule setting or enforcement to industry, but not both (Rees, 1988).
As such, “self-regulation” can be a deceptive concept (Gunningham & Rees, 1997).
Whereas this term conveys endogenous coordination (as opposed to direct government
regulation), it is sometimes created, evolved, or enforced by actors that are exogenous to
the industry, such as regulators (King et al., 2012; Rees, 1988). The involvement of
strong exogenous actors, including regulators, blurs the boundaries of a case of selfregulation.
Scholars of policy have not only acknowledged this interaction, but also found it
potentially useful. Huyse and Parmentier (1990) discuss that, beyond the pure models of
government regulation and self-regulation, there is an overlooked grey area that is run by
“sponsored regulation,” where the state encourages the formation of norms by various
private parties. Although their arguments mainly revolve around norm formation and
codes of conduct, these scholars also reiterate the need for further work on this grey area.
Another attempt, albeit in the context of law and policy making, was made by Priest
(1997), who proposed five models of self-regulation with different degrees of power
delegation from government to industry.
Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the various alternative institutional solutions to
address market failure. Two of the solutions are pure models: voluntary action by
industry and government regulation. The two other solutions are derivatives of selfregulation in which elements of government regulation are used to secure the formation
or implementation of the required action to protect the environment. Figure 1 graphically
demonstrates the pure and mixed models considering the role of business and government
in rule setting and enforcement stages.
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Table 1. Pure and Rees’s (1988) Mixed Regulatory Regimes

Main Mixed Forms

Pure Forms

Type of Action

Process of Regulation
Rule Setting Enforcement (Control and
Sanctioning)

Instances of
Representative
Literature

Conventional
Collective Action
and Voluntary ISR

By business

Government
Regulation

By
government

Mandated Full SelfRegulation

By business

(King & Lenox,
2000; Ostrom,
1990; Ostrom et
al., 1994)
Brewer & DeLeon,
1983; Sabatier,
1975
Rees, 1988; see
also Huyse &
Parmentier, 1990

Mandated Partial
Self-Regulation

By business

Ranging from no
enforcement to internal
monitoring or third-party
voluntary certification
By judicial power and
governmental coercion
By business, but monitored
by government to ensure
effectiveness
By government

By
government

By business

Business

Voluntary ISR
Two Types of Mandated Partial Self-Regulation

Government

Actors

Mandated Full Self-Regulation

Government Regulation
Rule Setting

Enforcement
Stages of Regulation

Figure 1. Representation of Pure Regulatory Forms and Rees’s (1988) Mixed Forms
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Each of the regulatory models has its own shortcomings. ISR has been criticized for
industry avoidance and delay in self-regulation, a lack of transparency (as it is run by the
private sector), free riding and inadequate incentives to ensure wide-scale participation,
and weak outcomes due to ineffective endogenous compliance and enforcement
mechanisms, among other reasons (Egorov & Harstad, 2017; King et al., 2012;
Rubenstein, 2011). Yet, government regulation involves common drawbacks as well: it is
a costly and lengthy process to establish such regulation, it may not be designed with
effective industry practices and efficiency in mind, and government may lack the
resources to monitor and closely enforce the implemented regulation. Most importantly,
government regulation often results in compliance, as designing a regulatory instrument
to generate innovation is difficult; in fact, studies on the relationship between government
regulation and innovative results have given no consistent results (Blind, 2012; Blind,
Petersen, & Riillo, 2017).
Mixed alternatives can solve many of these drawbacks, if not all of them. Free riding may
be reduced when government manages the enforcement of a self-regulatory regime, and
the outcomes may improve to different degrees, dependent on how closely government is
involved. With respect to rule setting, again, the result may improve with government
intervention as governments may set higher standards than industries would if let to their
own discretion. Although the proposed mixed models in the past literature may not solve
all of the common problems completely, new combinations of the two can be extremely
useful. The grey area between the two pure forms of regulation can provide a fertile area
for further innovative combinations (Rubenstein, 2011; Sinclair, 1997).
Therefore, rather than adopting a dichotomous view that separates government regulation
and ISR, scholars of policy have noticed the advantages of innovative combinations of
the two alternatives (Rubenstein, 2011; Sinclair, 1997). With increasing pressures on
firms to protect the natural environment—and with the understanding that external
pressure can enhance firms’ environmental and social performance (Tashman & Rivera,
2016)—scholars are recognizing the complex nature of exogenous pressures in selfregulatory practices which are conventionally deemed voluntary, such as the role of
regulatory settings (Arimura et al., 2016).
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2.6 The Need for New Models of Self-Regulation for the
Circular Economy
The shortcomings of the existing models of government regulation and self-regulatory
regimes are particularly noticeable in the area of environmental sustainability. As
described in Chapter 1, the concept of the circular economy suggests new approaches to
change the dominant models of doing business and close material loops with the aim of
improving sustainability. To meet this ambitious goal, the circular economy primarily
calls for business to utilize its innovation capabilities. Changing business models, ecodesign of products, and sustainability-oriented innovation are among the key drivers of
this change (European Environment Agency, 2016). Implementing these solutions on a
grand scale, however, is extremely challenging. On the one hand, such innovative
transformations require costly changes in design, supply, and operations—and some
industries will carry higher costs than others. For instance, many businesses would need
to replace their raw materials with resources that are more environmentally friendly, but
less available and harder to use. On the other hand, the circular economy and relevant
concepts such as extended producer responsibility imply that business should accept the
responsibility of downstream waste and manage it innovatively and sustainably; this
often means expanded operations and increased costs.
The economic ramifications of closing resource loops have meaningful implications for
those aiming to foster a circular economy, such as policy makers and managers. As
Moreau et al. (2017) discuss, the circular economy exemplifies the essential role of
institutions in distributing costs among economic agents. As these costs have historically
been covered by governments via tax systems, shifting them to business requires new
institutional regimes. Yet, existing regulations may safeguard private interests, which
could hinder the evolution of institutions to shift the responsibility for externalities
(Moreau et al., 2017; Vatn, 2009). Hence, the question remains: Under what social,
economic, or political conditions are the proposed strategies for a circular economy likely
to succeed (Bocken et al., 2017)? More relevant to this research, we need to understand
which regulatory regimes can facilitate the costly transition to a circular economy.
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The shortcomings of the aforesaid regulatory alternatives curb their potential in pursuing
a circular economy. In addition, these alternatives are problematic in transferring the
responsibility of post-consumption materials to business, for two major reasons. First,
managing post-consumer materials poses significant operational costs for firms;
therefore, large-scale voluntary business-driven solutions may hardly take form. Second,
given business’s reluctance to take voluntary action, governments may instead impose
regulation, which creates a secondary challenge. Government regulation tends to translate
society- and collective-level issues into individual-level mandates. For instance, cap-andtrade systems to manage greenhouse gas emissions adopt methodologies that convert the
overall carbon cap to a firm’s mandate in managing its externalities. However, based on
the existing socially evolved means to manage post-consumption materials, consumer
waste is collected and managed in an aggregated system in which consumers dispose of
all waste in one or a few categories, regardless of subcategories and manufacturers.
Therefore, requiring individual firms to collect and manage their used products from
consumers will create new challenges for which easy and optimal solutions may not exist.
In summary, the type of regulatory regimes to realize such a large transformation towards
a circular economy are of critical importance but are not readily available.
More importantly, when firms avoid taking voluntary action and government imposes
regulation, an even more critical difficulty may unfold in the long term. In essence, the
circular economy calls for innovation at all levels, especially in developing new business
models as well as the needed technology to close material loops. If firms resist taking on
this responsibility, government regulators could be urged to set the mechanisms needed
to coordinate individual firms’ actions towards post-consumer material management. The
more business avoids this responsibility, the more likely it is that government regulators
will establish further structures. Nevertheless, organizing with too much structure
discourages the proactivity and innovation of the system (Mintzberg, 1979; Sandhu &
Kulik, 2018). In other words, when an official regulation is imposed, firms often seek
compliance to avoid penalties of non-compliance. Yet, compliance-driven responses are
far from the proactivity that the circular economy needs. Hence, it is hard to imagine how
waste-driven regulation can spur the high level of industry proactivity required to propel
a circular economy.
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The need for new regulatory models should also be sought in the philosophical
distinction between the two concepts of collective and shared responsibility. The ISR
literature often touches on collective responsibility, where action is taken “to respond to a
shared threat and protect members from stakeholders” (King et al., 2012: 106). In
responding to a collective responsibility, all firms, regardless of their individual
performances, are made accountable for the collective performance (Fauchart & Cowan,
2014). An illustrative example is reputation commons, where a member’s action may
have a spillover effect on the collectivity, regardless of how other members act, because
the stakeholders are unable or unwilling to distinguish among the members (Barnett,
2006; Fauchart & Cowan, 2014; King, Lenox, & Barnett, 2002).
Across the ISR literature, the concept of collective responsibility is sometimes used
interchangeably with that of shared responsibility; however, policy and ethics scholars
have highlighted differences between the two. Whereas a collective responsibility rests
on the collective in its entirety, a shared responsibility is distributable to a multiplicity of
actors that contribute to a harmful outcome (Nollkaemper, 2018). Following Erskine, I
refer to shared responsibility as “responsibility that is necessarily distributive among the
individual members of a collectivity for outcomes that can only be achieved when they
act in concert” (Erskine, 2014: 134).
This distributivity constitutes a key difference between the two concepts. Collective
responsibility has been criticized for not only diluting the responsibility of each
individual, but precluding the observers (e.g., stakeholders or enforcers) from
determining the true source of any harm, since the ultimate bearer of responsibility is
basically individuals, not the collective (Narveson, 2002). With respect to this potential
problem, Erskine (2014), discussing shared responsibility, suggests that individual
constituents of a group action may bear even greater responsibility than they would bear
for individual actions; this observation reflects the complex nature of shared
responsibility. Shared responsibility is not the simple aggregation of individual
responsibilities, because the actors are not usually isolated. They interact and their
interconnection influences the outcome, and thus, the scope of the others actors’
responsibility (Nollkaemper, 2018). Interestingly, waste management has been widely
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viewed as a shared responsibility of all involved actors, both by researchers (de Lorena
Diniz Chaves, dos Santos Jr, Rocha, & Mara Santana Rocha, 2014) and by policy makers
(Association of Municipalities of Ontario, 2005). Arguably, a model that draws on
collective industry actions to realize a circular economy should make it possible to trace
the responsibility to the individual firm responses too.
These gaps in the research demand new models which propose innovative mixes of
regulatory regimes. Given their explained limitations, none of the existing models can
propel the circular economy, and pursuing more of them does not resolve these
constraints. Most significantly, the circular economy needs immediate innovative
solutions for various types of material resources; yet none of the aforementioned models
can secure this outcome. Hence, instead of pursuing more of each alternative, we must
develop novel combinations that may drive the transition in different contexts.
As I explain in the next chapter, the context of this research is the evidence of the
shortcomings of previous models and how the need for new ones, in an environment with
non-cooperative actors, gave birth to a hybrid regulatory regime through an evolutionary
process. The level to which, in this context, government regulation and self-regulation are
amalgamated towards a circular economy is unprecedented, to the best of my knowledge.
We need to better understand the complexities of the interactions between government
regulation and self-regulation (Mills, 2016) and how they can coordinate effectively.
Coordination is generally viewed as organizing human and physical assets within some
interdependent system to efficiently produce a value (Camerer & Knez, 1996; Lawrence
& Lorsch, 1967; March & Simon, 1958; Thompson, 1967). However, not every set of
purposeful and interdependent actions to generate a value is coordinated. That is,
organizations may choose to act together, whether voluntarily or under external coercion,
without establishing solid mechanisms for deliberate coordination. Further, different
forms of coordination may generate different levels of efficiency.
In the context of this research, coordination materializes through the process of
regulation, which involves both rule setting and enforcement. An effective and efficient
regulatory regime could pave the path to a circular economy. To this end, I aim to answer
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the question: How can business and government coordinate their actions to realize a
circular economy?
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Chapter 3

3

Research Context, Data, and Methodology

To address the research question, I conducted an inductive embedded single case study
using a combination of longitudinal and grounded theorizing approaches. In the context
of my research, various firms from different industries were interacting with regulators in
managing post-consumer waste. Across nearly four decades, the interactions took
different forms, from minimal voluntary involvement of business to a stringent regulatory
regime to a hybrid model of co-regulation in which both parties were involved in rule
setting and enforcement. This latter stage is the primary focus of the research, as it
directly addresses the research question. However, what happened prior to the formation
of the hybrid model is of crucial importance in understanding the hybrid model, its
essential elements, and its advantages over the two pure regulatory models. Thus, the
study embraces both a longitudinal investigation of the history of the phenomenon and a
deep analysis of the hybrid model. In this chapter, I detail the study’s context, data, and
methodology.

3.1 Household Hazardous Waste Management in Ontario
This study investigates past programs that have been developed to handle a group of postconsumer materials, officially and collectively known in the regulation as the Municipal
Hazardous or Special Waste (MHSW) program in Ontario, Canada. MHSW is a category
of the broader post-consumer waste management system, as defined by Ontario
Regulation 387/16. In practice, MHSW includes nine main groups of materials, namely
paint and coatings and their containers, pressurized containers (refillable and nonrefillable), single-use dry cell batteries, antifreeze, fertilizers, oil containers, oil filters,
pesticides, and solvents. In general, Ontario’s non-hazardous post-consumer waste
management programs (e.g., its paper and packaging materials collection and recycling
programs) were systematically launched in the early 1980s, and the MHSW program
followed a few years later, inheriting legacies from non-hazardous materials programs.
Yet, MHSW faced different challenges and evolved on a separate path over the
subsequent decades.
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Both from a financial perspective and with respect to the leadership in transforming the
programs, paint and coatings constitutes the main material group of MHSW. To illustrate,
in 2014, 9,422 tonnes of paint and coating materials were collected—equal to one-third
of all MHSW materials. Eighty-two per cent of the collected paint was recycled. Budgetwise, the highest revenue collected from the MHSW program came from paint and
coating companies. Further, waste paint has a significant environmental impact. It is
estimated that about 10 per cent of paint purchased by consumers remains unused. With
the establishment of the waste paint program, consumers can return their residual paint to
drop-off facilities at municipalities or some retail stores.
With the gradual introduction of waste policies in different provinces across Canada, a
separate sector has evolved in the paint and coatings industry to acts as the industry’s
“compliance vehicle.” Waste programs keep hazardous materials, such as alkyd (or oilbased) paint, away from the natural environment, and return the usable materials to the
consumption cycle. Based on type and quality, most of the collected coating materials are
used to manufacture recycled products with smaller environmental footprints compared
to virgin coatings, incinerated to generate energy, or disposed of safely. Other MHSW
materials also follow similar processes of recycling, recovery, or safe disposal. The costs
of managing these waste materials are often higher than the incomes; therefore, all
involved firms, known as “stewards,” pay a share of the costs of waste management
operations. These costs are generally added to the price of the products, either by adding
a visible handling fee to the consumer’s bill or by burying the fee in the price.
These programs are managed by collectives that are funded by stewards. The collectives
run the operations required for collecting the materials and consequently recycling,
recovering, or disposing of them. Waste collection is usually done at established
facilities, mainly run by municipalities or inside some retail stores. Hauling and other
operations are mostly done by service providers, such as transportation companies and
“recyclers.” Collectives often run the financial processes, internal monitoring, strategy
development, communication and promotion, and reporting to the government bodies.
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The formation of such collective actions has followed different routes in different
Canadian jurisdictions. In Quebec, for instance, a high school teacher with social
entrepreneurial characteristics sparked a rudimentary paint recycling program and urged
the government and business to support it. In some provinces, such as British Columbia,
most initiatives have been shaped after the government encouraged business to take
actions before being forced by regulation. In contrast to such classical forms of collective
action formation, and among all Canadian jurisdictions, Ontario’s MHSW program
appear to be unique, as they were never instigated on a consistent basis before regulation
finally mandated the stewards to collectively take responsibility under an unprecedented
structure that was stringently constrained by government regulation. The imposed
regulation created various conflicts among different stakeholders, such as stewardship
collectives and the municipalities who were being paid by the stewards for their
collection services according to the provincial regulation but were strongly criticized by
the stewards, who viewed them as inefficient. As conflicts continued to soar among the
provincial government and its representative bodies, the stewards (represented by their
collectives), the municipal governments, NGOs, the public, and the media, the stewards
increasingly strived to take more active roles by self-regulation. These dynamics
ultimately led to new approaches by the regulators and adoption of a substitute industryled collective action under provincial regulation (as outlined in later chapters).
Ontario’s MHSW program is unique, because in contrast to other provinces’ programs,
government’s attempts to encourage business to participate failed for a long time; it was
realized only after government’s coercion and went through a particular transition.
Accordingly, this case is important for several reasons. Theoretically, it represents an
emerging type of mixed regulatory regime that extends the field of collective action into a
context where business is not cooperative, and for a purpose that is urgent and collective,
but costly. Practically, such initiatives have strong environment impacts and can facilitate
the circular economy, while involving significant financial transactions. Due to its
novelty, the case of Ontario is closely monitored by many other jurisdictions, both within
and outside Canada, which are developing their post-consumer material systems towards
a circular economy.
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3.2 Data Collection
In order to conduct an inductive study, I collected extensive data from various sources.
The data were collected from May 2016 to the end of 2018, and include the history of the
phenomenon. The data collection process started broadly and unconstrainedly. As data
collection and analysis proceeded, questions and data sources became more specific
towards the research question until I reached data saturation (Langley, 1999; Langley &
Tsoukas, 2016; Strauss & Corbin, 2008), as described in the next sections.
Collecting data from such a multi-stakeholder context with a history of conflict and lack
of trust among actors (i.e., business, government, and other stakeholders) was
challenging. Initial steps were facilitated by a group of stewards, but I continued the
collection process independently. Given the conflict of interests among the actors, this
independence prevented the potential bias in the data. Not surprisingly, some informants
were not readily willing to participate and, in some cases, the informants did not consent
to contribute. In other cases, participation was realized after I explained the ethical
protocols of this research, including the anonymity of participants, the participants’
withdrawal rights, and how the confidential data were protected. Different measures were
taken to protect the data. For instance, in interviews, participants could choose not to be
audio recorded at all or to partially speak off the record when they intended to provide
sensitive information.
The data include a variety of samples from all key actors involved in the phenomenon.
These data were collected through multiple channels, summarized in Table 2 and
discussed below. More details are provided in Appendices.
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Table 2. Data Sources
Source of Data

Quantity of Data

Description

Application

Public
Documents

Voluminous
(enormous body of
data from the
involved
organizations and
other sources)

Different reports, policies,
government regulations,
board meeting minutes,
video-recorded events such as
annual general meetings or
past conferences, media
materials, success stories, etc.

Facts about the process and
events, used both to develop
the narrative and to
triangulate the data from
other sources

Interviews

54 interviews,
average time 92
minutes each, 32
organizations

Semi-structured, with various
key experts from all main
actor groups

Understanding perspectives,
tensions, and
interpretations, making
better sense of history and
process

Internal
Documents

Different records
from an industry, a
few documents
from two other
organizations

Board meeting minutes,
correspondence, memberspecific reports, internal
newsletters

Facts about events, actions,
and salient issues at different
times from the perspective
of the focal organization

35 events over 75
hours in total

Including site visits, industry
conventions, practitioner
conferences, and regulatory
and consultation webinars

Understanding the context,
critical issues from the
perspective of different
actors, current and future
trends, and dynamics among
the actors

Numerous
informal chats and
correspondence

Informal interviews, hallway
conversations, follow-up
emails or phone calls to
inquire about a previously
discussed issue, informal chats
with consumers, storekeepers,
or other involved people

Better understanding the
context, filling the emerging
gaps, finding alternative
sources of data, and
verifying the data or findings

Observations

Supplementary
Sources

3.2.1 Public Documents
Many of the involved organizations from all stakeholder groups, such as collectives of
stewards, governmental bodies involved in regulation and enforcement, NGOs, and
municipalities have published an enormous body of public data in different forms. These
documents include, but are not limited to, comprehensive reports (e.g., annual reports by
the collectives who run the programs); bodies of policies, legislations, regulations, and
guidelines released by the government or its representative organizations; publicly
available board meeting minutes; video recorded events (e.g., annual general meetings of
government bodies or public sessions to introduce policies); news clips; educational and
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promotional materials that explain the programs to consumers; and numerous websites
and webpages. Many of these sources are created due to the legal mandate of the
stewardship companies. Public data were a main source of factual data to understand the
events during the studied period, including the earlier years of program formation.

3.2.2 Interviews
I conducted 54 formal interviews with informed people from all groups of actors
involved in the field, including stewards and industry leaders (e.g., manufacturing
companies, retailers, importers, collective organizations, etc.), service providers
(especially recyclers and consultants), the Ontario provincial government and its relevant
bodies (i.e., regulatory and enforcement bodies), municipal/regional governments in
Ontario, and NGOs involved in the programs. The interviewees were typically among the
most informed people in the field. Many informants had experience in different
stakeholder groups, which had given them broader perspectives. The interviewees were
affiliated with 32 different organizations.
The interviews were semi-structured and in-depth, with an average time of 92 minutes
each. Forty-one interviews were conducted in person (mostly in the informants’ work
setting), eight were conducted by phone, and three by video-conferencing media. The two
other interviews, as requested by the informants, were written5. Most interviews were
completely audio recorded, except for seven interviewees who did not allow recording
the discussions; in these instances, notes were taken instead. Similarly, some parts of
other interviews, as per request, were conducted off the record. Given the sensitivity of
the data, six of the interviewees did not consent to the use of their data in the form of
direct quotations or consented conditionally upon approval by them. Some excerpts of the
interviews will be directly quoted in next chapters as representative data. To protect the
confidentiality of the participants’ identities, each interviewee was identified by a code,
consisting of a letter and a number (e.g., B17). The letter represents four broad actor

5

In calculations, I considered an approximate time for the two written interviews.
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groups: B for Business including firms and stewardship collectives, G for provincial
government and its pertinent organizations, M for municipalities and local governments
as well as their related associations, and S for service providers such as recyclers and
consultants. In addition to the interviewees’ codes, I may also broadly mention their roles
and expertise.
The interview data were a major source of information to help understand the
interpretation of different actors and conflicts among the interests and views of the
complex phenomenon in hand. These data were the main input to the analysis of the
identified dualities and tensions, as described in later chapters.

3.2.3 Internal Documents
Select documents pertaining to the stewardship programs of one of the involved
industries were another valuable source of data. Documents included selected board
meeting minutes, correspondence, internal reports, industry annual reports or reports
about a specific subject, member-specific industry documents, and internal
bulletins/newsletters for members of an industry. Although the provided documents were
not as extensive as the public data, they were extremely valuable as they were mostly
confidential or not provided to outsiders, and embodied retrospective but relatively
reliable data about the events, actions taken by the industry, and positions held at
different points in time. These documents reflect how the salience of the issues from the
perspective of the industry had changed over time, and how new challenges, tensions, and
perspectives have evolved, especially over the last decade. In addition, a few other
organizations also shared a number of their documents on specific subjects.

3.2.4 Non-Participant Observations
I visited different pertinent sites (e.g., recycling plants and waste collection depots),
attended industry and recycling events (e.g., board meetings and conferences held by an
industry or a research-practice institute), and participated in different online webinars
(e.g., those held by governmental bodies to introduce regulation or by service providers
to promote their services). The purpose of these observations was twofold: to understand
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the context and technical aspects of waste management, and to better capture the
underlying dynamics and unnoticed data that might otherwise have been missed.
My observations were complemented by note taking and informal conversations. In many
cases, observation fed into other data collection methods, such as interviews. Overall, 75
hours were spent on 35 observation opportunities.

3.2.5 Supplementary Sources
Data were also complemented with follow-up emails, phone calls, hallway conversations,
and informal and unrecorded short interviews, both with people involved in providing
other sources of data or with new people, such as consumers, store representatives, or site
staff. These data had various planned or unplanned applications. They were collected to
provide a broader and multi-faceted perspective of the phenomenon. They were also used
to fill the emerging gaps through the research process, including ambiguities and any
questions that evolved during the analysis. In some cases, interim findings were also
discussed in these friendly conversations, which provided opportunities for collecting
further data or confirmation of the findings.
The above five sources of data were complementary, but they also allowed me to
triangulate the data (Yin, 2016). For instance, I tested the precision of data supplied by
different informants by tracking the interview data in reliable documents, or fact
checking with informants from other stakeholder groups. The same process was used to
control for potential social desirability, which is likely in such contexts. Triangulation
was especially critical in understanding events and actions at different times. For
example, a claim on the proactivity and voluntariness of an action by business was
controlled by comparing the data from two conflicting stakeholders and from documents
that may reject the claim. However, where the data involved interpretation rather than
facts, triangulation was not required to provide evidence for the data’s “correctness.”
Analysis of the data began almost simultaneously with its collection. Therefore, the focus
of data collection gradually shifted from understanding the general trends and events to
the actions during the later stages in which the two alternatives were mixed, how actors
perceive the issues, and the contradictions between their perceptions.
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3.3 Analysis
The analysis followed an emergent approach. I first adopted a general longitudinal
approach (Langley, 1999; Langley, Smallman, Tsoukas, & Vane Ven, 2013; Langley &
Tsoukas, 2016) to understand the evolution of regulatory regimes. Yet, as the analysis
advanced and I explored the formation of a hybrid regime, I shifted the focus from the
process to the hybrid model in an attempt to explore its structure and characteristics. At
this step of the analysis, I used the classical grounded theorizing method (Strauss &
Corbin, 2008). Ultimately, I compared the characteristics of the hybrid model with those
of the previous stages of the process. Overall, the analysis followed a four-step process. I
used Atlas.ti qualitative software (version 8.1), complemented with spreadsheets and
other means.

3.3.1 Step 1: Developing the Narrative Based on Historical Data
The first step of my analysis aimed to explore and ascertain the “truth” and “facts”
concerning the events (Gephart, 2004), such as the imposition of a regulation at a certain
time or the formal initiation of a program. By reviewing a variety of data sources, I
identified all of the events and actions that could influence the phenomenon. I soon
realized that I needed to understand hazardous waste management within the entirety of
general waste management in Ontario, as the MHSW program is a subset of the general
consumer waste system there. The formation of waste management discourse in Ontario
dates back to the 1950s, but the first major event pertinent to the existing programs was
launched in 1981, which I set as the start point of my temporal analysis. To organize the
data, I created a log file and the data were triangulated to resolve potential conflicts, not
least those past events that were not adequately documented.
While working with these types of verifiable data, I was simultaneously collecting
descriptive data (i.e., data that reflect the rationale behind the actions and perspectives of
different actors). The goal was to ensure that in addition to the events, I identify the
underlying reasons of the actions as well as the reactions and consequences; these would
be required for the next steps of my theory development.

36

The data provided a thorough representation of the formation and transformation of the
MHSW management. On that basis, I wrote a rich chronological case narrative on
managing waste in Ontario (Jarzabkowski, Lê, & Balogun, 2018; Langley, 1999). The
data demonstrated that although the MHSW program was a subset of the general waste
management system, it faced different challenges and followed a different path. The
output of this step is summarized in a narrative and a temporal map, reflecting three
stages: unfulfilled self-regulation, government regulation, and hybridization (presented in
further detail in Chapter 4). Through this process, an initial collective-oriented regulation
was shaped by the government, faced various conflicts, and ultimately evolved into a
hybrid model of action that is co-regulated by business and government. The data also
demonstrated the extensive conflicts among the stakeholders and how the transformation
occurred as the actors interacted through the process.

3.3.2 Step 2: Understanding the Structure of the Hybrid Model
During step 1, continual reference to the existing literature revealed that the first two
identified stages (i.e., unfulfilled self-regulation and government regulation) are almost
consistent with the existing knowledge, but the hybridization stage has unique
characteristics that appear to be unprecedented. Thus, in step 2, I focused on investigating
the hybrid model. By temporal bracketing (Langley, 1999) of the hybridization process, I
studied the patterns of actions by different actors throughout this process. The results
showed how during this stage, business and government were both involved in coregulating (i.e., setting the rules and enforcing them). This step allowed me to simplify
the recurring patterns and propose a model for hybrid regulation.

3.3.3 Step 3: Characterizing the Hybrid Model
During the previous steps, I noticed that the hybrid regulation is characterized by
contradicting issues that form constructive tensions throughout the process. Tension, in
this sense, is defined as the state of “two phenomena in a dynamic relationship that
involve both competition and complementarity” (English, 2001; Epstein, Buhovac, &
Yuthas, 2015). To capture the characteristics of the hybrid model, I bracketed the
hybridization stage and followed grounded theorizing. I started by “tagging”—an open
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coding process (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), labelled in accordance with Jay (2013). Tagging
helps to compartmentalize data into building blocks of concepts. The specific goal was to
create grounded codes that could represent the dynamics of the collective action. I began
by asking of the data: What issues emerged throughout the process, and what created
contradictions (such as disagreements or concerns) among the actors? This dual question
aimed to generate the tags on underlying tensions and dualities and categorize the data
into building blocks of tensions.
After some progress in tagging, I started “theming.” Themes are higher-level codes that
reflect recurring factors or mechanisms in more abstract bundles of the identified tags
(Jay, 2013). Theming was performed based on the guidelines for axial coding (Glaser &
Strauss, 1967; Miles & Huberman, 1984). I expected the themes to reflect recurring
factors or mechanisms that created tensions in more abstract bundles. I repeatedly asked:
Why should this tag be categorized under this theme and not the others? Further, why
should this theme be distinct from the other themes? Tagging and theming involved
iterative analysis of the data and several shifts between them.
Theming was followed by theorizing—a more high-level conceptual effort to group
themes into abstract aggregations. I noticed that the emerging themes were referring to
contradictory concepts; for instance, two notions of compliance with regulation and going
beyond regulation were noticeably shaping a “duality.” In fact, the themes represented
the mechanisms that engender the tensions within the dualities. Theorizing involved
working with the data and referring to existing knowledge, such as how the ISR literature
has approached proactivity. By working deliberately with themes that still have unclear
boundaries and need further clarification, I repeatedly consolidated, disambiguated, or
deleted the previously generated codes, including tags and themes. In some cases,
theorizing also revealed the need for further data collection in order to address the
conceptual gaps.
My theorization generated four aggregated dualities that provide the ground for tensions:
compliance versus proactivity; decoupling versus integration, control over means versus
ends; and harmonization versus distinctiveness. Certain aspects of some of these tensions
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have been noted in the extant body of research on collective actions, ISR, or the circular
economy, but others are new. Figure 2 presents the grounded theorizing and how it
generated the mechanisms that create four salient tensions.
First-Order Tags

Second-Order Themes

- Extent and scope of government regulations
- Means for business to influence regulation

Boundaries of Formal
Regulation

- Curbing actions by augmenting requirements
- Negotiating aspirational targets
-

Stringency of Regulation

- Economies of scale
- Scale as transformer
- Global uniqueness and leadership

Program Scale

- Discharging responsibilities to industry
funding organizations (IFOs)
- Emphasis on ensuring a “level playing field”

Responsibility
Positioning

- Consumer sensitivity to visible fees
- Controversy over source of funding
- Perceptions of visible or incorporated fees

Cost Positioning

Compliance vs.
Proactivity

Decoupling vs.
Integration

Issue Interconnectedness

- Operational separation and conceptual
connection of waste management
-

Tensions

Imposing IFOs as the vehicle
Compromise to keep all stakeholders content
Top-down approach
Lack of market support by government

Cooperative Structure
Control over
Means vs. Ends

- Industry-funded monitoring
- Increased costs of monitoring
- Information ownership

Control Structure

-

Government
Distinctiveness

Polycentricity across municipalities
Provincial government’s leadership
Federal government’s global position
Harmonious rules with regional trade partners

Operational
Simplification

- Harmonious rule setting across programs
- Product specificity

Harmonization
vs.
Distinctiveness

Figure 2. Coding for Tensions in the Hybrid Approach to Regulation

3.3.4 Step 4: Developing the Comparative Framework
My higher-level approach to theorizing enhanced the extant understanding of the model
and led to a comparative framework. First, I noticed that the tension between proactivity
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and compliance is the outcome of the model and the three other tensions feed into this
tension. Second, upon identification of the four tensions that characterize the
hybridization, I traced all of the tensions back to investigate whether they had been
salient in the previous stages. Coding the data for previous temporal brackets revealed
that during the government regulation (stage 2 of the process), although confrontation of
actors was a noticeable characteristic of the regime, the constructive tensions were
absent. In fact, in this stage, only one pole of each of the dualities was salient. This
compelling finding helped me to theorize further on how a hybrid model is characterized
by constructive tensions that are beyond the banal confrontations among stakeholders.
These tensions distinguish the hybrid regulation from the existing models, allowing me to
explore how managing them can influence the outcomes, which are discussed in Chapters
6 and 7. The result was a comparative analysis of how the proposed hybrid model is
distinct from the two pure alternatives, and how it can resolve their respective
shortcomings.
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Chapter 4

4

The Evolution and Transformation of the MHSW
Program

This chapter outlines the case narrative of the formation and evolution of MHSW
programs in Ontario (i.e., the outcome of the first step of the research, as explained in
Chapter 3). The narrative covers the temporal scope from 1981, when the first critical
event relevant to this research occurred, until the end of the data collection period in
December 2018. It has been shaped according to the many data sources collected from
various actor groups. The foundation of the narrative is based on the historical data, but I
also touch on the inconsistent or even conflicting stances and perceptions of different
actors, such as how business and government may interpret a certain event differently).
Whereas the historical data has provided facts that help me to discover the pattern of the
hybrid model, the stances and interpretation of different actors allows me to uncover the
tensions that emerged through the studied process, reflecting the complexity of the
generated model. Based on critical events and turning points, the narrative demonstrates
three distinct stages that pertain to business-government coordination.
Figure 3 represents the critical events in the three identified stages of formation and
transformation of waste management programs in Ontario. In the next sections, I explain
the three stages and in the following chapters, I focus on the hybridization stage, which
directly responds to the research question. In Chapters 6 and 7, I use the data from the
first two stages to compare the three regulatory models.
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Municipalities Service Providers
Stewards
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July 21, 2010: Suspension of MHSW Phases 2 & 3

July 1, 2010: Commencement of MHSW Phases 2 & 3

July 1,2008: Commencement of MHSW Phase 1

Provincial Government

Stage 1: Unfulfilled Self-Regulation
Stage 2: Government Regulation
Stage 3: Hybridization

Figure 3. Mapping Critical Events in the Formation and Transformation of Ontario MHSW Program
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4.1 Stage 1: Unfulfilled Self-Regulation (1981–July 2008)
Systematic attention to waste management in Ontario imperceptibly increased alongside
government and public concerns about air and water pollution in the 1950s and 1960s.
The first waste management Act was introduced in 1970. Over the next decade, the
gradual development of this rudimentary Act was reflected in growing provincial
regulations, such as Regulation 309 (1980) which, under the Environmental Protection
Act, put more emphasis on the issue of waste and its classification and management. An
early watershed was the separation of some recyclables, such as bottles, paper, and
packaging materials, in a regular curbside collection program in leading municipalities in
1981. This program was gradually diffused across the province and relabelled “the Blue
Box Program” in 1986. In addition, in 1983, Ontario’s Ministry of the Environment
(referred to hereafter as “the Ministry”) published its Blueprint for Waste Management in
Ontario, a voluminous proposal that called for cooperation between the provincial
government, municipalities, industry, and the public, and introduced many advanced
ideas at that time to address waste.
Against this background, a number of municipalities and regions began to take the lead in
treating hazardous waste as a distinct type of waste. This was deemed part of their
mandate for provision of health and safety for citizens and environmental protection, as
disposing of hazardous materials with other types of waste could harm the environment
and create safety risks. As such, some municipalities used their resources to run
occasional programs to collect hazardous materials from households separately. The
scope of such materials was broad, including pesticides, pharmaceuticals, cleaners,
flammable liquids, aerosols, paints, stains, and virtually all household products that
carried a sign of potential danger on their labels.
As the idea of sustainable waste management continued to spread in the 1980s, both
existing businesses and newly formed companies found the opportunity to provide such
services to municipalities. The operations of these firms initially included collecting
household hazardous materials through scheduled local events. In 1991, Hotz
Environmental Services (Envirosystems, Inc. since 2010), one of the first firms that
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specifically proposed to handle hazardous waste, was founded in Hamilton-Wentworth
(now known as the City of Hamilton), expanding to Brantford, Toronto, Waterloo, and
other areas in the Golden Horseshow within a year. Hotz “Mobile Collection Units”
could be found at pre-announced locations (e.g., parking lots) over certain weekends,
collecting hazardous waste in neighbourhoods. The similar materials were usually
aggregated and repacked by the service provider, before being sent in bulk for safe
disposal. Running this model, Hotz could handle up to 1,800 incoming citizens in one
day with the help of more than 50 employees. From a very early point, safety was a key
consideration in all operations. Hotz received a “Generic Licence” from the Ministry to
run this model, with considerations such as prevention of spills in collection sites. Figure
4 demonstrates a newspaper advertisement and a photograph of a collection event in the
early 1990s.

Figure 4. Left: A Municipal Advertisement to Announce a Collection Event in
Hamilton, Ontario. Right: A Hotz Environmental Services “Mobile Collection Unit”
event in York, Ontario (early 1990s) (courtesy of Envirosystems, Inc.)
Soon the people involved in operations noticed that a significant portion of the collected
residuals were quality materials, and the idea of “reuse” was shaped as a viable
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alternative to disposal. Citizens who came to a collection event could take the half-used
materials brought by other citizens, albeit at their own risk. Given the potentially
hazardous nature of the materials and the fact that the materials were not always returned
in their original containers, safety became a key concern that curbed the reuse option.
Hotz soon realized that paint constitutes about half of the collected hazardous waste and
began experimenting with paint recycling in 1992.6 However, paint posed a difficulty as
it came in various types and shapes. Initially, Hotz started by separating paints into waterand solvent-based types, as well as dark and light colours, and mixing all of the incoming
paint in each of these broad groups. This simple separation process yielded just two
shades: a beige and a greyish brown. The company recognized that the volume of the
collected paint would be far more than what it could use or send to municipalities for use.
Managing this volume of paint required knowledge, expertise, and technology to produce
more attractive shades and find new applications. Interviewee S7, a paint recycling
expert, described the process:
How many different colours [could be produced]? Initially we didn’t
know. Blue can be [about] 10 different shades: navy blue, dark blue,
light blue, whatever it is. How do we know which colours should go
together?
To address these technical issues, Hotz sought advice from a local and a large coating
manufacturer. Under their guidance, a few more shades were soon developed. Yet, with
increasing volume, the large manufacturer stopped providing technical advice as it
noticed that the recycled paint could become a marketable product, potentially competing
with its own virgin paint. Still, despite the relatively acceptable quality of the early
recycled paint for spaces such as storage rooms and workshops, nobody was willing to
use it—not even to be used in municipality facilities.

6

Albeit, before Hotz, leftover paint was recycled in isolated projects in other regions, such as Quebec and
certain areas in the United States.
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Feeling this strong resistance from the paint industry and the market, Hotz managed to
market its affordable recycled paint in Cuba and later, in other international markets. To
economize on the costs of shipping and labour, the paint was aggregated in a limited
number of shades; after pre-filtering, the bulk was shipped to target countries, where it
could be fine-tuned and repackaged in smaller containers at the buyer’s discretion. Over
time, Hotz chose to keep its products simple and affordable: it did not add virgin
materials, such as costly pigments, to the recycled paint; therefore, its colour deck
included fairly limited shades. Clients, however, could make some changes in their own
final products.
With the growing volume of used or residual household hazardous materials returned by
consumers, some local governments gradually established their own permanent depots in
municipalities. These drop-off facilities were generally established in areas with a
considerable population that needed such services beyond occasional events. The number
of these facilities grew rapidly in the 1990s. Many of them still have limited reuse
programs to this day. Yet, in dispersed or smaller municipalities with limited turnover of
hazardous materials, occasional collection events are sufficient.
This hazardous waste management program continued to run parallel with (and was
influenced by) the large and broader waste programs at the municipal level. Under
Ontario Regulation 101, Recycling and Composting of Municipal Waste, 1994,
municipalities were regulated to manage the Blue Box Program, which collected and
handled materials such as paper, aluminum cans, and glass. Over the years, this curbside
recycling program has encountered many complications. Most relevant to the case of
hazardous materials is the fact that since the 1980s, various industries were trying to
eliminate the deposit-refund system on refillable containers and introduce single-use
containers instead. Circulation of refillable containers, supported by environmental
advocates and mandated partially since 1976, was an operational and financial burden for
business; thus, industries advocated recycling as a viable alternative to the deposit
system.

47

During the decades of debate over the merits of recycling versus the deposit system, at
some periods, the relevant industries financially contributed to recycling programs
voluntarily to relax the regulation. For example, in 1986, a group of soft drink businesses
formed an industry funding organization that is widely known as “OMMRI” (Ontario
Multi-Material Recycling Inc.) to co-fund the Blue Box Program through a depreciative
funding model, ultimately leaving the full costs on municipalities. Another important
event occurred in 1992, when grocery product manufacturers introduced the so-called
“CIPSI” (Canadian Industry Packaging Stewardship Initiative). This initiative was later
supported by some other industries as well as the provincial government, but was
challenged by other industries and finally ended in 1995 after a few years of controversy
(for a short narrative of the program see Chang, Macdonald, & Wolfson, 1998).
The Blue Box Program was supported by many citizens and was generally deemed a
success for Ontario. In the late 1980s, this public-private partnership was recognized by
the United Nations, which presented its first ever Environmental Award jointly to
OMMRI, the Recycling Council of Ontario, and the Association of Municipalities of
Ontario. Nonetheless, business’s contribution to these programs was inconsistent as
different industries and firms held different positions with little motivation for
cooperation; hence, the isolated “voluntary” programs were short-lived and largely due to
the pressures imposed by different governments.
Towards the late 1990s, waste costs became a significant concern for municipal
governments, government funding for the Blue Box Program ran out, and the cooperative
effort between industry, the province, and municipal groups was jeopardized, leaving it
unclear whether the Blue Box Program would be able to continue. Finally, on June 23,
2002, the Ontario government released the province’s first product stewardship
legislation, the Waste Diversion Act. Its purpose was “to promote the reduction, reuse,
and recycling of waste and to provide for the development, implementation, and
operation of waste diversion programs.” The Act mainly aimed to secure the operation of
the Blue Box Program through regulated industry funding, as previous invitations for
voluntary cooperation had failed in securing steady contributions by industry. As
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interviewee G6, an expert with both provincial and municipal government experience,
stated,
I don’t call them extended producer responsibility programs per se,
because they were primarily financial stewardship programs, but
nevertheless, it started on that path [to secure industry funding].
In this way, financial challenges were critical to the evolution of the programs; yet, in
regulation, they were framed under state-of-the-art environmental ideas such as extended
producer responsibility. The focus of the Waste Diversion Act was mainly on handling
and management of the “designated waste” managed through the Blue Box Program, but
it was open to the introduction of new waste groups, such as hazardous materials.
The Waste Diversion Act instated a unique governance structure to ensure that business
will continuously participate in waste management. It introduced a non-Crown
organization at arm’s length from the government, namely Waste Diversion Ontario
(WDO), which became responsible for putting the Act into practice by establishing waste
diversion programs, with a board of directors composed of various stakeholders. WDO
was also responsible for establishing the organizations known as industry funding
organizations (IFOs). These IFOs had to provide for payments equal to 50 per cent of the
total net costs incurred by municipalities to run the Blue Box Program. Programs run by
IFOs had to be approved by the Minister of the Environment (hereafter referred to as “the
Minister”) in advance. Each IFO was required to determine and collect the fees to be paid
by the stewards, as well as any necessary information, and to establish internal rules for
such operations. Figure 5 demonstrates the general governance structure and relationships
established by the Waste Diversion Act.
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Local/Municipal
Governments
(and their representing
association)

Ontario’s Government
(represented by the Ministry of the Environment, renamed the
Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change in 2014, and the
Ministry of the Environment, Conservation and Parks in 2018)

The Oversight Organization/ The Authority
(initially Waste Diversion Ontario (WDO); since 2016: Resource
Productivity and Recovery Authority)
Service Providers
(such as recyclers,
transporters, and
consultants)

Industry Funding Organization (IFO)
(or any organization to manage industry stewardship programs,
known as producer responsibility organizations in the 2016
regulation)

Individual firms (stewards)
(such as manufacturers and first importers)

Figure 5. The Structure Established in 2002 by the Waste Diversion Act
With the IFOs running the programs, WDO was responsible for overseeing the IFOs on
behalf of the Ministry. The budget of WDO, as a non-Crown organization, was also paid
by the stewards through the IFOs, rather than by the Ministry. This model was relatively
new. Monitoring compliance with regulation is traditionally an in-house responsibility of
the government, funded through the tax system. However, this adopted governance
structure put the costs of monitoring on industry—and, consequently, their specific
consumers—rather than on government and, consequently, the public. Moreover, it was
argued that this funding model would help WDO to be less influenced by politics; for
instance, changes in the provincial government could not influence this organization and
the programs by curbing its budget—challenges that had historically impacted waste
management.
In a controversial move, the Ministry also established and designated an organization
called Stewardship Ontario to act as the Blue Box program’s sole IFO, i.e. the only
collective which was responsible to collect fees from the firms that produced or
distributed the designated materials. Indeed, every steward had virtually no choice other
than to choose this IFO as its waste management collective. Therefore, although the idea
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of stewardship per se, built on many years of debate on the core idea, did not create
considerable negative reactions in industries except for a few sectors, dictating a
particular IFO as the representative of different industries generated contention. As
interviewee S6, an expert with experience in different actor groups, reported,
All the producers were obligated by law to participate in that
stewardship organization unless they got permission to do something
different, and getting permission to do something different was next to
impossible. It was a quasi-monopoly scenario […] that many of the
stewards objected to, both in principle and in practice. It was different
than the way some of these programs had happened in Europe and
elsewhere in the country where the industry created an association to
manage [the program].
In summary, the Waste Diversion Act laid the foundations of a unique collective-level
regulation. In contrast to typical regulation, which targets individual firms, the Act
focused on the collective level and individual firms had practically no other option to
meet the waste management requirements, at least in the beginning. In 2003, Stewardship
Ontario registered 3,300 firms as potential stewards and received reports from about
1,200 Blue Box stewards. Paying stewardship fees started in 2004, which covered half of
the Blue Box Program expenses as the industry’s mandated contribution. The role of
WDO was mainly facilitation, ensuring that the IFO was meeting its responsibilities,
including publishing the performance data.

4.2 Stage 2: Government Regulation (July 2008–May 2014)
The hazardous materials programs were built upon the Blue Box mandated action. After
the initial establishment of WDO as the Ministry’s oversight representative and
Stewardship Ontario as the IFO, the Ministry gradually expanded the scope of its
regulations to include materials such as used electronics, tires, paint, and batteries. In
December 2006, the Minister filed the first version of Regulation 542/06 under the Waste
Diversion Act to designate MHSW materials. This regulation defined different types of
MHSW materials. In a Program Request Letter to WDO’s board of directors, the Minister
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also directed WDO to develop a diversion program for MHSW. Further, he stipulated
that Stewardship Ontario act as the IFO for the MHSW program as well as the Blue Box
Program.
The contentious designation of Stewardship Ontario as the IFO for MHSW materials was
deemed a political decision, but it could also create economies of scale and facilitate the
operations, given the previous learnings. In addition, some new stewards for MHSW
materials were already paying Stewardship Ontario for their products that were collected
under the Blue Box Program. Some experts (even non-stewards) argue that alternative
organizations could potentially be more successful IFOs for these classes of waste. For
example, the paint and coatings industry believed that a Vancouver-based IFO, Product
Care Association, experienced in hazardous materials programs since the 1990s, was the
best option to be their IFO. Even Stewardship Ontario itself was reluctant to take on
responsibility for MHSW materials, which lay out of its expertise with the Blue Box
Program.
With this designation, Stewardship Ontario became the IFO for both the Blue Box and
MHSW programs. The other two IFOs in Ontario, Waste Electrical and Electronic
Equipment and Used Tires, were both established by the relevant industries. One year
later, in December 2007, the MHSW Program Plan for Phase 1, developed by
Stewardship Ontario and approved by WDO, was submitted to the Minister. Phase 1
included nine material groups: paints and coatings and their containers, solvents and their
containers, single-use dry batteries, antifreeze and containers, used oil filters, lubricating
oil containers, fertilizers and their containers, pesticides and their containers, and
pressurized containers such as propane tanks. The Minister approved the Program Plan
and it commenced on July 1, 2008.
Under the regulation, firms that had a commercial connection to such products (i.e., the
stewards) were responsible for the products throughout their life cycles, including after
consumption. However, this responsibility was practically relinquished to a collective (an
IFO) by translating it into a financial commitment of the stewards. The role of the IFO
was to identify the firms based on the provincial definition of stewards in Ontario, such
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as producers, brand owners, and first importers. The IFO would then calculate the costs
of collecting and handling waste disposal for each steward based on its market share and
the handling costs. Stewards were mandated to enroll in the program and pay the costs.
Potential free riders were caught by investigation in the marketplace by the IFO or other
bodies. In practice, these functions required extensive operations. For instance, the
regulation introduced nine broad product groups, but there were grey areas and the
inclusion of many products was questionable. Moreover, for some products imported to
the province, it was not clear which of the involved firms should be legally deemed the
steward. Managing the operations was therefore complicated. With the extended
operations of MHSW programs, Stewardship Ontario, which had initially outsourced its
operations, employed consultants to create an internal structure for managing these
operations internally.
A recurring question concerned the source of the funds spent on waste management. The
regulation and government rhetoric had always emphasized that stewards—rather than
taxpayers or municipalities—should pay for the costs of waste management. It was also
often acknowledged that by charging the stewards, these costs became merely another
item in firms’ operational costs, and were consequently transferred to consumers of those
products. For the provincial and local governments, this was a more favourable
mechanism vis-à-vis spending their own budgets on waste management. Accordingly,
after establishing this funding mechanism, government initially deemed it legitimate for
the sellers to charge customers an additional fee for environmental protection. These
handling fees were generally stated as an extra line in bills for Phase 1 materials.
Not surprisingly, business responses to these enforced programs were mixed. Evidence
suggests that in the earlier years, business sometimes tried to forestall the regulation by
means such as suggesting limited voluntary contributions. Nevertheless, when the
industries realized that regulation was inevitable, they approached it as a means to create
a level playing field and prevent free riding issues, which were common in the initial
Blue Box Program. The regulation could force all the involved firms to participate and
this was an advantage for business. Another consideration of business was the fact that a
firm’s responsibility was discharged by its financial contributions, and the costs could be
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transferred to consumers through the environmental handling fees; this was another relief
for the stewards, but overall, increased prices could have negative impacts on demand.
However, a major business concern was the predetermined path to meeting the
requirement. The industries that were influenced by Phase 1 of MHSW raised their
concerns about the government’s decision to continue the quasi-monopoly of
Stewardship Ontario as the only way to launch the program. Although the regulation
allowed these stewards to establish their own IFO or an industry stewardship program
after the initial launch by Stewardship Ontario, meeting the criteria for government
approval as an independent IFO was highly taxing. Indeed, firms in industries like paint
practically had no option but to work with the established IFO for the coming years;
hence, they decided to take an active role in this relationship.
In the few years after the introduction of MHSW Phase 1, the main focus of WDO and
the IFO was on operationalization. The IFO had many challenges to deal with, such as
identification of products, interacting with stewards, setting fair fees, establishing
collection sites, and dealing with service providers. Hazardous materials were mostly
collected by municipal depots or through collection events, but there were also retailers
who had agreed to establish drop-off depots for their customers to bring back their used
hazardous materials. These retailers themselves were typically stewards, as they supplied
their own brands of the designated products. With all of these operationalization hurdles,
monitoring the programs was arguably a luxury and WDO was merely playing the role of
a liaison between the IFO and the government.
Despite the above challenges, implementing Phase 1 was relatively smooth and the
experts, especially from the government side, generally perceived it a success. On July
22, 2008, shortly after the commencement of MHSW Phase 1, in a Program Request
Letter to WDO’s board of directors, the Minister provided direction on the development
of the subsequent phases of the MHSW program. This direction required an amended
MHSW program to include all MHSW materials designated under Phase 2 and Phase 3,
in addition to the materials currently included in Phase 1. Phases 2 and 3 included
materials such as aerosol containers, fluorescent light bulbs and tubes, pharmaceuticals,
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sharps such as syringes, and all types of flammable, corrosive, toxic, reactive, and
leachate toxic materials not included in Phase 1. The Minister’s letter also stipulated that
the amended program include all of the materials in both of the new phases
simultaneously. In September 2009, this Consolidated MHSW Program Plan (also known
as the “Orange Drop Program”) was approved by the Minister and its commencement
was set for July 1, 2010. The stewards and the IFO had to establish the system for all
included products in just nine months.
This quick expansion of the program was a bold decision, but extending producers’
responsibility was a proliferating idea at that time, and governments were motivated to
deploy it as quickly as possible. Almost simultaneously, in October 2009, the Canadian
Council of Ministers of the Environment released the Canada-Wide Action Plan for
Extended Producer Responsibility. The idea of extended producer responsibility suggests
moving the responsibility upstream in the product life cycle to the producer, which
obviates the need for resource allocation by municipalities and, in turn, taxpayers. The
implementation of this plan was naturally left to the jurisdictional authority of each
provincial government. Given its record in waste management, the Ontario government
did not want to be a late mover. Further, many of the Phase 2 and 3 materials were
already managed by most municipalities (and had been since the 1990s). Based on the
Phase 1 experience, extended producer responsibility was proving an effective approach
to transfer the costs of such programs from local governments to stewards.
The result of this shift, however, is generally recalled by experts with terms such as
“mayhem,” “crisis,” and even “disaster” and “catastrophe.” July 1, 2010 is still an
unforgettable date for all involved in those programs. Twenty-two new material groups,
many of which were consumables, were added to the initial nine MHSW material groups.
These new groups included thousands of newly regulated products. Stewards, including
retailers, were not yet ready to implement the right fees in their systems in a wellorganized and harmonious way. Most of the stewards chose to recover the fees by way of
a visible price in the bill to customers, which was common after 2008 for most of the
Phase 1 materials.
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Commencing the consolidated phase suddenly added an unexpected fee to many
consumer products and created strong consumer backlash. On July 1, 2010, citizens who
were shopping for daily products suddenly realized that they had to pay an extra fee for
many products. Angry with the fees, consumers started to contact media sources. One
expert (interviewee B14) recalled,
One of the things that caught the eye of the press was fees being
charged on some everyday products that people consumed, and that
people may not deem as being hazardous or special. For example, dish
soap, and that was pictured in the Toronto Star, because a lady […]
saw an eco-fee attached to her purchase and wondered what that was
all about. There was some confusion with the program with which
materials were included and which were not included, and that
confusion resulted in fees for corrosive materials being applied to a
non-corrosive irritant material, which was the dish soap [—hence the]
higher fees.
What was coined “eco-fees” soon became a hot topic (see Figure 6). The media started to
critically question Stewardship Ontario, an organization which it considered responsible
for these new fees. The problem was more confusing due to diversity of stores, such as
company-specific specialized stores and independent general retailers. Some stores had
not included the eco-fees in their bills, and some industries chose to keep eco-fees
invisible (i.e., adding it to the overall cost of the products) and this created more
confusion. In some cases, different retailers were even charging different eco-fees for the
same product. Stewardship Ontario was the main target of this increased outrage from
consumers and journalists, and some experts maintain that the IFO did not practice good
public relations to manage the crisis.
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Figure 6. Instances of Media Attention to Eco-Fees in July 2010
Some additional side issues exacerbated the consumer backlash. One was unreasonable or
wrong fees imposed on a number of products. For instance, the eco-fee calculated for a
box of a product was added to the price of every individual unit in the box. Experts who
were involved in operationalization of the consolidated program contend that with the
government’s short notice for implementing the consolidated plan, these problems were
inevitable. Further, the market was not conditioned for such a dramatic decision in a short
period and communication was poor, both before implementation and after the crisis.
The perception of the eco-fees as a new form of tax was another complication.
Supporting this perception was the coincidence of the consolidated phase’s
implementation with an important change in the provincial tax system. Based on the
Ministry’s decision, the consolidated program commenced on exactly the same date that
the harmonized sales tax was implemented in Ontario. This new tax system was in the
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Liberal government’s agenda for a few years, and consumers who had a negative
perception of the new tax system perceived the eco-fees as yet another type of tax
imposed on Ontarians—a tax on a tax.
This crisis also gave rise to conspiracy theory. Some involved experts still blame a
specific retailer for encouraging its angry consumers to reach out to the media. Because
charging recycling fees involved significant changes in firms’ operations, some
companies were willing to kill the program by fuelling the flame. But some other
individuals involved in the operationalization of the programs refute these rumors by
recalling the Ministry’s short notice and how it confused retailers. As such, the
operational errors were inevitable, and it was a natural reaction of uninformed employees
of these retailers to advise consumers to blame those who made the main decision.
On July 21, 2010, after three weeks of furious debates and fights, the Minister revoked
the consolidated program by filing a regulation that suspended the payment of fees on the
products under Phases 2 and 3 of the MHSW program. Soon after, the existing Minister,
John Gerretsen, was fired and John Wilkinson took the office. The new Minister, who has
now held that office since August 18, 2010, asked WDO’s board of directors to develop a
revised program to include only Phase 1 materials. In developing this document, which
was approved by the Minister, Stewardship Ontario updated the definitions of Orange
Drop materials, with the new definitions taking effect on October 1, 2012. Despite the
cancellation of Phases 2 and 3, collection of the newly designated materials in
municipalities was neither new nor stoppable. Stewardship Ontario continued to operate
the Orange Drop Program in its entirety until September 30, 2012. To manage the
municipalities’ dissatisfaction, the Ministry allotted a limited budget to cover some costs
of six of the 22 material groups for a limited time.
The 2010 crisis influenced subsequent waste management policies and practices for at
least another few years. The public remained sensitive to the costs of waste management
and media frequently covered the operations and costs of Stewardship Ontario. This
contention was a gift to opposition parties seeking to attack the Liberal government,
which made that government and its relevant bodies increasingly cautious, as is reflected
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in the publicly available documents; for example, board meeting minutes of WDO lack
any detailed information after the crisis years. Another aspect of this caution is reflected
in the increasing disfavour of the government with respect to visible eco-fees. Arguing
that visible fees were a reason for the 2010 troubles, government representatives
gradually put more pressure on business to bury the eco-fees in the final product price.
Visibility of these fees did not violate any regulations and is common in most other
Canadian jurisdictions, and even in some industries in Ontario, such as electronics and
tires. However, in the years to come, stewards in industries such as paint were strongly
discouraged from making an extra cost for waste management visible.
The 2010 problems were not limited to public disapproval. They also flamed the fire
under the ashes of operating stewardship programs, and stewards started raising their own
concerns about the rules and implementation afresh. One concern was program
performance targets. The government had raised the idea of aspirational targets and asked
the IFO to include such targets in its programs. In MHSW Program Plan 2009, for the
paint and coatings class, the collection target for the first year of the program was 37 per
cent. Targets for years 2–5 were 47, 57, 67, and 77 per cent, respectively. Other
performance goals were equally challenging. Moreover, an increasing portion of the
collected residual paint was expected to be recycled, which involved operational
challenges. Paint stewards were also expected to establish an increasing number of
return-to-retail depots in their own stores to make drop-off locations more accessible for
consumers. Yet, establishing these depots was costly for participating stores and not
many large companies were interested in volunteering to meet this goal.
As the collected volumes were ramping up, processing the collected materials was
another challenge for stewardship programs. For paint and coatings, the only active
recycler in Ontario was still Hotz, acquired by Envirosystems, Inc. in 2010, and the few
other existing recyclers in North America did not have a growing market to accept
Ontario’s collected residual paint. In fact, the market price of the recycled paint did not
create enough margin for the recyclers to pay for collection; this made the recycling
operations costly for the IFO and, consequently, stewards. In many cases, they would not
only pay the costs of collection and transport, but also pay the recycler to take care of the
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collected materials. With increasing volume, another active company in waste services,
Photech Environmental, entered the paint recycling business in Southern Ontario and
broke Hotz’s monopoly. This helped the IFO dramatically in solving the problem of
accumulated collected paint and complying with the program targets, highlighting
Photech’s services in separate sections of its annual reports for 2010 and 2012. For
stewards, despite the importance of compliance, increased collection still meant paying
more for operations. Both of the paint recyclers continued their operations in the coming
years. In May 2012, Photech sent its recycled paint to the consumer paint market under
the Loop Paint brand, whereas Hotz continued its bulk export marketing strategy—a
weaker alternative in margins but perhaps more convenient.
Comparing the eco-fees across provinces, stewards raised additional concerns about the
costs of the program in Ontario. Higher costs resulted in higher-than-average eco-fees in
the province, which could not only disrupt the market and influence the demand, but
could also disharmonize the markets across provinces. Whereas in most other provinces,
municipalities were not charging the programs for their collection services, they were a
main source of cost in Ontario. Further, stewards and IFOs continuously expressed their
dissatisfaction about the efficiency of the municipalities and various service providers,
such as hauling companies and processors. Stewards criticized some municipalities for
discharging their public responsibilities and utilizing their political clout to influence the
provincial government’s decision, hiring unnecessary people in collection sites, and
gaining popularity by leveraging funds imposed on businesses. As one steward
(interviewee B11) noted,
We don't have control over [municipalities’] operating hours or how
much we pay them […]it seems like they've built a Cadillac for return
depots when they only need a Volkswagen. If you think of the process of
returning paint, you're coming in, you're taking the can of paint, and
you're putting it in a box, simple as that. That's what I'm paying
somebody to do. I understand people have to make a living. I'm not
saying they don't. All I'm saying is that I think they're being
unreasonable in terms of what they're requesting as compensation.
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On the other side, some municipalities condemned stewards for attempting to evade the
costs of their legal responsibilities and hinder the established recycling programs by
finding exemptions and leaving the operational costs on municipalities. This sentiment
was reflected in an uncomfortable conversation with a local government representative
after I asked a challenging question about the methods of assessing the net environmental
advantage of a specific recycling program. The question raised the fact that many
consumers drive personal cars to return small volumes of a regulated material with
minimal hazard for the environment, and inquired how the net environmental impacts of
the programs are assessed. The expert (interviewee M1), angry with remembering how
some stewardship programs were exempted from the regulation in 2010 and left the costs
to municipalities, also cast concerns about the intentions behind this question:
[M]any, many product manufacturers are going that way [to prove that
their products are environmentally safe, leaving the expenses on
municipalities]. And I don't know who's funding your study, but if it's [a
company name] who's trying to get out of funding things by finding
alternative ways for municipalities to give up on these things, those are
types of things where the municipality will have—and the general
public will have—some issues.
The same type of conflict was noticeable among stewards and other service providers,
such as collectors of waste and processors and recyclers. WDO and the Ministry were the
go-to authorities of various stakeholders with different levels of power. Whereas WDO
was still a silent intermediary organization, the Ministry had its own problems and
concerns. A steward, interviewee B11, described the political dynamics as follows:
Steward:

There was a lot of politics involved, people moving […]. One time
the Ministry would agree with us and then they would agree with
Stewardship Ontario and then they would change their mind
because there was a political faction that was involved.

Researcher:

Could you give an example?

Steward:

The trucking companies, for example, this is a lot of money for
them. [The IFO] would sit down with them and try to negotiate
with them and they would run to the Ministry and say,
“Stewardship Ontario is not being fair with us.” The
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municipalities—one of the things that really opened my eyes was
power, because obviously we would engage the municipalities to
pick up the waste and then we would pay them and you had some
municipalities that did it in a fairly efficient manner and then
there were other municipalities that, because they thought it was
just cost plus, so whatever the cost are, you will pay plus and [the
IFO] would bring this to their attention and say, “Look, this
municipality is costing us x, you are costing us x times 5.” […]
and they'd say, “Well, that is none of your business. Your job is
you pay us what we tell you.” And the municipalities would
obviously run to the Minister in Ontario and say again,
“Stewardship Ontario is not being fair to us; we are a smaller
municipality, we can't compete with those other municipalities.”
And so [the IFO] would say, “Okay, well then let that
municipality handle your work.” [This was the relationship]
between the municipalities, the trucking companies, WDO, the
Ministry…
Researcher:

So why do you see this as political?

Steward:

It comes down to simple political clout. The [municipalities] had
a tremendous amount of clout. They would go to the local MPP
and they would say, “Hey, look what is happening, we are not
going to let these [stewards] push us around, we will remember
this when the next election [comes.]” So, the Ministry of the
Environment was getting calls from MPPs across Ontario saying
here is what is happening.

Stewards also argued that service providers—viewed by them as actors with no special
role in waste management and environmental protection—were making fortunes with the
stewards’ money without stewards being able to negotiate. An anecdote from the same
steward demonstrates such dynamics:
One of our more animated [colleagues] went to a meeting and the guys
running the trucking company showed up [in] Lamborghinis and
Ferraris, and [our colleague] said, “Really? You guys are driving
around in Ferraris and Lamborghinis and you are worried about
[lowering costs]?!” So [the colleague] made sure that the Ministry
found out that these guys were driving these types of cars to meetings
where, apparently, they were saying “You are not giving us enough
money.”
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With such tumultuous interactions with other stakeholders, many firms viewed Ontario as
the most complicated province in terms of waste management. A manager from a
manufacturing company (interviewee B13) described:
[In other provinces] there didn’t seem to be all of these special interest
groups […]. I don’t remember having these issues in British Columbia,
Quebec, or Alberta. It did seem sometimes when we had meetings [in
Ontario] that the world was trying to beat up on us, because everybody
wanted their pound of flesh.
In the volatile circumstances after 2010, the last thing the Ministry wanted was noise
from the operation side and local governments. Still, stewardship collectives would
pursue cost efficiency whenever possible. For instance, in 2011, Stewardship Ontario
managed to start changing the imbursement model of waste processors to an incentivebased one, which significantly lowered the income of processors and recyclers. However,
with such conflicts, the context was devoid of trust among different actors, leaving no
opportunities for cooperation. In a series of correspondence with an industry leader
(interviewee B9), when I asked him whether they have ever invited NGOs to their
collective’s meetings to create mutual understanding, after a 15-day delay the leader
replied:
Involving NGOs to advocate for transparency has been so disruptive to
my normal paradigm that I have had to think long about this […]. My
point is that there is a wide division and [an NGO’s name] are usually
positioned against manufacturers. There is a lot of baggage and I am
not sure that manufacturers would trust them or be willing to engage,
just like [the NGO name] do not trust manufacturers.
Interestingly, WDO was historically a fairly silent actor, both before the 2010 issues and
throughout this ongoing dissonance. Interviewee G9, an expert then involved in
operations, remembers this low-profile role:
I didn't really even understand WDO existed. WDO, historically, was
very small in staff… four, five people. […] WDO didn't have a day-to-
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day role with Stewardship Ontario the way it does now. When all of
that was going on in 2010, even if you look through the news clippings,
WDO was never even quoted. It's actually quite interesting to look
through it and think, "Why wouldn't the media be contacting the
organization that's supposed to be overseeing all of this when
something went as wrong, as it did." So WDO's role back then was very
minimal and hands-off. More behind the scenes than front-facing.
WDO’s role was more of an intermediary organization between the government and the
IFOs, facilitating information transfer and mediation when conflicts arose among the
stakeholders. Its initial structure, defined by the 2002 Act, included board members from
not only provincial government, but various stakeholder groups with competing interests,
including different stewards, municipalities, and service providers. On February 9, 2012,
the Ministry changed the regulation to designate a “disinterested” board structure for
WDO, with members assigned directly or indirectly by the Minister. It was the beginning
of a shift in the role of this monitoring body and other elements of the system.
The transition to stage 3 happened gradually. Although it was sparked by the 2010
troubles, I consider a major action by business as the threshold of hybridization: the
transfer of the paint stewardship program from the government-designated IFO to the
industry’s IFO, which was the harbinger of further changes in the system.

4.3 Stage 3: Hybridization (May 2014–Present)
The Waste Diversion Act, 2002, had formally considered the right for business to
establish its own industry stewardship programs after the programs were initially
launched—that is, after the first launch of the program, individual and groups of firms
had the option to establish their own IFOs, distinct from the government-designated IFO.
However, the requirements for taking on the programs by alternatives rather than
Stewardship Ontario were so strict that industry’s initial attempts in this direction failed.
Paint was always a main MHSW material class. In 2014, Stewardship Ontario collected
9,422 tonnes of paint and coatings materials, equal to one-third of all collected materials.
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Eighty-two per cent of the collected paint was recycled. Budget-wise, Stewardship
Ontario’s highest revenue collected from the member companies came from paint. The
paint and coatings industry had long planned to establish its independent industry
stewardship program. The industry’s choice was Product Care Association—an IFO
involved in waste paint management programs in other provinces since the 1990s. Due to
its experience, Product Care Association was even involved in the initial design of the
MHSW program in Ontario, but the designation of Stewardship Ontario had kept it
almost entirely separate from the program in the following years.
Nonetheless, over time, both government and industry learned that the imposed structure
curbed the achievement of the program goals, and this learning facilitated the process. As
one government expert (interviewee G6) described:
The province probably could’ve done a better job in helping and
educating stewards on the opportunities that they could avail
themselves of. A few years later [the Ministry and WDO] realized that
no one’s coming forward with an industry stewardship program.
Everyone was just joining the [existing, government imposed] IFO […]
so, to their credit, they put together a guidebook to develop industry
stewardship programs.
Business also views the change as a result of stewards’ continual efforts. Interviewee B17
who had worked with different sides referred to the active role of business in this change:
Paint industry chaps jumped through the hoops to get their program
under control, rather than just paying the eco-fees to Stewardship
Ontario. The Ministry and Waste Diversion Ontario were reluctant at
first, but over time they figured that this overloaded truck is stuck in
mud and business may provide traction to get it out.
On behalf of the paint and coatings industry, Product Care Association started
negotiations with WDO and prepared an industry stewardship program which was finally
submitted to WDO on May 23, 2014. In December, WDO announced that it had
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approved the industry stewardship program and the effective date of Product Care
Association’s stewardship program would be June 30, 2015.
Substituting an industry-shaped program for the government-imposed IFO was deemed a
step forward for the industry. The industry’s collective, the former IFO, and WDO agreed
on a process to transfer stewards who were current with financial and reporting
obligations to Product Care Association. At the effective date of the June 30, 2015, 98 per
cent of paint stewards, by market share, had already transferred to Product Care
Association. The new collective seemed to have more agency to develop its industryspecific strategies and make the programs more efficient while meeting the targets. It
should be noted that, theoretically, the firms in this industry had the right to establish
different individual or collective stewardship programs (conditional on WDO’s prior
approval), but no other program yet exist. Therefore, in the short term, the introduction of
the new stewardship program meant that, for practical purposes, firms would transition
from one monopoly to another, as there was no other choice; however, in a year or so,
they could act differently. Overall, the transition from Stewardship Ontario to Product
Care Association has been described as relatively smooth. Product Care Association
announced that it would follow the existing procedures for one year.
Despite its reluctance to accept the MHSW program in its early years, Stewardship
Ontario was not content with this change, as it had invested in establishing different
systems to run the program and was now losing a main part of its MHSW program,
which had placed the burden of the fixed costs of operation on other MHSW stewards.
Notably, Stewardship Ontario had already realized that establishing the industry-based
stewardship programs was a growing trend—one that would impact its business
significantly. To this end, in 2013, the IFO established a not-for-profit organization,
Canadian Stewardship Services Alliance Inc., which focused on running such programs
(especially for the Blue Box materials) to create harmony across Canadian provinces with
heterogeneous systems.
As such, following the dynamics in the paint and coatings stewardship program, other
industries also tried to establish their own stewardship programs, especially when they
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heard that bigger changes were on the way which would impact this transition. As a
consultant (interviewee S7) described:
Industry’s now saying, “Oh, I saw the writing on the wall, let's get out
while we can, have some more flexibility.” What's happened there is
they've just been able to not get encumbered and stuck in Stewardship
Ontario […] because the government isn't allowing new [industry
stewardship programs] now for these materials. That was why they
said, “We gotta get out of here now!”
As a side note, experts believe that government’s acquiescence to change after such a
prescriptive regulation was the gradual outcome of various factors. First, the
irreconcilable stakeholder conflicts, especially with respect to inefficiency of the
programs, proved the regulation inefficient. Among different powerful stakeholders with
conflicting interests, business seemed to be the best actor to create efficient programs to
manage the used products that they had manufactured themselves.
Second and more importantly, despite the environmental protection rationale behind the
regulation, it was mainly designed to secure the business funding for municipalities to
continue the status quo in waste management. Indeed, for most of the materials, paint
included, no significant improvement was observed after nearly three decades of waste
management practices. Many of these materials were not recycled but instead incinerated
or disposed of safely. Such solutions are often less desirable and contested by
environmental activists (Baxter, Ho, Rollins, & Maclaren, 2016) This latter approach was
far from the emerging discourse of resource management, such as the cradle-to-cradle
concept and, more recently, the concept of the circular economy. The circular economy
focuses on enablers such as eco-design, innovation, business model change, reuse, and
recycling, with the idea that these approaches will mainly be pursued by business
(Beaulieu, van Durme, & Arpin, 2015; European Environment Agency, 2016). Yet, the
regulation offered no incentive for such proactive actions by business, as firms could
comply with the requirements by paying their shares to the IFO. With such shortcomings
in the regulation and the solidified needs of society to not only prevent pollution but also
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preserve resources, the circular economy gradually became a catalyst for change.
Adopting this new approach in policies could also ensure Ontario’s leadership in resource
recovery programs.
To improve the situation, the Ontario government first proposed the Waste Reduction Act,
2013, known as Bill 91. The submitted Bill aimed to make dramatic changes in the waste
management system, such as focusing on individual producer responsibility,
relinquishing new high-level enforcement roles to WDO as the government’s monitoring
hand, and banning visible eco-fees. Such changes created strong backlash from the
industries and the Bill was finally killed.
In the next course of attempts, the government directly adopted the concept of the
circular economy. To effect this transition, in November 2015, the Minister posted a
proposed waste reduction legislation for public comment. Entitled the Waste-Free
Ontario Act, Bill 151 proposed to enact the Resource Recovery and Circular Economy
Act and the Waste Diversion Transition Act. These statutes were intended to replace the
Waste Diversion Act, 2002. In addition, the Ministry released a Draft Strategy document
which illustrated how the new legislation might be applied to create a circular economy
in the province.
On November 30, 2016, the Waste-Free Ontario Act, 2016 was proclaimed. The new Act
aimed to dramatically overhaul the province’s recycling regime and transition to a more
robust producer responsibility that left more flexibility for stewards. The Act empowered
the Minister to direct the relevant IFO to implement a windup plan. The legislators
argued that replacing IFOs with business-oriented programs would resolve the concerns
regarding the IFOs’ monopoly. More importantly, the Act allowed firms to adopt various
individual- or collective-level programs, theoretically incentivizing firms to remove their
waste or develop innovative solutions to manage post-consumer materials more
efficiently and effectively. This regulation was expected to be a game changer, as it could
provide financial incentives (e.g., fewer costs or even a profit) for improvement. Further,
having multiple collective and individual programs could spur the competition and
innovation needed for the transition to a circular economy. On March 1, 2017, the
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Minister released the final revision of the Strategy for a Waste-Free Ontario: Building
the Circular Economy.
As noted, the paint and coatings industry had already taken the initiative and established
its industry stewardship program, run by Product Care Association. Along with the
government’s proclaimed support for more flexibility to encourage business to move
towards a circular economy, Product Care Association attempted to improve its financial
efficiency by managing program operations, for example, by establishing more return-toretail depots at the industry members’ sites (which were often free input channels
compared to the municipal facilities). Moreover, Product Care Association started
conversations with some of the more costly municipalities about lowering their
operational fees. Municipalities, in turn, gradually realized the shift in their position. As
industry stewardship programs and producer responsibility organizations took on the role
of the government-imposed IFO, municipalities generally considered three possibilities
going forward: (1) working with industry-based programs as service providers, (2)
cooperating with another service provider by letting them use their existing facilities for
collection and management of waste, or (3) shutting down their facilities completely.
Given the limited market for recycled paint, the industry stewardship program also
considered alternative applications for collected paint, including both usable and
unrecyclable materials, such as dried paint. Easy solutions for unrecyclable paint, similar
to many other MHSW materials, include incineration to generate energy or desiccation
and then disposal in special landfills. As a third option, for many years, a cement block
manufacturer accepted these materials to add to its products, as scientific evidence
suggests that this could enhance some of the characteristics of cement. But upon the
introduction of the industry-based program, more innovative solutions received greater
attention from the stewards. Using leftover paint to manufacture driveway sealants is a
fourth alternative. Such solutions can solve the problem of unrecyclable materials, reduce
the recycling costs imposed on stewards, and lower the dependence of the industry on
recyclers. However, the major vehicle for such innovative solutions is recyclers
themselves, which gave recyclers a dual role.
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Although the actors agreed that groundbreaking innovation should be sought in the long
term, with increased autonomy, the paint industry not only adopted strategies to enhance
efficiency but also demonstrated many instances of proactivity. As one industry leader
(interviewee B9) explained,
10 years ago, industry members didn’t even know each other.
Stewardship drove the agenda, and now, we can collaborate [within
the industry]. We've developed a really good logistics and distribution
network for collecting post-consumer paint. We haven’t developed
expertise in what we do with that [residual] paint. Well, what we're
doing is okay, right, but I’d sure like to see that go to another level.
[For me, that’s] the big opportunity. So, [now we are] using up
[residual] paint as paint, but what’s even more clever that we can do
with it? Is it a more deliberate use in cement processes and bonding
processes? That’s what I would like to see. It’s going to take some
R&D expertise.
The large manufacturers’ support for innovation in recycling was unprecedented.
Whereas paint recyclers were initially deemed outsiders who would consume the free
waste from virgin manufacturers’ products to produce paint and compete with them, the
industry gradually became more receptive to this sector, to the degree that even a leading
recycling company’s top manager joined the industry association’s board of directors.
Finding new applications for the collected materials was beneficial to everyone in the
industry, as it would secure compliance, lower the stewardship costs for the members,
and potentially resolve the concerns of virgin paint manufacturers about competing with
recycled products.
The increased involvement of stewards in the program was also reflected in operational
aspects. For instance, Product Care Association gradually recruited members to establish
more return depots in their stores. Despite the costs for the participating stores, this was a
cheaper input channel than municipal depots, which reduced the total costs for the
collective as well as increasing consumer access and collection volume. Another instance
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of proactive effort by business was the voluntary collection of a new material group,
bulbs and lights. This product group was part of the consolidated program that was
deregulated in 2010. In 2014, Product Care Association offered to voluntarily run a new
program for this material group, with the condition that the government regulate these
products after one year to ensure a level playing field. Admittedly, this proactive
initiative was discontinued because the government did not regulate this material group.
The regulators have acknowledged that transitioning to a circular economy is a long-term
plan, beginning with many consultations and step-by-step pilot actions for the first few
years. As a primary part of this transition—and under the new Act, proclaimed
simultaneously with the Waste-Free Ontario Act—WDO was replaced with a new
organization. The new body, the Resource Productivity and Recovery Authority (referred
to hereafter as “the Authority”), not only acquired responsibility for overseeing the
programs, but is now responsible for compliance and enforcement as well. As an
introductory action, the Authority started developing a comprehensive registry to collect
data from various sources, including individual stewards—a task previously undertaken
by the IFOs on a limited scale. These data would be used for a number of reasons (e.g.,
setting performance targets and penalizing stewards who cannot meet them). To meet its
new mandate, the Authority also started to acquire and develop compliance and
enforcement capabilities.
Gradually, both collectives and individual firms showed interest in establishing their own
waste management and circular economy programs in accordance with the government’s
base regulation. At an individual level, in April 2016, one company (SodaStream)
managed to get program approval for its refillable pressurized cylinders. Other collectives
and individual firms also followed this pattern, and government cautiously scheduled the
transition under the new Act. For instance, several firms proposed their plans to establish
new programs to manage used tires by the end of 2018. The resultant market dynamics
were deemed a driver of competition and, consequently, innovation. Ultimately, on April
12, 2018, the Minister issued a direction to the imposed IFO (Stewardship Ontario) to
fully wind up the MHSW program by the end of 2020, marking the complete transition to
individual producer responsibility for all materials collected under the program.
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Chapter 5

5

Tensions and Underlying Mechanisms

In this chapter, I first recap the data from Chapter 4 and summarize how three different
regulatory regimes were shaped. Doing so will provide a bigger picture of the shaping
process and also allow me to theorize, in next chapter, on the proposed model of hybrid
regulation and how it differs from other two alternatives. To this end, in this chapter, I
draw on the data and explain the unearthed tensions and dualities, as inherent components
of the studied hybrid model of regulation, and what underlies them.

5.1 From Regulation to Co-Regulation
The case of MHSW management demonstrates how, through the identified stages, ISR
and government regulation were tested and proved ineffective, and how a hybrid form of
regulation evolved with different features compared to those of conventional regimes. In
the beginning, the emerging expectations called for industry’s cooperation with other
actors in post-consumer waste management, but despite government persuasion, business
avoided taking on the costly responsibilities that were historically positioned at the
societal level.
Consistent with the literature, I find that two decades of avoidance and push and pull
(Chang et al., 1998) ultimately activated government regulatory institutions. Nonetheless,
a main challenge was the fact that waste management has long been constructed as a
collective issue. The government’s solution to translate this collective mandate to
individual firm practices was to impose a collective-level program to be run by a
designated collective (IFO), along with an oversight authority (WDO), all funded by the
regulated firms based on the costs of managing the waste their products create. This
structure was deemed an innovative policy solution for the waste problem, but in
practice, it proved far from efficient or progressive. Despite its advantages, the strictly
regulated program not only did not result in new solutions for resource management, but
also brought forth unexpected confrontation among the involved actors, especially
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industries and municipalities, and ultimately transformed into a hybrid model of
regulation.
Although the goal of this research is not to explore the transition process and causes, it is
important to mention the factors that facilitated the evolution of the hybrid model. Based
on the data presented in Chapter 4, four drivers were pivotal in transitioning from the
collective-level regulation to the hybrid model. First, the regulation had hindered
industry’s ability to utilize its capabilities to enhance efficiency, and government tended
to view business merely the provider of funds for waste management; this resulted in
growing resistance and dissatisfaction among stewards. Moreover, past literature has
noted that when industry faces shared “enemies,” it gradually develops stronger in-group
identity and shows more forceful reactions against the out-group (Pozner & Rao, 2006).
As a result, various industries were challenging the prescriptive regulation
simultaneously.
Second, the regulation fuelled the conflict of stakeholder interests and did not suggest a
solution for such problems, creating ongoing confrontation rather than synergy. Whereas
the source of funding was business, industries had minimal authority to run their
programs at their discretion, as the Ontario Regulation 101, Recycling and Composting of
Municipal Waste, 1994, had transferred that authority to municipalities (i.e., an array of
444 local entities with heterogenous needs and goals). The regulation had not predicted
how these different interests among actors could be productively resolved, which
changed the role of WDO from a monitoring authority to a mediator to control
contentions. The conflictual years after 2010 made it clear that the existing regulatory
regime could not proceed further.
Third, the strong backlash from citizens and media in the midst of the process weakened
the provincial government with respect to post-consumer policies, making the
government cautious and increasing media and consumer concerns about the programs.
Whereas in the past the government had focused on controlling the flames among the
stakeholders, it was now more open to revising the coerced regime, which made the
transition possible.

73

Finally, the outcome of the regulation was far from the significant environmental
improvement that it had aimed to achieve. Instead, the focus of the waste management
programs was mainly on maintaining the status quo by securing business’s financial
contribution, rather than reducing the environmental impact by exploring innovative
solutions and disruptive outcomes.
The turbulent period after the government regulation, fraught with conflicts among the
actors, finally facilitated the transition from the government-regulated collective-level
program into a regime that was co-regulated by both government and business and
operated by business. The government’s role in this model was to set the vision, broad
goals, and high-level rules (such as Waste Diversion Transition Act, 2017), as well as to
provide guidelines and general strategies. The role of businesses in rule setting was to
translate the higher-level rules and goals into policies for practice based on their own
discretion. For instance, firms can now choose to establish individual-level stewardship
programs to manage their own waste, cooperate with other firms to establish a collective
program jointly, or simply join an existing collective-level program. However, all such
stewardship programs must still be approved by the Authority and Ministry in advance.
Upon implementation, both sides will also be involved in enforcement. That is, in
addition to internal controls by business, external audits are also in place to ensure
compliance, and the Authority monitors actual program performance to ensure that
business meets the approved targets. Business’s agency in co-regulation, for example, is
reflected in the granted power at the operational level to negotiate with municipalities.
Although collection of hazardous waste is still mostly done by municipalities, the
industry’s collective had the option to establish other collection channels, such as store
depots, and choose the service providers. Still, the Authority monitors that process to
ensure that the established municipal facilities are not neglected. Overall, this system has
created a new model of co-regulation which is neither government regulation nor selfregulation, but both intertwined. I further explain the structure of this model in Chapter 6.
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5.2 Tensions in Hybridization
As the case narrative depicts, conflicts of interest among different actors (often with
respect to the costs and efficiency of the program) were a defining characteristic
throughout the studied process. However, delving deeper into the data allowed me to
understand that the complexity of the context went beyond mere conflict among the
stakeholders. To understand the dynamics that characterize this hybrid model of
regulation, as explained in Chapter 3, I used grounded theorizing and temporal bracketing
to unearth the precise features that characterize the model. The result demonstrated that
the co-regulated regime is characterized by four tensions, embodied in dualities, each
shaped by different mechanisms.
Interestingly, these tensions and their underlying mechanisms were temporally bound to
the hybrid regulation—that is, the tensions emerged parallel with transitioning of the
mandated program into the hybrid collective action. Tracking the elements of the tensions
in the data demonstrated that prior to the formation of the hybrid model, the governmentregulated system was characterized by just one pole of each duality. This regulatory
regime was associated with the concepts of compliance, decoupling, control over means,
and harmonization (all of which are discussed in next sections). As the hybrid form
evolved, the opposite poles of these four concepts—proactivity, integration, control over
ends, and distinctiveness, respectively—also emerged and gained salience. The
juxtaposition of these new concepts with the four existing concepts form four dualities
that generate ongoing tensions as the characteristics of the identified hybrid regulation.
The coding hierarchy was presented in Chapter 2 (see Figure 2) and below, I provide the
data and explanation of each of the four tensions in the hybrid model.

5.3 Compliance versus Proactivity
Whereas government regulation often tends to seek and foster compliance, the circular
economy relies heavily on innovative business models, technology development,
disruptive changes, and products that can close the material cycles. In addition, as
discussed in Chapter 2, proactivity in collective actions and ISR is an open question with
conflicting evidence. Hence, it was not surprising that the developed hybrid model was
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characterized by an ongoing tension between compliance and the expected proactivity.
This tension was sustained by different mechanisms, explained below.

5.3.1 Boundaries of Formal Regulation
In general, Canada is viewed as a proactive country in regulating for environmental
protection, especially compared to its main trade partner, the United States. For instance,
under the third phase of Canada Chemical Management Plan, 1,550 substances are being
reviewed over five years, and those identified as toxic will be banned. Unsurprisingly,
business may find this proactivity a constraint, as one industry leader (interviewee B1)
described:
Canada has its fair share—some would say unfair share—[of
environmental regulation]; one of our colleagues [from] a large
multinational manufacturer says, “Dealing with regulations in Canada
is kind of like drinking water through a firehose!” And I know because
we got wet every day. This ultimately impacts business operations.
From this perspective, extending the scope of regulation not only has economic impacts,
such as on the flow of business from Canada to the United States, but also hinders
proactivity and innovation as the expanding scope of regulation calls for more business
actions to guarantee compliance. Proactivity is often costly, at least in the short term;
therefore, the more convenient alternative of compliance, which is an ongoing
requirement due to government regulation, may frequently dominate the relationship.
Although the data do not refute this argument, they do suggest that expanding regulation
can in fact have an opposite impact and result in proactive actions by business.
Interviewee B21, a representative of an IFO, explained how the IFO’s prior compliancedriven actions were gradually accompanied by proactive actions to influence the next
phase of government requirements:
We have to represent our members. Eye-opener! We are not an
environmentalist not-for-profit for recycling. We are a bridge between
industry and regulation. Unromantic idea but quite accurate: “We are
a compliance vehicle for industry.” This is the bottom line. […] So, we
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constantly maintain compliance, but now we sometimes try to do more,
like, we sit together and think how we can do more “reuse.” Reuse is
definitely better than recycle for the environment and it may reduce our
costs, but it needs a new system. We work on such projects without
being obliged to.
The same expert also described how that IFO occasionally expands the geographical
boundaries of its waste management practices to sparsely populated regions not covered
by the existing regulation. This costly expansion is often questioned by cost-conscious
members of the collective. However, it is one of the means that business can utilize to
influence the scope of government-imposed regulatory requirements.

5.3.2 Stringency of Regulation
Like the impact of broadening the government’s requirements, the impact of imposing
stricter requirements, businesses argue, forces firms to focus their attention on
compliance. A steward’s representative (interviewee B15) argued that,
Some provincial governments just compete in raising the bar. Ontario
likes to be the leader. [Ontario’s regulators] don’t consider whether it
would work or not; they just want to impose stronger regulations. We
are always behind on the regulation. We can’t keep up with them. It
always takes time and resources and effort to implement the new
legislation and before we are done, they are raising their expectations.
This doesn’t leave us time to think about innovation, to figure out how
we can do things better.
Similarly, interviewee S7, an expert who had worked with various stakeholders, provided
an example of how over-regulating can be counterproductive by shifting the
responsibility within the firms:
We worked with one company and there was a battle within that
company. It's a well-known brand, and the environmental health and
safety people who were so focused on making sure that they're clean
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got us involved [in that project] because they just said, “This [stricter
regulation] is beyond our capabilities.” Well, [the responsibility] got
transferred over to finance and, well, they could care less about the
environment—you know what I mean. […] [The finance people]
weren't really paying as much attention and it drove the health and
safety people nuts, but that's how companies take whatever it is and
internalize it.
In contrast, government argues that with the authority firms have gained in the
transformed system, they can take the lead and shape innovative measures, reduce costs,
and compete towards better solutions. This idea is central to the government’s published
strategies towards a circular economy.
Although stringent regulation can foster compliance and hinder proactivity, the data show
that conversely, it can also trigger proactivity. One example of such proactivity in
response to strict regulation was the voluntary program, launched by Product Care
Association in 2015, to manage bulbs and lighting products. Indeed, industry aimed to set
the foundations of the program through this voluntary action and expected the
government to regulate this material group after one year. Regulation could set a level
playing field, secure consistent funding by stewards, and prevent free riding.
Surprisingly, because the government did not respond to this industry expectation,
business ultimately stopped the voluntary program.
The dynamics over stringency of requirements were also reflected in the ongoing
interaction between business and government in setting the targets. As interviewee S6, an
expert who had worked with several different stakeholders, described,
[T]here’s always a tension between what’s being achieved today, and
the government talks about aspirational targets. That’s part of the
ambiguity that was created by the legislation. A tacit recognition was
that industry says, “We’ll do the best we can, but we’ll only go as far
as what makes sense from a business perspective.” […] Then two years
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later [stewards] are under pressure for not achieving their aspirational
targets.

5.3.3 Program Scale
The scale of the waste managed by the stewards has always been a source of contention.
As the program plans must be approved by the Authority, the collection and recycling
amounts were determined in advance, after negotiations between the Authority and
business. Historically, the actors had agreed on aspirational targets, expecting businesses
to aspire to meet them, while no clear penalties were in place in case of not meeting
them. From the business perspective, controlling the volume is necessary in order to keep
the program costs manageable. It is therefore unreasonable to expect businesses to set
ambitious targets that disrupt their cash flows and competitiveness. In practice,
businesses adjust the scale for continual operation by mechanisms such as promotional
and communication activities. The following dialogue with two stewardship experts
(interviewees B1 and B8) illustrates this point:
Interviewee B1: If they double the amount [of waste] coming back, that’s a cost
for those producers […]. In the United States, they have these
challenges because they are communicating very strongly in
certain states and they are getting a lot back and they say, “Oh
my god, the cost is so high and we have deficits.” So, there is a
calibrating that goes on in mature programs like [those] we have
in Canada.
Researcher:

How can you manage the input? Is it variable?

Interviewee B8: Because all those [old hazardous materials] are in basements and
garages, they’ll start coming back as consumers get more
opportunities to bring them back to the corner of a store. So, if
this happens, the amount of the environmental fee will have to go
from $1.30 a gallon to [more] like $2. But it may go down later.
So, there is ebb and flow in the cost of recycling.
In contrast, the government aims to increase the scale of the programs for two reasons.
First, doing so would better protect the environment. Second, the government views
increased volume as a means to foster competition towards a circular economy—that is, it
hopes that collecting more waste will create opportunities for new firms to emerge and
the resultant market dynamics could spur innovation, create new products, and
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consequently lower the costs of waste management. Hence, scale can be used as a
transformer to realize the envisioned future. As an expert in operations of the programs
(interviewee B17) argued,
When you have a bit more of a broader view, when it's your
responsibility to government to pay for the program [and] make sure
you're meeting high environmental standards, then your lens changes
to say, “I'm not just meeting the service need for my community; I'm
now meeting a legal requirement for the entire province, and that
forces me to think of things differently. Can I get better economies of
scale? Can I rationalize, can I standardize some of the things that are
happening in the field?” Standard contracts, that saves money.
As such, scale can be deemed a potential driver of innovation and increasing the scale can
transform the equation. However, given the significant marginal costs of expanding waste
management programs in the short term, a larger program can also be viewed as a barrier
to regional competitiveness, which can encourage business to keep the scale at the level
of minimal requirements.
Another factor that fuels the tension between proactivity and compliance is frequently
reflected in the rhetoric of actors on the government side. These actors tend to position
Ontario as the vanguard of stewardship and the circular economy programs, and
frequently highlight the unique aspects of the program. Scale is a key driver of this
uniqueness and a larger scale would make it possible to develop more advanced features.
For instance, the program scale allowed the Authority to develop a database during the
hybridization process which was frequently raised in many consultation sessions and
interviews as a unique achievement of the system, such as this excerpt from interviewee
G9:
This registry is going to be very comprehensive [with] strong data
coming from Ontario waste providers and everyone in the province.
That will allow the Authority to do some very intense analytics, because
that [is what is] missing from anywhere in the world. Taking what was
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sold in the market and taking what was actually recycled and matching
them up, nobody actually really does that […] it's all very piecemeal all
over the world.

5.4 Decoupling versus Integration
An ongoing tension in the co-regulated model is whether business should integrate postconsumer waste into its core operations, or continue considering it as separate from the
technical core. Three different mechanisms underlie this tension between decoupling and
integration.

5.4.1 Responsibility Positioning
As a unique jurisdictional characteristic, from the beginning, Ontario regulation
mandated waste management to be operated by the government-designated IFO. This
structure could utilize the preexisting solutions for waste management, which were all
based on aggregated collection of materials, but it practically discharged the stewards
from their presumed post-consumption responsibility by translating that responsibility
into a merely financial mandate. An expert in government (interviewee G6) recalled,
The government and the legislation were not initially clear enough in
assisting stewards to understand exactly how to develop an [industry
stewardship plan] or what was involved. It was rather vague, it was
very non-descriptive, and because this was brand new territory for
Ontario and for companies, it was easier for them to just say,
“Stewardship Ontario, here's my cheque, just the cost of doing business
in Ontario that you handle, you discharge my responsibilities.”
The very notion of collectivity of the action did not face strong criticism, and many
stewards still find it a more practical and efficient way to manage waste due to the
economies of scale. Nonetheless, regulators themselves later questioned the collective
design of the system. These actors found the mandate for acting collectively not only a
constraint on progress, but a potential threat due to the possibility of price fixing and
coalescence of competitors. Over time, these perspectives changed and actors on the
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government side argued that managing waste should be an individual responsibility of
every single producer. A “true” extended producer responsibility model, therefore, is one
that integrates waste management into a firm’s business. The responsibility of a firm is
not transferrable to a collective that is funded by individual firms. Having said this, the
regulators now acknowledge that it might not be possible (from a practical standpoint) for
every individual firm to collect and manage its own post-consumer materials
individually.
These dichotomous views were also noticeable among stewards. Some stewards who had
already established their systems based on collective operations found integration
problematic and argued that the responsibility could be met by exogenous entities. Yet,
other stewards sought opportunities to integrate their own post-consumer materials into
their businesses. Each model seems to have its own advantages, and both compete in
intra-industry discussions.
Government has always emphasized the notion of a level playing field. More recent
arguments focus on the fact that policy should create an atmosphere for encouraging and
protection of individual actions for better waste management practices; in a level playing
field, they argue, leader businesses would be able to innovate and lower their costs,
whereas when responsibility is put on the collective, the collective may discourage any
movement towards individual progress, which can hamper the transition to a circular
economy. Nevertheless, having a level playing field does not negate the ability of some
individual firms to fulfill their responsibilities through a collective. In sum, the question
of whether or not the waste responsibility can be transferred within a firm’s operational
boundaries does not appear to have a clear answer.

5.4.2 Cost Positioning
The debate over whether waste management is an integral part of the core business or an
ancillary operational practice is also represented by the controversy over whether the
costs of managing waste should be visible to consumers as a separate item on their bills
or not. With no restriction in the early regulation, most of the stewardship programs in
Ontario decided to operate visible eco-fees at point of sale. However, as noted in Chapter
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4, the government gradually adopted a strong position against visibility of fees. For
example, when the paint and coating industry developed its own stewardship program,
despite its eagerness to demonstrate the fees on the bill to remain consistent with most
other jurisdictions, it was urged to bury the eco-fees in product prices. Indeed, the
government perceived avoiding visible fees as a tacit condition for approval of the
industry’s stewardship plan in 2014. Treating the costs of recycling as a visible add-on at
the point of sale is desired by many stewards, as it can have advantages such as
harmonization in their sales system across provinces. Yet, some stewards argue in
support of invisible fees.
Visibility of fees became a red line issue during the transition to the hybrid model.
Especially after the 2010 crisis, government adopted an increasingly negative position
against visible fees. This stance has been gradually framed as a tenet of the whole idea of
stewardship. Interviewee G9, an expert from the government side, argues that having
visible fees is at odds with the philosophy of true extended producer responsibility:
[T]he cost of an [extended producer responsibility] program is not an
eco-fee. It is not a visible tax. It is a cost of doing business and should
be treated as such. It is no different than your CEO salary. […]
Stewards have difficulty recognizing it as a cost of doing business and
want to treat it as a tax, so they want to have it as a visible fee. […]
The more that you insist that a television has a $40 visible eco-fee on it,
it turns more into a user-pay system, and that's not [extended producer
responsibility].
The government views visible fees at the point of sale as a trigger for consumer
complaints, arguing that the costs of the programs are all open to the public and
accessible on the program websites, which obviates the need for mentioning them on
customers’ bills. A representative from the Authority described that years after the 2010
crisis, some consumers are still contacting them and expressing their distrust about
whether the fees mentioned on their bills are really used to protect the environment.
Visibility of the eco-fees also attracts more media attention, and media continue to
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frequently investigate this area. An interview participant from the Authority remember
that the media does not care about the Blue Box IFO’s surpluses, because that program
does not have eco-fees. Similarly, interviewee G9 described,
When it's visible, they're perceiving it as a tax. When it's incorporated,
they're perceiving it as a cost of doing business. It's the perception.
[…] In Ontario, at least, when people see a visible fee, they get mad,
very mad.
As such, the question of who pays for waste management has remained a point of
controversy, buried in rhetoric and semantics, with each actor arguing from a different
perspective. In fact, in the data, I noticed that even the same interviewee might argue
differently at two different points in one meeting. Although it is more than evident that
costs are officially and publicly communicated and imposed, stewards tend to frequently
credit themselves as the cost-bearers. For this reason, they argue, they should be the main
decision makers—even as they argue, in a contradictory direction, that increased costs
will harm the consumers who pay these costs. Government experts asserted that the costs
should be somehow internalized and absorbed in business, but in some arguments, the
consumer (rather than general taxpayers) was also acknowledged as the person who
should pay the costs. These experts further argued that integrating costs into business
costs will encourage firms to innovate and find solutions to avoid waste management
costs; thus, integration of costs can have long-term advantages.
Overall, although most experts from various stakeholder groups seem to agree that
managing waste is, in most cases, cost-intensive and this cost will normally be passed to
the consumers through pricing mechanisms, the controversy over who should pay still
lingers. An interviewee with experience with different stakeholder groups (interviewee
S7) articulated this controversy:
It's semantics but it's a way of getting around the optics of the fee […].
Different people have different opinions. It really becomes interesting. I
personally would prefer to see that [on the bill], but other people react
differently to that. The government doesn't want industry to turn this
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back on them and make it a political issue. Eco-fees do that. If you look
at some of the history of the MHSW [materials] and the tax, that was
what so much of the venom from the public was.

5.4.3 Issue Interconnectedness
The co-regulation provides an opportunity to view the problem from more than one
viewpoint. In this case, the introduction of the concept of the circular economy also
provided new areas to revisit the program boundaries. In essence, the circular economy
views environmental considerations as fundamentally intertwined and systemic, which
requires simultaneous efforts in a number of areas, such as procurement, design,
production, consumption, and post-consumption. This inherent interconnection has been
acknowledged in Ontario’s revised approach to waste management, encouraging the
stewards to consider various objectives and means in the long-term transition towards a
circular economy. Yet, the government itself is accused of isolating the waste problem
from other issues in hand—that is, “decoupling” it to make it more manageable. For
instance, the data suggest that different recyclers criticize the government for not
supporting green products and even releasing functional policies that ban or discourage
the purchase of a recycled product that, according to the recycler, has proven technically
identical to the comparable virgin product.
Whether or not to address the waste problem in connection with other issues is another
ongoing question in business. Whereas some stewards believe that they need to address it
as something that is interconnected to other practices, others argue that such an approach
would further confuse the problem of waste with other issues, which will increase the
issue’s complexity, as one stewardship leader (interviewee B15) expressed:
These new folks tend to mix different things around environment. They
are now mixing waste management with eco-design, with innovation,
with production and [greenhouse gases]. These are separate issues.
They confuse all of these and it becomes a “jack of all trades and good
at none” [situation]. And we still don’t know how to deal with the
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waste sector of our industry. We don’t have a solution yet. And they
don’t say how they want to deal with all these together.

5.5 Control over Means versus Ends
The co-regulation based on the studied model raises another question: As both
government and stewards are involved in both regulatory stages (i.e., rule setting and
enforcement), to what level should the regulators engage in each? Put differently, to what
extent should each of the two parties, especially government, intervene in defining the
means, and to what extent should each focus on controlling the ends?

5.5.1 Cooperative Structure
Some involved informants believe that business-government relationships in Ontario are
noticeably far from cooperative. This argument can be observed in the stage 1 of the
studied process, when business did not develop appropriate voluntary programs, resulting
in a stringent government regulatory regime. Yet, this non-cooperative approach seems to
be bidirectional, as stewards complain about the government’s limited trust and
cooperation with business. Many other experts agreed with this complaint, asserting that
regulators of waste management have historically determined both what shall be done
and how business shall do it. They unanimously described the government’s collectivelevel regulation as over-prescriptive. The most salient instances of this over-prescription
are the imposition of an IFO in earlier years, the pressure on the industry to keep all of
the involved actors (including service providers) content as an informal condition to
approve the industry stewardship plans, and dictating the invisibility of eco-fees (while
this was neither mandated nor uniform across different industries) as another condition
for program approval.
Due to this level of prescription, many interviewees agreed that in Ontario (compared to
other jurisdictions), stewards have had few opportunities to collaborate with government
or other stakeholders. Some stewards argued that despite their willingness, the
government is not willing to cooperate with business beyond a certain level, and tends to
prescribe means as much as possible. From their view, the cooperation does not go
beyond formal consultations when a new policy is being developed. As an example,
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when the Ministry and its bodies were planning the transition to the circular economy in
2017, several stewards’ representatives complained that they were not informed why and
how the system would change. As a result, stewards believe that opportunities for
cooperation are systematically missed in the complicated system, where industry’s
attempts to help are (supposedly) appreciated, but not considered. Business views this
non-cooperative structure as a general characteristic of the government’s system and
perspective, which is not limited to the MHSW program. For instance, one industry
member (interviewee B1) recalled a multi-stakeholder workgroup as a means for the
government to merely fulfill a bureaucratic mandate:
[The group] is comprised of NGOs, industry associations, etc. We sit
around and make nice for a whole period and complain about what
governments are doing […] and the government talks about what they
are doing to make our lives miserable and they seem to enjoy it! So, we
have to do it and the government checks the box, “Consulting
Canadians and Civil Society,” I guess.
As such, in absence of an atmosphere shaped by trust and cooperation, the regulators
normally tended to determine not only the goals but the means needed for the ends.
Although the co-regulated model partly shifted the regulators’ focus from means to ends,
the tension seems to be ongoing. This tension is highly salient in the studied case, but
may also be noticeable in any form of co-regulation. In addition, such a tension may vary
through the process.

5.5.2 Control Structure
Waste Diversion Act, 2002, gave birth to a unique control structure in waste management
systems, in which stewards fund the government-imposed system to monitor and sanction
themselves. The non-Crown delegated body, then WDO, gradually grew and developed
the required systems, and its costs doubled from 2010 until its transformation to the
Authority in late 2016. As interviewee G9 from the government side mentioned,
One thing that is a challenge even today when you have oversight:
there is always a push to spend as little as possible. The stewards don't
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want—and rightfully so, I don't blame them for this—to spend a lot of
money on an oversight body that watches them. It would be
counterintuitive for them. So I think that there, historically, has always
been a strong push to keep WDO's costs very low and to keep [its]
interference in the programs, if you will, very minimal.
Still, WDO’s administrative costs of monitoring, proportionally split among various
programs, were not a significant part of program expenses. Particularly for MHSW
programs before 2016, the regulatory costs generally constituted about 1 to 2 per cent of
all the program expenses. When WDO transitioned to the Authority and took on the
responsibility of compliance and enforcement as well, stewards started raising their
concerns about the required resources for its new projects. The first project was
establishing a new comprehensive IT system—a registry to collect large data directly
from all relevant stakeholders. With its own logic of efficiency, simplicity, and cost
reduction, business found this system unnecessary and costly. This issue was raised in
different forms; such as when, in an observed business convention, a participant from the
stewardship programs challenged this control structure as follows:
We’re still pulling the string of this Authority and their budget went up
$2 million. But a year ago it was already up to $7 million and counting.
So, we expect that number, I make a guess, will be $20 million next
year, because they are going to buy a brand new IT system to collect
the data from all the material categories, and all the program
operators already have that material. The [stewardship programs]
collect that as part of doing their job as program operator and they can
just hand it over [to the Authority]. [The Authority] want to duplicate
the effort. We all know what IT systems cost and the ongoing
maintenance will even cost more.
Although the Authority had its own reasons for needing such a comprehensive registry,
many of the interviewed stewards described it as a redundant activity with high security
risks due to the collection of confidential data from all involved companies, with no value
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added. From the business standpoint, stewardship programs collect all the needed data,
which are already audited and can simply be expanded with more third-party audits to
resolve the Authority’s potential trust gap. Several interviewed stewards complained that
they were not informed about the rationale behind the need for this registry, nor was their
concern sufficiently addressed in public events in which I participated. In discussions
with experts from the government, lack of accessible and trustable information for
monitoring and decision making was explained as a problem with the past system. WDO
had no control over the information, nor could it force the IFOs to provide the
information that it required. Thus, from that organization’s perspective, the solution was
sought in owning the information independently, even if it initially results in redundant
data collection, as stewards were concerned.
Therefore, although the co-regulated model aims to balance the level of control of each
group over means and the ultimate goals, the exact level of control that can foster a
constructive collaboration between the parties will remain a blurry target, subject to
ongoing dynamics and bargaining.

5.6 Harmonization versus Distinctiveness
When business and government cooperate in a regulatory regime, it remains an ongoing
question whether the regime should create harmonious practices across various locations,
products, and industries, or respect granularity and specificity across the impacted units.
The data show that different factors may urge business and government to support or
oppose each pole of this duality, creating continuous tension. These factors can be
categorized according to two main mechanisms.

5.6.1 Government Distinctiveness
The value of polycentric institutions in protecting society and the environment, and in
addressing global environmental issues, has been long acknowledged by scholars
(Ostrom, 2010b, 2012). Polycentric systems have multiple authorities at differing scales,
each exercising sufficient independence to make norms and rules within its focal domain.
A polycentric system can better pursue goals, first by experimentation across the units
based on local context, and then by sharing the learning (Ostrom, 2012). Moreover, one
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of the circular economy’s tenets is diversification (i.e., the involvement of complex
modules and subsystems) because involving heterogeneous subsystems can enhance the
main system’s resilience (Beaulieu et al., 2015; Ellen MacArthur Foundation, 2013).
This polycentricity is observable at both provincial and municipal levels. By definition,
provincial policies bring into account the unique aspects of the jurisdiction. While this
ability might be the raison d’être of a federal system, participating experts acknowledged
that it could also create quasi-competitive mechanisms that lead to unnecessary schisms,
making it hard to align idiosyncratic policies across provinces. In case of waste
management in Ontario, the architecture of the system makes it unique in Canada,
referred to by its supporters as “true extended producer responsibility,” which is also
curiously followed by other jurisdictions. Similarly, as discussed earlier, local municipal
governments tend to emphasize their unique local needs that should be treated differently
by stewardship programs. Interviewees from both municipal and provincial levels viewed
this autonomy as a potential advantage bestowed by the constitution, as one participant
(interviewee M8) clarified:
The idea that a municipality still has its own autonomy, that's
entrenched in the Municipal Acts; it is what it is because of our
constitution. Our constitution, with the division of powers, 91 and 92,
that allows municipalities to be responsible for waste. That is not
unique to Ontario. That is a nation-wide concept.
From a legal perspective, waste programs should respect these differences as each
municipality has its idiosyncratic needs. For example, in many regions, consumers carry
their hazardous waste to depots, but in cities like Toronto, the local government tends to
have provisions in place to collect MHSW waste from households that otherwise would
need to use public transport to carry their hazardous waste to depots; a sparsely populated
municipality may need only a few collection events year round. Municipalities have also
developed heterogeneous provisions for recycling, such as the type of materials they
accept and how waste should be categorized. However, operation-wise, such distinctions
often generate extra costs and problems. Therefore, those involved in managing and
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funding the operations strongly advocate harmonization and cost standardization. In one
observed business convention, a steward complained about how the authority of
municipalities to develop their idiosyncratic systems caused preventable costs to the
expense of business, resulting in unnecessarily fancy facilities with little practicality:
They have a region in Ontario, kind of Taj Mahal collection area,
which the industry has to pay for, and we didn’t want to [raise a fuss
about it] because during the development of the legislation, they would
just run to Queen’s Park to complain [to the government]. So, they
were charging $40 per hour whether they collect 10 [units of products]
or 500. Just to be the “Maytag repairman.”
Referring to a classical TV commercial, this quotation reflects stewards’ concern about
how distinct municipal systems could cause stewards significant costs in some
municipalities, making the program far from the operationally efficient for business. Of
course, municipal experts challenged this view by reminding that stewards only paid their
own share of the programs, not even all of it, let alone for the facilities and existing
technology.
Furthermore, by and large, the governments of Canada and Ontario were both viewed by
business as strong advocates of global environmental actions. This approach specifically
impacted the chemical industry and MHSW stewards, and firms sometimes expressed
their concerns about this progressive view, such as Canada’s focus on environmental
issues in the G8 summit in 2017, or the formation of the Standing Committee on
Environment and Sustainable Development at Canada’s House of Commons.
Some business experts interpreted these measures as prioritizing global issues to
domestic needs, which shrinks the economy. From the business perspective, the
importance of transnational issues should be determined based on the local issues; one
example of this was what an industry member termed “the Trump effect.” To illustrate,
after the U.S. presidential election in 2016, with increasing pressure by Donald Trump on
other members of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), businesses in
Canada had their own share of concerns about the harms that altering NAFTA might have
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on the country’s economy. But despite these concerns, some stewards were hopeful that
the Trump effect might slow down the high-level decisions in Canada about the
environmental policies, as this expert (interviewee B1) stated:
With what’s happening in the United States with the whole NAFTA
thing, I think that’s backed up a bit; I think they are less activist now in
Ottawa than they were intending to be. That’s my hope [...]. There is
also a dissenting report by the Conservatives on the Standing
Committee; that’s kind of pushing back a bit […]. Hopefully, that
Trump effect will see all those things go away.
Given that the United States is the main trade partner of many Canadian industries, from
this expert’s view, the Trump effect could help preserve the local alignment with the
United States. Conversely, global trends could act in the opposite way, creating
opportunities for the United States as a “polluted haven.”
This example reflects the fact that business tends to welcome global harmonization when
it can facilitate doing business. The Global Harmonized System (wherein different
countries seek to embrace more commonalities in their requirements for products,
labelling, and stewardship) is another example of this sentiment. Stewards consider this
system useful as it can engender more alignment in Canada-U.S. standards, facilitating
operations for multinational firms.
In summary, regulators may emphasize developing distinctive systems to meet unique
regional needs across jurisdictions and municipalities, and may aspire to take leading
positions in global environmental moves. Meanwhile, business is generally an advocate
of harmony, especially with its trade partner countries.

5.6.2 Operational Simplicity
As mentioned, distinctiveness rarely results in optimal cost effectiveness in a regulatory
regime. To reduce costs, the system needs to harmonize the units within the domain.
Harmonization can be favourable for both government and business. For government,
because the process of regulating is highly time-consuming and resource-intensive,
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harmonization can simplify the complexity (e.g., by treating different municipal systems
equally). Further, it is often simpler for regulators to treat all regulated materials equally.
For stewards, harmonizing the operational aspects of running the programs is a highly
desirable goal, but harmonizing across different material groups is not, as reflected in a
quotation from interviewee S6—an expert experienced in various stewardship programs:
MHSW is very product specific. Therefore, it lends itself more to the
producers of that product to say, “Well, why am I associated with these
other people? I produce tanks for consumer carbonated drinks; why am
I associated with propane tanks?!”
In summary, harmonization results in a simplicity that underlies efficiency; hence,
business values harmonization, which serves the economy of the program. Furthermore,
harmonization creates economies of scale, which again increases cost efficiency (e.g.,
when the same collection system serves a variety of materials). However, because all
different regions and different material groups have their idiosyncratic needs, an opposite
force directs the programs to a level of distinctiveness. Interestingly, whereas government
initially respected the distinctiveness across the regions, harmonization is even desirable
for regulators who prefer to develop more abstract and generalizable rules. As a result,
tension between these two concepts will remain a salient tension in a hybrid model of
regulation.
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Chapter 6

6

Theory and Discussion

This research aims to answer the question: How can business and government coordinate
their actions to realize a circular economy? To answer this question, I studied a context
where effective coordination was not realized through a government-persuaded voluntary
collective action, nor through a government regulation. The shortcomings of either
alternative (i.e., ISR and government regulation) and the unsatisfactory outcomes
ultimately led to the formation of a coordination mechanism in which both business and
government participated in developing a regulatory regime. This regime is more effective
in generating the expected results and facilitating the transition to a circular economy.
Thus, I answer the above research question mainly by understanding the resultant
coordination mechanism, which is a hybrid form of regulation. Moreover, understanding
the stages before the formation of this hybrid regulation model helped me to better
understand the model and its advantages compared to the two pure alternatives, and to
provide a comparative model based on both the literature and my findings.
In this chapter, I first overview the context and outline the phenomenon based on both the
literature and my research. This overview lays the ground for making sense of the process
and answering the research question. Next, I explain the pattern of the hybrid model and
the main actions in rule setting and enforcement, and how these actions are required to
achieve the outcomes. I also explain how this model can solve the common limitations of
the two pure alternatives. Lastly, I elaborate on the tensions that characterize this hybrid
model.

6.1 Revisiting the Phenomenon
Post-consumer waste has historically been managed by local governments, using taxbased budgets, often as an amorphous mass of useless materials with no distinction
among producers and products. This aggregative model of waste management has been
so deeply entrenched in the socio-technical institutions that when the responsibility of
managing post-consumer materials transferred from the society level to the firm level, it
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was disruptive and almost impossible for the average firm to control its waste
individually. This collective responsibility, therefore, required collective action. Yet, in
Ontario, for about two decades, business avoided taking on the new responsibility
voluntarily except for a few isolated, short-lived self-regulation programs. The ebb and
flow of government’s pressure on business resulted in inconsistent responses and
unfulfilled ISR. Not only was business uncooperative with other actors, but individual
industries and firms were not even motivated to cooperate among themselves.
In response, the provincial government regulators imposed costly regulations on business.
Due to the collective structure of the existing waste management systems, and because no
other solution was available for handling the relatively urgent problem of waste, the
regulation aimed to maintain the status quo. The result was a governance system to
coerce collective-level business actions and translate them into firm-level mandates. This
translation was achieved through monetary tools which are common in many government
regulatory regimes, such as carbon taxing. The regulation aimed to secure the preexisting waste management systems operated on the discretion of municipal
governments. Moreover, to secure the expected outcomes, regulators strictly defined the
means by which the program had to operate and be monitored, all of which was to be
funded by regulated firms but without giving them much authority to define the means.
The regulators viewed this model of linking individual and collective regulation as an
innovative policy regime. Theoretically, it aimed to convert a collective responsibility
into a shared responsibility (i.e., distributive to any firm). This model could utilize the
existing institutions and processes that were mostly shaped by almost independent
municipalities in a polycentric system. This type of regulation partly solved the problem
of business’s avoidance of taking voluntary collective actions consistently, and met the
government’s goal of securing sufficient funds to help municipalities maintain their
existing systems. However, it completely failed in spurring new solutions for the ultimate
environmental goals. Further, this rigid structure left minimal agency to industry,
resulting in new costs for firms who deemed the process inefficient. Yet, the collectivelevel regulation had hindered industry’s typical capabilities to improve the operations and
enhance the efficiency. Finally, conflict of stakeholder interests and power imbalances in
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fulfilling the regulation brought about continuous dissonance and, in many cases, farfrom-optimal results. Thus, overall, neither the society-level not business-level goals
were achieved.
Consistent with the past literature, when non-cooperative firms faced shared ”enemies” in
this context, they gradually developed stronger in-group identity and showed more
forceful reactions against the out-group (Pozner & Rao, 2006). Various industries
challenged the stringent regulation, which can be viewed as a form of institutional work
by industry (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Nilsson, 2013). Simultaneously, the
government’s ambitious extension of the collective-level regulation to a number of other
products also created strong backlash from citizens and media, which put extra pressure
on the regulators, who acknowledged the drawbacks of the prescriptive regulation. As a
result, the government-imposed collective-level regulation transformed into a new form
of collective action—one that differs from previously known models and is a hybrid
regulatory regime. I outline this model by identifying the pattern that was used for
different materials through the process of hybridization.

6.2 The Hybrid Model of Regulation
Inspired by the case of the MHSW program in Ontario, the model that this research
suggests goes beyond the conventional forms of government and self-regulatory regimes
and is a mixed regulatory model (Rees, 1988) with business at the centre stage. It is
different from the two common forms because the involvement of business and
government is almost equal, in a way that even some stewards perceive the system as
their own program in which government intervenes—a claim that was rejected with the
data. It is different from ISR because the government’s involvement is beyond the known
intervention of non-business actors in ISR (King et al., 2012), and it is not a conventional
government regulatory system because the role of business is beyond normal. Although
the importance of “listening to firms” in regulatory systems is acknowledged in the
literature (Malesky & Taussig, 2017), the level of business involvement in rule setting
and enforcement exceeds the common levels drastically.
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Hybridity refers to “the state of being composed through the mixture of disparate parts”
(Battilana & Lee, 2014: 400). In particular, using the label of “hybrid” in this research is
informed by the literature on “mechanism-centred” hybrids (Seibel, 2015). Whereas a
conventional “sector-centred” perspective of hybridity focuses on overlapping sectoral
segments and coordination structures that arise due to the conflict of sectors (e.g., in
cross-sector partnerships), a mechanism-centred perspective conceptualizes hybridity as a
combination of basic sector-specific mechanisms. Such an approach facilitates the
exploration of latent hybridity (Seibel, 2015).
As such, a hybrid regulation utilizes different mechanisms common in the two pure
regulatory solutions (i.e., government regulation and ISR), and moves between the
mechanisms of these two forms iteratively. For example, as discussed in Chapter 5,
whereas provincial government regulation protects the discretion of municipal
governments and their idiosyncratic models, business is preoccupied with the concept of
efficiency, which calls for harmonized models. In the identified hybrid model, neither a
heterogeneous nor a homogenous system is prioritized, but in such a complex
phenomenon, actors iteratively consider these options in multitudinous real situations and
co-develop systems that may draw on various combinations of the two. The resultant
program will go through a dynamic process that can better address the emerging and
outstanding issues over time. Accordingly, the proposed hybrid model inherits some
characteristics of each of the original regimes but also resolves some of their
shortcomings.
To explain the identified hybrid model, we must reconsider that every regulatory regime
has two core processes: rule setting and enforcement. The former denotes all the
processes of formation and release of the goals, policies, and rules; the latter deals with
monitoring and control mechanisms to ensure compliance and penalize non-compliant
actors. In a pure government-regulated regime, the government both sets the rules and the
enforcement provisions, either directly or through its affiliated organizations. In a pure
self-regulatory regime, industry voluntarily sets the rules and may or may not establish
intra-industry enforcement mechanisms. As discussed in Chapter 2, scholars have also
noticed self-regulatory regimes in which the government, for instance, runs either rule
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setting or enforcement, and leaves the other to industry (Gunningham & Rees, 1997;
Rees, 1988).
The marriage of government regulation and ISR mechanisms in this particular hybrid
model requires both actors to coordinate both rule setting and enforcement. This
interconnectedness is beyond the division of practice between the two sectors with
occasional interactions. As shown in Figure 7, the identified hybrid model involves five
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core practices in rule setting and enforcement.

Setting rules of practice
and defining structure

Endogenous enforcement by
business entities

2

4

1
Mandating the action
and defining the
foundations

5

3
Monitoring business’s
self-regulation

Overarching exogenous
enforcement

Rule Setting
Enforcement
Stages of Regulation
Figure 7. A Hybrid Approach to Regulation and Its Five Core Practices

6.2.1 Rule Setting
Government and business coordinate rule setting through the three first core practices. In
the first core practice, after the identification of the specific market failure, government
institutes a regulatory regime. At this point, to ensure that an appropriate and timely
action will be taken, and business will not pursue avoidance or resistance strategies,
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government mandates the action by defining the foundations of the regulatory regime.
These foundations can include ultimate goals, the scope and type of actions needed, those
responsible, and even broad requirements that need further development. Government
can also develop roadmaps or propose strategies to guide the next steps, but at this stage,
the requirements do not go beyond high-level principles and requirements, leaving it to
business to study the practical aspects and set rules that may vary across different
industries, sectors, groups of firms, or even individual companies and products.
This approach is equifinal and ensures the flexibility required for utilizing business’s
capabilities to develop solutions that meet the high-level goals and principles, but does
not disregard legitimate firm-level interests. An exemplary instance of flexibility in the
studied case was business’s agency during the hybridization process (stage 3 in the
narrative) to take actions either individually or collectively, in any collective forms that a
group of firms may find effective and efficient. In sharp contrast to the structure that
government imposed through the collective-level regulation (stage 2), such flexibility
resulted in the active involvement of industry in maintaining its efficiency-driven
mechanisms (e.g., minimizing the costs of operations by utilizing different arrays of
individual and collective actions). More importantly, the active involvement of business
can bring about competition, as different service providers will emerge to provide more
efficient and effective services and individual firms may also opt to seek internal
solutions. This market competition mechanism is a driver of innovation that propels
movement towards the intended outcomes (here, a circular economy) while serving
business’s interests.
The above dynamics unfold in the second core practice, in which business finds the
opportunity to develop policies that translate the foundational rules into operation-level
regulations and structures, in the form of competing systems that pursue the designated
goals. In such a regime, the private involvement goes beyond the conventional means in
government regulation, such as industry lobbying and government’s formal consultation
with stakeholders.
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In the third core practice, the fine-grained regulation developed by business should be
approved by the government to ensure that it can meet the foundational requirements—
that is, the translation of foundational rules to practice rules set by business will address
the focal market failure and meet the intended goals. Moreover, because the model allows
for the formation of heterogeneous self-regulatory regimes by business, this core practice
helps government to ascertain that the business systems complement each other, and no
gap will remain unaddressed. Together, these first three core practices embody the
coordination of government and business in rule setting, as the first part of a regulatory
regime.

6.2.2 Enforcement
Upon implementing the co-defined regime based on the agreed-upon structure, both the
government and business sides are also involved in enforcement. As the fourth core
practice, industry actors establish their own monitoring and compliance mechanisms to
ensure that their regulatory system is implemented in compliance with the regulatory
regime. Somewhat predictably, business organically creates this endogenous enforcement
because it not only prevents potential government sanctions due to non-compliance, but
also, with collectively shaped actions, it serves the participants’ interests by preventing
free riding. Endogenous enforcement might deploy both norm-based mechanisms similar
to those in conventional collective actions (Ostrom, 2000a) and formal enforcement
mechanisms, such as industry audits.
For two reasons, endogenous enforcement does not obviate the need for exogenous
enforcement by government or its designated third party. First, historically, ISR has been
vulnerable to becoming a self-serving means, minimizing industry efforts, and generating
insufficient efficacy (Borck & Coglianese, 2009; King & Lenox, 2000; Rivera, 2010).
This risk is higher in contexts with a less successful history of partnership and more
heterogenous actors, such as the one I studied. Second, given that the hybrid model
allows equifinality (i.e., firms can adopt various means to meet the ends), there is a risk
that the expected total sum of the adopted actions leaves unattended gaps; hence,
exogenous enforcement can ensure that no void has remained across different actions
taken in the regime.
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Accordingly, the fifth and last core practice is where government establishes its
independent mechanisms to monitor the compliance of all firms impacted by the
regulation and impose penalties and potential incentives on that basis. As a unique
characteristic of the studied regulatory regime, this government enforcement mechanism
is mandated to be entirely funded by industry. Such a provision can secure that
government change or budget fluctuations will not harm the outcomes.

6.3 Solving the Ubiquitous Drawbacks of Regulatory
Regimes
Each of the five core practices involved in setting the rules and enforcing the identified
hybrid model is arguably necessary to resolve the key shortcomings of prevalent
regulatory solutions. The first such shortcoming is the fact that the very formation of a
regulatory regime is uncertain. Business operates at a different level compared to society
and this jeopardizes the formation of such regimes, because the issues at the society level
do not immediately transfer to business issues (Garud & Gehman, 2012; Geels, 2011;
Geels & Schot, 2007). Therefore, when a new issue emerges at the macro level, it may
gradually take the form of a business responsibility (e.g., managing post-consumer
materials). In such cases, immediate and comprehensive government regulation might not
take form to translate the issue into a business mandate. Further, literature has well
acknowledged that self-regulation is vulnerable to substantial delay, until the external
pressure reaches a certain level (Egorov & Harstad, 2017). Lack of an official mandate
for action makes the initiative vulnerable to business resistance or intermittent actions by
businesses just to safeguard themselves. The first core practice of the proposed hybrid
model solves this shortcoming by early government rule setting at the minimal level. By
limiting government endeavours to the fundamental goals and broad requirements of the
future regime, the formal regulatory process becomes less costly and sufficiently agile—
qualities that are not common in formal bureaucratic regulation.
Second, in the second core practice, the involvement of business in setting the rules can
not only prevent potential conflicts which may stem from ineffective regulation, but can
also give the firms an opportunity to utilize their expertise in market mechanisms and
enhance the efficiency, effectiveness, and innovativeness of the regulatory regime. When
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rule setting deals with evolving problems and unprecedented business practices, such as
those to close material loops, constraining the involvement of business to the methods
common in public policy making, such as stakeholder consultation when legislation is
under development and lobbying, can miss the multiple aspects and impacts of the policy.
Insufficient engagement of business can bring about shortcomings in implementation,
such as minimal business response (i.e., just sufficient to ensure compliance with
requirements), and lack of fit between the imposed rules and complexities of the resultant
actions. This shortcoming can lead to the two forms of decoupling, as discussed by
Bromley and Powell (2012): a gap between policy and practice, or a gap between practice
and goals.
Third, government approval of industry’s regulatory process, which occurs as part of the
third core practice in the model, will prevent the problem of converting a collective
action to a self-serving mechanism, as noticed in the literature (Borck & Coglianese,
2009; King & Lenox, 2000; Rivera, 2010). This core practice is not common in any of
the discussed regulatory regimes. Yet, by doing so, government ensures that first, the
individual or collective business entity has translated the goals to means and proposed a
workable structure to coordinate the actions, and second, the aggregation of the planned
actions by different entities leaves no gap or overlap across the actions that may cause
future conflicts. Thus, expectedly this practice needs government to protect the interests
of various stakeholders, which may require a process of negotiation and adjustments.
Fourth, business’s endogenous control mechanisms in the fourth core practice can utilize
intra-industry institutions that sustain the action. In a conventional collective action,
norm-based control mechanisms are the main means to secure the compliance of
individual entities. Endogenous norms and intrinsic motivations can be such effective
levers that scholars prioritize them over exogenous regulatory control (Montgomery &
Bean, 1999; Ostrom, 2000a; Reeson & Tisdell, 2008). Although informal and normbased control mechanisms may also take shape in the hybrid model, formal endogenous
control mechanisms are necessary to prevent free riding. Endogenous enforcement can
also secure compliance with regulation, as the minimal level of requirement. Moreover, it
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can prevent the second and more common form of decoupling discussed by Bromley and
Powell (2012) (i.e., a gap between daily practice and intended outcome).
Fifth, endogenous enforcement mechanisms in a non-voluntary action, such as the hybrid
model, are not sufficient, because it may not deliver the required “iron fist,” which is
missing in many self-regulatory regimes and is often deemed the main reason for
underperformance of the self-regulated firms (Héritier & Eckert, 2009; King & Lenox,
2000). In absence of formal enforcement bodies, intra-industry enforcement mechanisms
may hardly suffice to penalize the non-compliant firms. Therefore, exogenous
enforcement is crucial when firms are not cooperative enough to self-regulate effectively.
Further, exogenous enforcement can secure transparency and prevent information
asymmetry, as performance reports and information sharing are often a requirement of
regulatory systems.
In this way, the identified hybrid model is an apt solution for many emerging social and
environmental challenges that can best be addressed by collectives, given the diverse
challenges in collective-level regulation to address market failures. We will compare this
hybrid model with other alternatives in next chapter.
It should be noted that the above account of the iterations in a hybrid model represents
the minimal interactions required to prevent the drawbacks of alternative regulatory
regimes. In practice, such interactions typically exceed these minimums, as business,
government, and other stakeholders actively interact in each of the five core practices.
For example, consistent with the data on the hybridization process in Ontario’s MHSW
program, in the third core practice, the government did not merely approve a proposed
self-regulatory regime; it may include a dynamic process in which different parties agree
on different elements of the industry’s regulation. In addition, the proposed interactions
in the model do not substitute for other common interactions in formal regulation, such as
lobbying or advocacy by the industry to influence the initial regulatory foundations.
Regulatory regimes are subject to cyclical change, and the proposed model can also take
the form of cycles; to this end, point 5 in Figure 7 may continue with a new cycle of rule
setting and enforcement.
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6.4 Tensions as Characteristics of the Hybrid Model
In Chapter 5, I explained how the analysis revealed that the model is characterized by
four dualities that embody four tensions. These tensions are unique to the hybrid
regulation, compared to other regulatory regimes. This finding is consistent with the
existing studies on hybrids, as hybridity, by definition, refers to the composition of
disparate elements (Battilana & Lee, 2014; Jay, 2013; Seibel, 2015). The same quality
applies to the identified model, as the model iterates frequently between the two distinct
regulatory regimes by government and business, and juxtaposes two sets of mechanisms
that, in a pure form of regulation, do not coexist.
Further analysis revealed that none of the four tensions were salient in the previous stages
of the studied phenomenon; yet one pole of each duality was identified at the second
stage, when government coerced the collective-level regulation. First, the government
regulation was shaped to engender compliance. Although industry increasingly
contradicted the prescriptive regulation from time to time, firms had no option other than
short-term acquiescence (Rivera, 2010) and to meet the minimal requirements.
Second, at this stage, the program was formally decoupled from business—industry did
not “own” the practices and merely contributed financially. This action was deemed a
legitimate response because at that early stage, the government’s primary focus was on
securing the existing waste management practices through municipal systems, and this
goal could be met by financial contributions from business.
Third, this regulatory regime established strong control over means to ensure that, in such
a de novo collective-level regulatory system, the linkage between individual firms and
the collective initiative is strongly established and will yield the expected result. The
government’s focus on means was especially significant because of business’s past
avoidance of taking collective actions. It took some years until the insufficiency of ends
in meeting higher-level goals, such as closing material loops, attracted the government’s
attentions.
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Finally, regulation typically tends to create harmony. In the collective-level regulation,
the government was naturally preoccupied with designing a novel system to handle the
collective-level problem of waste. Not surprisingly, the result did not address the
heterogeneity of the involved materials, industries, and regions. It established a single
IFO to run the program in 2002, with its scope gradually expanded to other materials,
including MHSW materials in 2008. The regulators did not pay sufficient attention to the
idiosyncratic needs of different sectors and product-specificity of waste management—
though admittedly, is it difficult to include such details in such a regulatory regime.
These characteristics are not unique to the studied government regulation. Any such
regime that tackles new collective-level problems is likely to focus on compliance, allow
decoupling, focus on establishing means, and try to harmonize the practice.
The transition from the collective-level regulation to the hybrid model was parallel with
the emergence of four new concepts that are opposite poles of the four initial dominant
concepts. Interestingly, the new concepts did not dominate their opposite poles; rather,
the opposite poles continued to coexist and sustain ongoing tensions. Figure 8
summarizes the process and demonstrates the existence (or absence) of each concept in
the three stages. The two first stages represent the pure forms and the last stage represents
the hybrid model.
As outlined in Chapter 3, a tension is defined as the state of “two phenomena in a
dynamic relationship that involve both competition and complementarity” (English,
2001; Epstein et al., 2015). Importantly, the identified tensions are not merely conflicts
among the actors. In most cases, these tensions exist even within a single actor group,
such as the ongoing question among the stewards of whether they should integrate waste
management operations into their core business or decouple it by outsourcing it to
recyclers and service providers.
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Figure 8. The Formation of the Hybrid Model and Emergence of Tensions
Figure 9 includes four 2x2 grids that schematically demonstrate how each of the
mechanisms that underlie a specific tension (as identified in Figure 2 and also explained
in Chapter 5) can be associated with an actor and one pole of the duality. For instance, in
the compliance-proactivity duality, three mechanisms underlie the tension. As per
“stringency of regulation,” whereas business argues that imposing more strict regulation
urges firms to merely try to minimally comply, data suggest that more strict regulation
can also enhance proactivity, and some stewards confirm this view; thus, stringency of
regulation feeds into this tension even within business. Alternatively, as per “program
scale,” whereas business argues that increasing the scale of programs increases costs and
harms the competitiveness of Canadian business, government tries to use scale and
encourage business to find innovative solutions to appreciate the value of waste; thus,
program scale feeds into this tension due to the different ways in which business and
government perceive the issue. It should be noted that this depiction of tension
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mechanisms provides a schematic view and the identified mechanisms involve somewhat
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more complicated relationships, as discussed in Chapter 5.
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Figure 9. Associating Tension Mechanisms to Business and Government
The four tensions embody the nature of this hybrid model. The fact that they were not
salient in the previous stages is due to this nature that juxtaposes inconsistent elements
from pure models. More particularly, the tension between proactivity and compliance did
not emerge in stage 2 because, first, the prescriptive structure imposed by government
curbed any actions by business except for the incremental moves that ultimately
transformed the regime. Further, the compliance-based regime treated the post-consumer
waste responsibility as a fixed cost added almost harmoniously to all similar products,
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offering little motivation for proactive efforts. The decoupling-integration tension did not
take form in stage 2 simply because the regime prescribed a pre-existing system
decoupled from business—and again, the coerced structure left no room for developing
integrative ideas. For the same reason, the focus was on controlling the rigid structure and
the means, rather than leaving them to business and focusing on the end. Finally, the
stringent regulation treated the regulated units harmoniously, as government regulation is
often abstract and general, leaving practical details to implementers.
These tensions can prevent the dominance of one pole of each of the dualities over a long
period of time, because different actor groups—as well as the heterogeneous actors
within a group—may lean towards to opposing poles, especially in the long term. For
example, although stewards initially preferred a decoupled system to fulfill the
requirements, many of them later considered the potential advantages of integrating the
system into their business. Therefore, the tensions do not represent a transition phase;
rather, they depict the ongoing dynamics of this hybrid model. Arguably, the four
identified tensions apply to any form of hybrid regulation to protect the natural
environment due to the coexistence of conflicting elements in such a model. In the
following section, I provide a theoretical overview of each tension.

6.4.1 Compliance versus Proactivity
The notion of proactivity or reactivity is a point of apparent conflict in the existing
literature. On the one hand, collective action is fundamentally viewed as the most
proactive strategy taken by industry to go beyond compliance and address social and
environmental expectations (Rivera et al., 2009). On the other hand, ISR scholars have
noticed that despite this gesture of goodwill, industry often aims to meet the bare
minimum expectations in advance, rather than waiting for more strict requirements
(Borck & Coglianese, 2009; King et al., 2012). Further, such actions are far from real
proactivity, because (similar to business’s response to typical government regulations)
they entail minimal compliance with basic requirements. These two perspectives, both
supported by diverse evidence, bifurcate the existing views to ISR.
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The studied hybrid model represents and reconciles both perspectives. I propose that
industry moves in cycles of proactivity and passivity. This proposition is supported by the
observation that when the studied industries confronted the surging regulatory
requirements, after a period of compliance seeking, they decided to take the lead and
perform a few proactive actions. Indeed, business may find that economizing the costs by
focusing on bare minimal compliance can be even more costly when exogenous actors
take the lead and raise the requirements continually. Thus, although proactive business
actions impose immediate cost, proactivity may financially pay off in the long term. This
dual effect creates a tension between compliance and proactivity in the hybrid model, as
the regulatory elements of the action activate compliance, which seems a less costly
response. Yet, proactivity can forestall further imposition of government requirements
with respect to the ongoing action.
As the data suggest, the compliance-proactivity tension is reflected in industry’s periods
of proactivity throughout their ongoing compliance efforts, such as the voluntary
adoption of the bulb and lighting waste program in 2014, or the decision to seek
innovative solutions for used materials like coatings and tires. Figure 10 represents an
example of how, through the surging requirements in the studied context, firms signalled
different levels of proactiveness. Given the uncertain short- and long-term costs of
proactive actions and the heterogeneity of incumbent the firms that partake in collective
decision making, choosing between the two poles of the duality will constitute an
ongoing tension between them.
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Figure 10. A Schematic Flowchart of Periods of Proactivity in the Hybrid Model

6.4.2 Decoupling versus Integration
Decoupling might be the first response of business to a new policy, where compliance
with the policy becomes ceremonial (Fiss & Zajac, 2012; Meyer & Rowan, 1977;
Sandholtz, 2012). Organizations decouple their practices when they find a conflict
between their core practices and the fragmented environment, characterized by diverse
rules, soft laws (e.g., standards), and norms. Decoupling may represent a disconnect
between either formal policy and daily practice, or daily practice and intended outcome
(Bromley & Powell, 2012). As Sandholtz (2012) notes, decoupling seems to be the most
replicated finding across many studies of compliance. In fact, enforcing compliance on
firms may curb the goal achievement prospects (Wijen, 2012). Nevertheless, decoupling
can create legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and serves the interests of powerful
organizational leaders (Westphal & Zajac, 2001), among other results. As represented in
the case study, when regulation requires a new business practice to protect the natural
environment, decoupling can save costs and help business buffer its core practices.
Nonetheless, by allowing business to self-regulate towards the goals, a hybrid regulation
can also encourage business to integrate the new policy into its core; this may occur in a
variety of ways. First, business may gradually find potential advantages in integration of
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the program within its core (as in the studied context, where the industry eventually
accepted the waste sector within its boundaries, and began to discuss whether integration
was also possible within individual firms). Second, the diversity of involved firms in a
collective action and their agency to develop different self-regulatory provisions can
create integration opportunities that may be pursued by some innovative actors. In
particular, environmental frameworks such as the circular economy suggest various
business models that bring environmentally beneficial operations to the heart of firms’
practices (Bocken, Short, Rana, & Evans, 2014; Ellen MacArthur Foundation, 2013).
It should be noted that innovative outcomes in such a system are not merely the result of
complete integration. For instance, mainstream business may decouple its responsibility
and transfer it to service providers who, for their own interest, compete to develop
innovative solutions. As such, the ongoing tension between proactivity and integration
can support innovation in different forms. In short, heterogeneity of firms in such a
hybrid regime will create an ongoing tension between adopting practices to decouple the
requirements versus integrating them within the core business.

6.4.3 Control over Means versus Ends
In the studied context, regulators gradually restructured the regime to leave part of the
means to industry and focus more on control over ends (i.e., outcome-based
enforcement). This approach can utilize the self-regulatory capacity of firms in
developing strategies and practice-level policies and designing actions that can meet the
environmental goals in the most efficient way. However, in a real setting, the regulator’s
tendency to intervene in means will not vanish easily, for a number of reasons. First, the
boundaries between the roles of government and business in rule setting and enforcement
are blurry and remain open to interpretation in different contexts. We can expect that, in
order to protect its interests, business would prefer to extend its share in rule setting as
much as it can, and government may tend to curb it. Further, in a turbulent field with
multiple stakeholders and pre-established institutions, government is also influenced by
other actors, such as NGOs and municipal governments, and should protect its interests
as well, which might conflict with those of business, resulting in government’s further
involvement in setting rules and controlling the ends. As such, the degree to which a
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government may allocate resources to control the means or the ends will remain an
ongoing tension in the hybrid model.

6.4.4 Harmonization versus Distinctiveness
As noted, scholars have discussed the critical role of polycentric institutions in protecting
society and the environment and addressing global environmental problems (Ostrom,
2010b, 2012). Unlike a monocentric governing unit, polycentric systems have multiple
authorities at differing scales, each exercising sufficient independence to make norms and
rules within the focal domain. Such systems can have various advantages. For instance,
given the uncertainty and changing nature of sustainability problems as grand challenges
(Ferraro, Etzion, & Gehman, 2015), optimal solutions do not exist; a polycentric system
can better pursue the goals by fostering experimentation across the units based on local
context and sharing learning (Ostrom, 2012). The strengths of a granular, polycentric
system are also well understood in the circular economy approach to sustainability. The
circular economy supports diversification (i.e., involvement of several modules and
subsystems) as one of its tenets, because diversification can enhance system resilience
(Beaulieu et al., 2015; Ellen MacArthur Foundation, 2013).
Nevertheless, polycentricity may not serve optimal cost effectiveness in a regulatory
regime. To reduce costs, the system needs to harmonize the units within the domain.
Harmonization results in simplicity, which underlies efficiency, which in turn serves the
economy of the action and might be key in sustaining the regime. Furthermore,
harmonization creates economies of scale, which is again a major driver of costefficiency. In the context of this study, where different regions pursued their own
idiosyncratic needs, business found it extremely expensive to maintain the existing
granularity. Arguably, the tension between the two concepts will remain an ongoing
tension in a hybrid regulatory model.
In summary, the four tensions in the model represent fundamental dualities that the
studied hybrid regulation for the circular economy confronts. The tensions between the
poles of these dualities are not temporary and will sustain as long as the hybrid model
exists, because the inherent mechanisms in the hybrid model perpetuate the conflicting
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poles. These mechanisms are fuelled by the conflicting elements of government
regulation and self-regulatory regimes. Hence, harvesting the results of a hybrid model
requires tackling such tensions continually and constructively. Such an effort needs both
groups of actors—that is, government and business—to find the balance in each tension
over time, in a way that does not jeopardize the hybrid nature of the model (i.e., with
dominance of the mechanisms of one regulatory regime) over the long term. Maintaining
such a balance will secure the livelihood of the action and the achievement of the
expected innovative outcomes.
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Chapter 7

7

Contribution and Conclusion

As stated, the main goal of this research has been to answer the question: How can
business and government coordinate their actions to realize a circular economy? This
question is vital because overconsumption of natural resources—and its subsequent
impact on society—is reaching crisis levels, making the circular economy imperative.
However, the circular economy requires various disruptive business models and value
chains, innovative technologies, and novel institutions, which call for synergistic business
actions and policy changes. Hence, given the urgency of closing material loops,
coordinating government regulation and business’s self-imposed regulation is critical to
propel actions. Nonetheless, effective coordination is the missing link in many contexts,
including the one studied here.
To this end, simply increasing either government regulation or self-regulation cannot
address the problems, as each alternative suffers from its own inadequacies. Instead, as
some scholars have noted, innovative amalgamation of the two can have remarkable
advantages (Gunningham & Rees, 1997; Rubenstein, 2011). I studied a case where, in
absence of cooperative business-government relations, such an innovative model
evolved. I identified the pattern of this particular model of hybrid regulation as one in
which both business and government coordinate both rule setting and enforcement
through five core practices. The main advantage of the model is that it can ultimately
result in business proactivity. Proactivity drives innovation and can yield groundbreaking
solutions to meet the vision and goals set by government. A key finding about the model
is that it is characterized by particular constructive tensions; this is an important finding,
as it emphasizes the ongoing dynamics that must be continuously managed.
Acknowledging such tensions and their potential constructive nature is crucial in
generating the expected innovative outcomes.
By answering the above question, this research contributes to theory in three major ways.
First, it extends the theory of ISR, as one type of collective actions, by attending to the
marriage of government regulation and self-regulation. Scholars of ISR have long
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realized that regulators frequently influence or intervene in self-regulatory regimes,
creating a blurry boundary for “self”-regulation (King et al., 2012; Rees, 1988), but
mixing the two can have merits too. In spite of this awareness, especially by scholars in
public policy, literature on ISR (and relevant fields such as collective action and interorganizational relationships) is preoccupied with intra-industry coordination. My research
illuminates this grey area of business-government interactions in ISR by identifying a
hybrid model. This regime evolved as the outcome of a learnings process after decades of
trial and error with the two pure models of self-regulation and government regulation.
The structure of the hybrid regulation model can resolve the common drawbacks of each
pure alternative.
Second, by going beyond the static depictions of regulatory regimes, my research
identifies four major tensions that characterize the hybrid regulation model. These
tensions stem from the hybrid nature of the action and are shaped through the
coordination of actions undertaken by heterogeneous actors. They need to be managed in
balance; otherwise, the hybrid model may tend towards one of the original regulatory
forms, limiting the potential outcomes of the model and giving way to appearance of the
common regulatory problems. Thus, active participation of different actors in the model
can secure its sustainable proactive outcomes.
Last and perhaps foremost, I suggest that this hybrid model is especially apt for
addressing the circular economy and other emerging social and environmental collective
responsibilities that require proactive business actions. Such actions are often urgent and
need immediate attention, but coordinating and implementing them is costly. Therefore,
in absence of government mandates, they are not likely to be realized in the short term. In
fact, the circular economy calls for the orchestration of distinct elements that, with the
established institutions, may not fit well together. This model can harmonize social-level
issues with both industry-level and firm-level practices.
In this chapter, I discuss each of the above contributions in more detail. Using a
combination of literature and this study’s findings, I provide a comparative analysis of
the identified model with pure models and discuss the advantages of the former. I
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conclude by explaining the implications of these contributions for practice and discussing
their limitations and boundaries, as well as the opportunities they afford for future
research.

7.1 Crossing the Boundaries of Regulatory Alternatives
Some studies on common pool resources and the tragedy of the commons point to
government-regulated actions that translate resource protection to firm-level mandates,
but firms can take collective action proactively and self-regulate to prevent the tragedy of
the commons (King & Lenox, 2000; Oliver, 1993; Ostrom, 1990; Poteete, Janssen, &
Ostrom, 2010; Rivera, 2010; Sandler, 1992). In contrast to the mandatory nature of
government regulation, business collective action is largely shaped by the assumption of
voluntariness, managed by norms and internal control mechanisms, as opposed to
exogenous rules (Ostrom, 2000a; Ostrom et al., 1994). These two alternatives, for a
particular purpose and in a limited scope, can substitute for each other; thus, ISR can
obviate the need for government regulation. In a broader institutional landscape, various
government-regulatory and self-regulatory regimes can co-exist and complement each
other.
In practice, the two pure models are rare. Business often influences government
regulation by advocating and other means, and government sometimes influences ISR in
one way or another (Gunningham & Rees, 1997; Maxwell et al., 2000; Short & Toffel,
2010; Sinclair, 1997). This involvement has created grey areas in the boundaries of the
literature (King et al., 2012). Broadly speaking, management scholars acknowledge the
dynamics of inter-organizational relationships (Majchrzak, Jarvenpaa, & Bagherzadeh,
2015). Yet, the ISR dynamics are not sufficiently studied, especially when government’s
role exceeds partial intervention. Given that more complex and dynamic patterns of
interaction between organizations are associated with successful outcomes (Majchrzak et
al., 2015), crossing the boundaries of these two models is crucial for addressing the
increasing complexity of sustainability issues.
This study contributes to this gap by undertaking an empirical investigation of a dynamic
model in which, rather than influencing each other, government regulation and self-
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regulation are intertwined. The existing empirical ISR studies do not sufficiently address
such an amalgamation of the two alternatives. Most notably, Rees (1988), acknowledging
the need for investigating hybrid models, argues that government intervenes in ISR either
at arm’s length by mandating the industry to regulate itself (i.e., “mandated full selfregulation”) or by taking on either regulating or enforcing, but not both (i.e., “mandated
partial self-regulation”). The hybrid model that I study goes beyond these alternatives, as
it was developed after trialling the two pure models and involves a balanced combination
of elements of both regimes. Drawing on the literature and the discussions in Chapter 2,
Figure 11 illustrates how the studied hybrid model differs from the major known pure and
mixed alternatives.

Business

Voluntary ISR
Two Types of Mandated Partial Self-Regulation

The Area of
Hybridity

Government

Actors

Mandated Full Self-Regulation

The
Proposed
Hybrid
Model

Government Regulation

Rule Setting

Enforcement
Stages of Regulation

Figure 11. The Major Regulatory Regimes and the Proposed Hybrid Model
Table 3 also draws on both the literature and my findings to compare the hybrid model
with government-imposed and self-regulatory regimes—specifically, when new but
challenging collective responsibilities emerge in society, offering no or little incentives
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for firms to respond voluntarily. This insufficient motivation of business is different from
many conventional regimes studied in ISR, as will be elaborated later.
Table 3. Comparing the Model with Pure Regulatory Regimes in the Absence of
Motivation for Cooperation
Self-Regulation

Government
Regulation

The Hybrid Regulation
Model

Dominant State

Government/stakeholders:
Persuasion and potentially
sanction
Business: Mainly avoidance,
potentially isolated minimal
actions as late as possible

Government:
Coercion
Business: Compliance
and/or contradiction

Business and government
coordinate rule setting
and enforcement

Outcome

Inactivity

Often minimal
compliance to
prevent penalties

Compliance and periods
of proactivity

Characteristics of the Regimes:
Embedding
Responsibility in
Business

Not realized

Business decouples
responsibility by
separating practice
from outcome

Tension between
decoupling and
integration

Focus of Control

No control

Mainly over means

Tension between control
over means and ends

Approach to
Polycentric Issues

Disjointed and temporary
actions by business

Harmonized
regulation to serve
heterogeneous needs

Tension between
harmonization and
distinctiveness

Common Shortcomings and Solutions:
Defiance/
Avoidance/ Delay

Despite the expectations,
business may avoid taking
timely collective actions

Business may resist
regulation or formal
regulation may take a
long time

With government’s highlevel rule setting, business
is motivated to flexibly
self-regulate

Free Riding

Avoidance of participation
by most individual firms

Potentially resolved if
efficient government
enforcement in place

Resolved by coenforcement

Lack of
Transparency

Ubiquitous information
asymmetry

Potentially resolved if
regulation requires
disclosure

Resolved by coenforcement

Underperformance

Minimal or no
performance, due to nonparticipation, ceremonial
adoption, or late response

Minimal performance
to comply to policy

Compliance with
requirements which
become stricter over
time, and periods of
proactivity and innovation
that improve performance
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Many previous studies have shown that problems such as business avoidance/ resistance/
delay, information asymmetry, free riding, minimal environmental performance, and
(most importantly in this context) lack of proactivity and improvement are ubiquitous
across the different regulatory alternatives to protect the environment (Arimura et al.,
2016; Blackman & Rivera, 2011; Borck & Coglianese, 2009; Darnall & Sides, 2008;
Egorov & Harstad, 2017; Gamper-Rabindran & Finger, 2013; King & Lenox, 2000;
Potoski & Prakash, 2013; Rivera, 2010; Sandler, 2015; Tashman & Rivera, 2016). These
drawbacks will be resolved by adopting the mechanisms utilized in this hybrid model.
This work proposes new possibilities in coordinating the actions of multiple actors,
including heterogeneous firms with diverse views of the problem and government.
Moreover, the comparison among the models clearly demonstrates that, in order to solve
sustainability issues, we need more mixed models, rather than more of each pure
alternative.

7.2 Hybrid Mechanisms and Tensions as Intrinsic
Characteristics
The form of hybridity identified in the regime occurs between organizations, rather than
within them. This is not a common approach to study hybridity. Although the term
“hybrid” has been used in various contexts, extant studies have mainly explored hybridity
within organizations such as social enterprises (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Battilana,
Sengul, Pache, & Model, 2015; Peteraf & Barney, 2003). The hybrid nature of such
organizations can cause tensions—for instance, between social and economic dimensions
(Battilana et al., 2015)—due to different identities (Pratt & Foreman, 2000) and logics
(Jay, 2013) as organizations face conflicting institutional demands (Greenwood, Raynard,
Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011).
This research, however, explores hybridity that occurs between organizations in order to
enhance the efficiency of coordination. The result is a mechanism-centred perspective
which is less discussed in the literature (Seibel, 2015). The model conceptualizes
hybridity as a combination of sector-specific mechanisms. My findings contribute to this
stream by delving into what constitutes a specific hybrid regulation. The hybrid model is
built upon the mechanisms borrowed from the two pure alternatives—mechanisms such
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as business’s efficiency-driven tools and government’s enforcement practices. The
juxtaposition of these distinct mechanisms underlies tensions, as these distinct
mechanisms may serve conflicting aims and compete to attract the regime’s resources
towards different goals.
Understanding hybridity is particularly important in regulatory regimes. The advantages
of hybrid regulation were long acknowledged by policy scholars (Rees, 1988), but were
not sufficiently studied by business researchers. In contrast to the relatively static
formulation of regulatory regimes (including ISR) in business literature, there regimes are
often highly dynamic; thus, studying hybrids can draw attention to the changing nature of
the regulatory regimes. The acknowledged dynamism in the studied model can better
address the emergent issues in real time, compared to a static approach.
Hybridity in such inter-organizational coordination leverages some of the principles and
concepts uncovered in the existing literature. Consistent with previous works in the broad
field of multi-organizational collaboration (De Rond & Bouchikhi, 2004; Majchrzak et
al., 2015), I argue that the identified tensions make the hybrid model unstable, because
they involve contrary forces that can throw the relationship off balance. Without balanced
management of these tensions, the hybrid model may shift towards one of the constituent
regulatory forms, which will constrain its outcomes. An illustrative example of
unbalanced management and its impact is the voluntary adoption of bulbs and lighting
materials by a business collective, described in the data. When government avoided
regulating the material group, business discontinued the proactively shaped program, as
government’s role was pivotal in creating a level playing field and preventing free riding.
Government’s avoidance of taking its enforcement role, therefore, shifted the regime
towards an ISR regime fraught with non-cooperation and free riding, which ultimately
resulted in the lighting program’s failure. Forward-moving dynamics are necessary to
drive action towards the goal, as each pole of each tension represents part of the
interests—and not meeting the interests beyond a certain level hampers this movement.
Adopting a tension perspective also helps to better understand the complexity of
collective actions discussed in the literature. As explained in Chapter 2, scholars have
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identified conflicting results for exogenous intervention in self-regulated regimes. On the
one hand, intervention can “crowd out” the collaborative behaviour of the firms in a
voluntary regime (Montgomery & Bean, 1999; Ostrom, 2000a; Reeson & Tisdell, 2008),
for example, due to its affect on intrinsic motivations (Beretti et al., 2013; Frey, 1994).
On the other hand, exogenous intervention can provide the “iron fist” missing in many
self-regulatory regimes when norm-based controls cannot deliver the expected outcome
(King & Lenox, 2000; Tashman & Rivera, 2016). Given the diversity and complexity of
ISR models, such inconsistent outcomes of exogenous intervention are not surprising, but
adopting a tension perspective can inform these complexities. For instance, intervention
in the means versus in the ends will produce a different outcome. Whereas strong
intervention in defining and controlling means is likely to shift a hybrid system towards a
command-and-control system and negatively impact innovative outcomes, intervention in
enforcement is less likely to have such an impact but may negatively affect cost
efficiency. These different outcomes are helpful for theory and practice and further
research can shed more light on these findings.
It should be noted that as long as the hybrid model exists, the tensions within it will never
be resolved, as the conflicting poles that embody the tensions are embedded in the model.
For example, one may argue that the decoupling-integration tension would be resolved if
all firms adopt innovative technologies to integrate post-consumer materials in their value
chain; nevertheless, such a new state, even if realized, would fundamentally obviate the
need for a regulatory regime, as the ultimate goal would be realized. In other words, the
hybrid regulation model is a solution for new responsibilities that business may be
reluctant to assume, not those profitable practices that are proactively embraced by
firms.7

7

In Ontario, profitable waste management programs were excluded from the regulators’ radar as business
addressed them long before regulators attended to such waste. For example, with respect to the MHSW
materials, although oil filters and containers are regulated, used lubricant oil itself is not, because business
had already established profitable oil recycling operations. The need for regulating oil only arose after the
profit declined and used oil was occasionally sent to other regions for incineration.
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7.3 Levels, Innovation, and Propelling the Circular
Economy
Business practices to address ecological challenges often occur at the firm level. Yet,
sustainable development was originally introduced as a macro-level concept (WCED,
1987) that should be practiced at all levels (van Marrewijk & Werre, 2003) and in its
essence, “sustainability is a collective good” (Geels, 2011: 25). As a result, academics,
managers, and policy makers continue to struggle with the question of how to effectively
translate higher-level issues into firm-level practices (Geels, 2011; Geels & Schot, 2007;
van Marrewijk & Werre, 2003). This collective-individual interrelation is especially
crucial for common goods.
When industry does not voluntarily translate the collective responsibility into its agenda,
government is expected to react by imposing firm-level regulatory solutions. Government
regulation generally targets individual firms. However, regulation may not provide an
ideal means for crossing the levels. For instance, cap-and-trade systems are widely used
as an innovative carrot-and-stick regulatory regime to control firms’ greenhouse gas
emissions. These systems aim to both impose negative externalities as a cost on business
and encourage firms to reduce their ecological footprints. Yet, the effectiveness of these
systems has been questioned. When imposed on all incumbent firms, these systems can
create a new equilibrium—a new normal to sustain “business as usual” by adding an
almost equal item to operational costs across all firms, which will ultimately be passed on
to consumers; this can reduce the expected outcomes of the system.
Tackling the world’s increasing environmental challenges will require more than
imposing prices on unsustainable practices. Particularly in the circular economy, global
issues such as resource depletion need innovation to disrupt the status quo (Beaulieu et
al., 2015; Bocken et al., 2017; Ellen MacArthur Foundation, 2013; European
Environment Agency, 2016; Geissdoerfer et al., 2017). Further, collective action is
critical to pursue sustainable development, and policy coherence is critical to spurring
such practices (OECD, 2018). Translation of a collective responsibility into a shared
responsibility is necessary but not sufficient. Innovation is also a required outcome,
whether it is achieved collectively or individually.
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Innovation forms the missing link in solving such broad sustainability problems. On the
one hand, government-driven regulatory regimes can hardly translate a collective
responsibility into firm-level practices while spurring innovation, because developing
innovation-based policies is significantly more difficult than compliance-based policies.
Indeed, the relationship between conventional government regulation and innovation has
demonstrated no consistent picture (Blind, 2012; Blind et al., 2017). Further, business’s
reaction, especially when regulation is stringent, is often minimal measures for
compliance and “pinhole seeking.” Moreover, firm-level government-induced responses
may not achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency at the collective level, as these
require coordination processes and government is not the best coordinator of business
actions.
On the other hand, for several reasons, waiting for self-regulatory solutions to emerge
organically has proved to be an unrealistic option. The complexity and diversity of the
emerging sustainability expectations make it even less likely that firms will reach an
agreement and voluntarily respond to disruptive expectations such as post-consumer
materials management. Even if business adopts such actions, the efficiency of
conventional ISR remains unproven.
The hybrid model can provide this innovation-based journey to the circular economy by
suggesting a regulatory tool to coordinate actions and translate a collective responsibility
into a shared responsibility distributed to all individual firms. This level-crossing
approach is particularly important for the circular economy, as it requires both firm-level
innovative practices and social-level policy; however, connecting the two still remains a
challenge (Beaulieu et al., 2015). The hybrid model can utilize business’s innovative
capabilities, but leaves the decision of whether to act individually or collectively up to
firms. When this right is reserved for competing firms, they organically generate
competing solutions to meet the imposed goals through different solutions. The
multiplicity of firms in a field can create different firm- or group-level self-regulatory
solutions that compete with each other and propel action towards less costly solutions
that meet the imposed goals.
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Among the remaining questions in the ISR literature are, what are the characteristics of
the institutional problems that are associated with carrying out different regulatory
mixes? And what are the institutional mechanisms by which such problems can be
moderated or corrected? (Gunningham & Rees, 1997: 398) This study contributes to
answering these questions by introducing a mix of the two regimes to achieve a circular
economy in a non-cooperative context (see next sections).
Finally, this research also speaks to the so-called “Porter hypothesis.” According to this
hypothesis, stringent environmental regulation—conditional on efficiency—not only
enhances social welfare but serves firms’ economic performance as well, because
stringent regulation can induce business innovation and thereby increase firms’
competitiveness (Porter, 1991; Porter & van der Linde, 1995). Various theoretical and
empirical studies have supported and challenged this hypothesis and the results do not
provide a consistent picture (Blind, 2012; Blind et al., 2017; Palmer, Oates, & Portney,
1995). Among those criticizing it, some question how regulation can be simultaneously
stringent and efficient (Wagner, 2003). The proposed model and its underlying
mechanisms can address this conflict: regulation can be stringent and efficient when
stringency and efficiency are determined by different mechanisms. In the hybrid model,
the role of government is mostly focused on setting goals and foundations, and it is left to
business to identify the most efficient approach to meet them. Thus, as discussed in
Chapter 6, although setting higher goals by government can reduce efficiency in the short
term, when business holds the power to define the rules of the game itself, it can use its
capabilities in the longer term and enhance efficiency. Indeed, efficiency is a relative
concept. The hybrid model allows firms and government to attend to the dynamics of the
process and the changes in the stringency-efficiency-innovation sequences. A commandand-control regime is unlikely to offer the flexibility that Porter identifies as necessary
for innovative environmental solutions, as it hinders efficiency.8

8

Porter and van der Lynde (1995) emphasize the importance of industry participation in setting the
standards. However, they do not explain how industry may participate in setting stringent requirements.
Such participation can hardly take form if the roles are not identified.

124

7.4 Contribution to Practice
7.4.1 Implications for Business
In addition to theoretical contributions, this research has several implications for
business. First, the case depicts how business’s reluctance to respond to emerging
expectations can result in substantial costs and challenges. If the industries in Ontario had
adopted and maintained voluntary actions to manage their post-consumer materials
(similar to what industries did in provinces such as British Columbia), they could
probably have established more efficient actions and consequently shaped the
foundations of future regulation. Industry’s resistance also constrained its ability to
participate in future programs (e.g., by giving control to peripheral stakeholders such as
service providers who made a profit from the program with no pivotal role in serving the
environment). It took years for business to regain the authority to economize on such
operational costs.
Second, when non-business actors convert a higher-level responsibility into a collective
responsibility for business, responding collectively by firms might create significant
economic advantages compared to individual actions. Collective action can create
economies of scale as well as specialization. In the context of post-consumer resources,
many used materials are inputs to manufacture other products rather than the same
product. Therefore, waste processing may require different technologies from those used
by the original manufacturers. A collective pursuit by business can help members
minimize their costs, if not make a profit. Business practice, however, is mostly shaped
by individual actions and competition, which may conceal opportunities for
collaboration.
Third, business needs to value the role played by regulatory bodies in helping it meet
social expectations. In the context of this research, actors acknowledged that governmentdriven monitoring mechanisms can provide a level playing field and an efficacious lever
to prevent free riding. An interesting observation from the data is the fact that,
simultaneous with the involvement of government, the role of other actors (e.g., NGOs)
was gradually minimized, to the degree that the hybrid model is mostly shaped by
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business and government. In a context fraught with conflict, dealing with one actor who
can integrate diverse interests into a more consistent set of requirements seems to be
more effective than dealing with multiple groups.
Last, but certainly not least, business must acknowledge constructive tensions in the
development of such interactive programs and relationships. In fact, many actors,
including firms, confuse tension with conflict of interest and contradiction. Viewing
tensions as intrinsic to complex, multi-faceted phenomena, such as the grand challenge of
sustainability, provides unique opportunities for synergistic actions towards more
efficient, effective, and innovative solutions (Hahn, Pinkse, Preuss, & Figge, 2014).
Accordingly, acknowledging the role of different actors in balancing these tensions helps
business to make more informed decisions.

7.4.2 Implications for Policy
In terms of implications for policy, the case of the MHSW program in Ontario
demonstrates how depriving industry of its coordinating capabilities can be
counterproductive, creating detrimental conflicts among the stakeholders. In this context,
the negative conflicts were ameliorated after the government partly relinquished selfregulatory processes to business. At that point, as the foundations of the program and its
ultimate goals were relatively respected across the board by all involved actors, the
conflicts of interest among the stakeholders were replaced with constructive tensions
between the necessary but contradictory concepts contained in the hybrid model.
Another implication of this research for regulatory process pertains to the notion of
responsive regulation—that is, the idea that regulatory policy should be responsive to
industry self-regulation structure by considering different levels of institutionalization,
morality, and formality, among other things (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992; Gunningham &
Rees, 1997; Parker, 2013). Responsive regulation may far exceed the common rights of
business to provide feedback on legislation or adopt advocacy activities. Although the
importance of attending to firms’ perspective in legislation has been emphasized in
literature (Malesky & Taussig, 2017), my model suggests that responsive regulation can
have more progressive forms. In the Ontario case, two forms of policy responsiveness
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emerged that were critical for the formation of the hybrid model. At a basic level, after
business took a more active role, the regulators gradually conferred a level of authority to
business to establish independent programs and modify some practice-level policies
independently. Later, at a more progressive level, regulators enhanced the flexibility to
allow firms to launch different self-regulation systems at the industry, group, or even firm
levels in future. I argue that to navigate these tensions, regulators must consider the
notion of responsive regulation as a main lever for business-government interactions, not
least in maintaining the balance of constructive tensions.
Perhaps the main contribution of this research to policy is the proposed hybrid model as a
means to translate collective-level responsibilities into business practices. The model
resolves many drawbacks in government- and industry-regulated systems. A main
advantage of the model also lies in the flexibility of firms to choose between individualand collective-level actions—actions that organically evolve and compete with each other
towards better outcomes. As an add-on to the proposed model, by laying the burden of
monitoring and sanctioning costs on business, government can both secure the actions
and direct the costs to the specific consumers of product groups, rather than the general
public.

7.5 Boundaries and Generalizability
Single-case studies usually fall short in generalizability, and this embedded single-case
study is no exception. Yet, the value of such cases lies in their uniqueness. Compared to
other cases with the same goal, the case of MHSW programs in Ontario is relatively
extreme, as the respective roles of business and government in the regime were almost
equal. This parallel involvement of both sides is far beyond government regulations
influenced by industry or ISR regimes influenced partially by government. Extreme and
revelatory cases can add significant value to theory with the generous information they
provide compared to ordinary cases (Hällgren et al., 2018). Such a case, sometimes called
“talking pig” (Siggelkow, 2007) or “black swan” (Flyvbjerg, 2006), is valuable in
extending the boundaries of extant theory, challenging or falsifying previous works, and
sparking imaginations with creative results for both theory and practice.
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This study expands theory in the area of ISR by proposing an efficient regime in a
particular context. The context of the research has three distinct qualities. First, in
contrast to many other self-regulatory regimes, the driving force of the action was a
responsibility that was deeply rooted in collective processes, because producers of similar
consumer products cannot collect and manage their post-consumer materials individually
unless extreme disruptions take shape in institutions and technology. Thus, the regime
broadly called for collective action. But, in the complex and multi-actor context, it was
not clear how this collective action can be fulfilled by individual firms. Second, the new
expectation was costly and challenging, leaving no motivation for business to proactively
participate. Exacerbating this unwillingness was the lack of cooperation among the
actors. Not only did firms in the same industry have little experience in cooperation, but
cooperation with other actor groups was also deeply harmed by severe conflicts. Third,
the government was too ambitious to curb the goals to compliance with a set of
requirements; instead, it sought innovative solutions to help transition to a circular
economy.
These three characteristics shape the boundary conditions of the findings. Although the
results still need to be validated by generalizable empirics, the identified model can be
proposed for similar contexts in which one or more of the above characteristics exist—
that is, (1) there exists no trusted and optimal means to translate the collective
responsibility into requirements for individual firms, (2) the involved firms are not
cooperative or motivated enough to undertake timely and efficient actions voluntarily,
and/or (3) the problem lacks a solution and therefore needs innovative outcomes. In
absence of any of these conditions, although the model may still work, it seems less
efficient compared to the existing models. For instance, where business proactively
cooperates in leading the environmental agenda, a pure ISR model may work more
efficiently. My data from other regions show that post-consumer material management
for the circular economy is an exemplary context involving all these characteristics.
According to the data, many of the implemented regimes do not generate innovative
outcomes, which makes them inefficient for the circular economy journey. Notably,
however, the proposed model may not be limited to the circular economy.
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Given the design of the research (i.e., exploring an existing model through an embedded
single-case analysis), the study supports the fact that the proposed hybrid model can be
more efficient than other models discussed in Chapters 2 and 6, and it can spur
proactivity and innovation; however, it is key to note that this is only one model to this
end. That is, there might be other models with more efficiency and higher outcomes.

7.6 Future Research
My field work, data analysis, and theorizing have opened up many promising
opportunities for future research. Some of these possibilities are touched on in this
research, but still need further work; I list a few such possibilities below.
The first opportunity is a more focused work on the evolutionary process of the MHSW
program. Although this study investigates the longitudinal data, due to the research
question, it is designed to investigate the established hybrid model and its characteristics.
Adopting a more focused process research methodology and delving deeper into the
transition processes could shed more light on how (and possibly why) each identified
stage evolved and transformed (Langley, 1999; Langley & Tsoukas, 2016).
Relevant to the above opportunity, the role of business in formation of the hybrid model
deserves better understanding. This role is a type of institutional work carried out by
business (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Nilsson, 2013). The data suggest that without such
institutional work through stage 2 of the process, the hybrid model cannot be realized,
which may result in more stringent regulation and less proactivity. As such, although
business initially avoided proactive actions for environmental purposes in this case,
proactivity took the form of institutional work. Understanding how uncooperative firms
coordinated the institutional work and how the resultant proactivity led to a new form of
proactivity towards the goal of the hybrid regime can contribute to the literature on
institutional work and its transformation.
A third avenue for research is a comparative multiple-case study on different
jurisdictions. Indeed, different provinces have pursued post-consumer waste management
in different regulatory forms, resulting in different outcomes. A few Canadian
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jurisdictions have taken more extensive steps and achieved remarkable results. A
comparative case study could reveal what underlies the formation of regulatory regimes
and how the socio-political atmosphere can influence regulatory regimes (e.g., a study
that considers the type and level of business-government cooperation and how it has
impacted the ultimate results).
Although this research focuses on one particular hybrid model, various combinations of
regulatory regimes may be utilized to yield the expected outcome. In fact, the “area of
hybridity” demonstrated in Figure 11 can include diverse innovative combinations to
serve the circular economy. Exploring such models and their potentials can contribute
significantly to the knowledge of mixed regulatory models—an area which needs more
work by business scholars. This fourth opportunity for research could help scholars
investigate the tensions of hybridity in other contexts as well.
Finally, considering the data retrospectively, it is evident that although actors such as
NGOs initially played a relatively active role (mostly in the 1980s and 1990s), their role
was gradually weakened to the extent that they are no longer active players in the current
study. The simple explanation for this development may be that the involvement of
government and its “hard institutions,” i.e., regulation, obviated the need for such actors
and “soft regulation” (Reinecke & Ansari, 2015). Yet, this area could be a fertile avenue
for research on the complementarity and substitutivity of the roles of actors such as
NGOs and governments. For instance, under what conditions can stringent regulation
weaken non-business actors? How can the formation of different institutions (e.g., norms
and hard regulations) change their roles? And more broadly, how can such entities make
growth, change, or resolution decisions when the socio-political context changes?

7.7 Conclusion
Specifically, I call on you—individually through your firms, and
collectively through your business associations—to embrace, support,
and enact a set of core values in the areas of human rights, labour
standards, and environmental practices (Annan, 1999).
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The above statement to the World Economic Forum by former United Nations SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan has commonalities with the Ministry of the Environment’s 1983 call
for voluntary business actions which opened Chapter 1. Much has been said about the
pivotal role of business in sustainable development, mostly by adopting a normative
approach to encourage business to voluntarily participate in synergistic practices. To this
end, much has been done by individual firms voluntarily. But much has been missed too.
First, the speed of such voluntary participation to develop solutions is not commensurate
with the speed of unsustainable practices (e.g., the surging rate of natural resource
consumption). Second, firms are still insufficiently involved in collective work,
especially to protect common goods. The notion of competition has arguably
overshadowed business and constrains collaboration and collective work. In absence of
collective endeavours, many required changes are not realized in a timely manner; this
has certainly been the case for the change in institutions and value chains to close
resource loops.
With the need for sustainable solutions becoming increasingly urgent and publicized, it is
now evident that we cannot simply wait for innovative solutions to emerge through a
Schumpeterian approach. To realize a circular economy, policy is required too. If many
thought leaders have deemed business the vehicle for sustainable development in the
past, scientific facts such as those regarding resource depletion demonstrate that the
vehicle must gain traction. Business can be the vehicle, but policy should accelerate it.
And that policy needs to encourage both innovation and collective work by firms
preoccupied with competition. These two aims can be met only through innovative
regulatory regimes, as banal policy merely revolves around compliance with
requirements at the individual level. Hence, the uncertainty, diversity, and complexity of
sustainability as a grand challenge or wicked problem makes conventional policy an
inefficient means (Head & Alford, 2015). To address such issues, an efficient regime
embraces business capabilities rather than suppress them (as command-and-control
regimes do); however, it should also be forceful enough to urge potentially uncooperative
firms to participate. Thus, the combination of government regulation and business
regulation is crucial.
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Furthermore, the assumption of cooperative actors can sometimes be unsubstantial or
problematic. The notion of within-community cooperation has been considered in
voluntary collective action studies (Ostrom, 2010b), including those studies that address
the characteristics of communities that cooperate (Rivera, Naranjo, Robalino, Alpizar, &
Blackman, 2017). Most works on within-community, inter-organizational, and crosssector collaborations are shaped by the assumption of cooperative actors (for example see
Albareda, 2008). In such contexts, although actors might have conflicts of interest, they
are willing to compromise part of their interests and navigate through intra-industry or
cross-sector projects to meet the common goals. Admittedly such cases are not rare, but
they do not reflect the complete reality. Arguably, a more frequent situation is the
ubiquitous opportunities that are missed because non-cooperative actors do not even
think about such collective actions. Non-cooperation is arguably common across
competition-oriented firms, and it is even more common across firms and non-business
actors.
Therefore, the urgent environmental problems at hand demand collective actions in noncooperative settings fraught with conflicts, where participants work under “coerced
cooperation” (Levi, 1988; Ostrom, 2000a). Such dynamics are not ignored in the broad
cooperation literature (Majchrzak et al., 2015) and are addressed in ISR models
developed by economists (Lyon & Maxwell, 2016; Maxwell & Decker, 2006; Poteete et
al., 2010). Management scholarship, however, needs to delve deeper into such contexts
and extend the existing knowledge. The tension perspective is a useful approach to this
end. As my research demonstrates, involving cooperative actors is not necessary for a
collective action to result in innovative outcomes; rather, a regulatory regime can deliver
remarkable innovation as long as it acknowledges, utilizes, and manages the inherent
tensions.
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Appendices
Appendix A: List of Interviews (Company and individual names are confidential)
Interface

Other

Duration Content of Data
(minute)
Service Provider

Municipality

Actor Group

Government

Interviewee's
Position

Stewardship

Date

31-May-16 Two stewardship
senior managers

*

60

Introductory information Phone
about a specific program call

15-Jun-16

President and
CEO

*

45

Facetime

28-Jun-16

President

*

11-Jul-16

VP of Operations

*

120

11-Jul-16

CEO

*

60

11-Jul-16

Product
Development
manager
Director of
Communication

*

30

General information
about different
programs
General information
about collection and
recycling
General information
about the waste
management system
The waste management
system from the
perspective of stewards
Their innovation process
and projects

*

90

Communicating the
programs

In
person

12-Jul-16

President

*

135

In
person

28-Jul-16

President/Board
member

General information
about the MHSW
program
General information

12-Jul-16

*

*

345

180

In
person
In
person
In
person
In
person

In
person

02-Aug-16 President and
CEO

*

60

Information about one
industry's actions

Facetime

13-Sep-16 President and
CEO

*

350

Information about one
industry's actions

In
person

29-Sep-16 President and
CEO

*

70

General information

Facetime

09-Nov-16 Project Manager

*

30

Potential innovations in
industry

In
person

23-Jan-17

*

105

Collective actions and
challenges

In
person

Chairman and
General
Manager

150

25-Jan-17

Director of the
Ontario
Programs
06-Feb-17 Director and
board member

*

120

Processes and
challenges in Ontario

In
person

*

100

Recycling from the
perspective of a retailer
and manufacturer
Ups and downs of the
recycling program and
government bodies
Policy making in Ontario

In
person

Other

Interface

Service Provider

Duration Content of Data
(minute)

Municipality

Actor Group

Government

Interviewee's
Position

Stewardship

Date

14-Feb-17 Project leader

*

105

24-Feb-17 Sr. Analyst

*

70

01-Mar-17 Directeur
Général

*

02-Mar-17 General
Manager

*

02-Mar-17 Retired expert

*

02-Mar-17 President and
board member

*

08-Mar-17 Corporate
director

*

11-Apr-17

*

various role in
operations and
service
04-May-17 VP executive

*

*

*

General information and In
history
person

100

About the history and
operations of the
company
Background info about
the evolution of
recycling in early years
Early years of the
program and status quo

In
person

100

Various aspects from a
steward's perspective

In
person

120

History of the program
in Ontario

In
person

80

History and rationale
behind historical events

In
person

Formation of recycling in
Ontario in 1990s and
current challenges
Formation of recycling in
Ontario in 1990s and
current challenges
Policy making processes
and ebbs and flows

In
person

90

08-Jun-17

VP operations

*

45

08-Jun-17

VP business
development

*

105

23-Jun-17

President

27-Jun-17

Director of
operations

27-Jun-17

Director of Policy

*

*

In
person

300

90

*

In
person

90

In
person
In
person

In
person
In
person

*

60

Recycling operations in a In
region
person

*

60

History of regulation in
Ontario and issues they
address in their region

In
person

151

supervisor

60

History of the program
in Ontario

In
person

04-Jul-17

President & CEO

*

90

General issues about
recycling

In
person

13-Jul-17

VP executive

*

100

History and rationale
behind decisions

In
person

19-Jul-17

Two directors

*

60

General MHSW
transition

Phone
call

28-Jul-17

VP compliance

*

20

General issues

Phone
call

01-Aug-17 Store manager

*

20

Consumers, market
issues, and collection

In
person

20

Municipal waste
collection

In
person

130

Evolution and challenges Phone
of a particular MHSW
call
program
Evolution of MHSW
In
person

Other

Interface

Service Provider

Duration Content of Data
(minute)

Municipality

04-Jul-17

Actor Group

Government

Interviewee's
Position

Stewardship

Date

*

*

01-Aug-17 Site manager

*

*

03-Aug-17 Executive
director

*

10-Aug-17 VP compliance

*

*

*

150

14-Aug-17 Director

*

40

On municipalities and
conflicts

Written

15-Aug-17 Manager

*

45

Operations for diverse
materials

In
person

100

All aspects of a
In
particular material group person

70

Broader issues and
challenges in policy

In
person

16-Aug-17 VP compliance

*

*

17-Aug-17 Executive
director

*

17-Aug-17 Senior advisor

*

60

Various policy-related
issues and processes

In
person

21-Aug-17 Project leader

*

120

Programs from the
municipal perspective

In
person

60

Transition in policies and In
programs
person

25-Aug-17 Chairman

*

26-Sep-17 Public
information
manager
26-Sep-17 Director of
operations

*

30

Provincial policies

In
person

*

60

Provincial policies

In
person

*

152

27-Sep-17 President

*

20-Nov-17 Project leader

*

27-Nov-17 President
04-Dec-17 Director

*
*

Duration Content of Data
(minute)

Interface

60

Recycling a MHSW
material

In
person

60

Policy making and
monitoring

Phone
call

95

Evolution of the
programs

Phone
call

60

Stewardship from the
perspective of retail

Phone
call

Other

Service Provider

Municipality

Actor Group

Government

Interviewee's
Position

Stewardship

Date

08-Dec-17 Director

*

45

On municipalities and
tensions

Written

08-Dec-17 Director

*

60

On municipalities and
tensions

Phone
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Appendix B: List of Observations (Company and individual names are confidential)
Content of Data

29-Jun-16

site visit

A recycling factory

*

60

Technical issues in
recycling operations

12-Jul-16

site visit

A stewardship
organization

*

120

General information about
their program

12-Jul-16

site visit

A steward’s site

*

120

Their innovation projects
across the company’s
sites; safety issues
How they recycle concrete
and use residual paint as
an additive to concrete
General operations, their
small workshop in the
office, and collection
system in stores
General information

12-Jul-16

site visit

A manufacturing
site

12-Jul-16

site visit

A stewardship
organization

28-Jul-16

site visit

A recycling factory

07-Sep-16

event

An industry board
meeting

13-Sep-16

site visit

An industry
association

01-Mar-17 site visit

A stewardship
organization

02-Mar-17 site visit

A recycling factory

24-May-17 event
25-May-17

An industry
annual conference

08-Jun-17

site visit

A recycling factory

28-Jun-17

event

01-Aug-17

site visit

A stewardship
program board
meeting
A store with waste
collection depot

01-Aug-17

site visit

A waste collection
site

Other

Duration
(minute)
Service Provider

Actor Group

Municipality

Type of Site/
Event

Government

Type of
Observation

Stewardship

Date

*

*

60

240

*

*

180
60

The dynamics of their
stewardship program

*

350

Stewardship management
processes

*

300

General information

*

100

Recycling processes

*

900

Various professional and
policy issues

*

150

Formation of HHW
recycling in Ontario in
1990s and current
challenges
This research and how it
can contribute

*

*

60

*

30

On collection of waste
paint

30

Broadly on waste
collection operations

*
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An MHSW
collection site

16-Aug-17

site visit

A recycling factory

21-Aug-17

site visit

An MHSW
collection site

07-Sep-17

Webinar

27-Sep-17

site visit

A webinar on
global
stewardship
programs
A recycling factory

04-Oct-17

Event/
Webinar

A stewardship
office

08-Nov-17

webinar

A webinar on
global issues in
compliance of
hazardous
materials
A webinar on
circular economy

09-May-17 webinar

Content of Data

60

Operations for different
materials

30

Operations

160

Their operations and
challenges in collection

*

60

Harmonization of
stewardship

*

30

Recycling operations

120

Views on fees and
stewards’ concerns

30

Harmonization of hazmat

65

The dynamics of
implementing the circular
economy
General info about
operationalization of a
new waste program and
imposing bans across
regions
General info about the
fees and windup
programs, and questions
for consultation process
Info on the forthcoming
changes in European
regulations

Other

site visit

Duration
(minute)
Service Provider

15-Aug-17

Actor Group

Municipality

Type of Site/
Event

Government

Type of
Observation

Stewardship

Date

*
*

*
*

*
*

*

07-Dec-17

webinar

A webinar on
global waste
management
issues

* *

105

18-Dec-17

webinar

*

90

22-Jan-18

webinar

23-Jan-18

webinar

29-Jan-18

webinar

A public session
on Ontario's new
regulation and
plans
Regulation in
European Union
and the emerging
issues
Consultation
session on the
tires program
windup plan
Consultation
session on the
tires program
windup plan

*

35

* *

180

The plan for next steps
approved by the Minister

*

120

Question and answer on
windup plan, mainly with
focus on service providers

155

07-Mar-18 Webinar

Overview of
regulation in the
chemical industry
09-Mar-18 Webinar Final consultation
on fee setting
policy
24-Apr-18 Webinar Session on
regulatory
changes for
preservatives in
paints
21-Jun-18 Conferen Conference on
ce
resource recovery
partnership
21-Jun-18

07-Oct-18

offline
observati
on
webinar

10-Dec-18

Webinar

The Authority's
annual general
meeting
The Authority's
consultation
session on waste
electronics
program
Session on global
issues in
hazardous
products labelling

Duration
(minute)

Content of Data

60

General info about
regulating new chemicals

90

Details on the fees of the
Authority

45

Legislative atmosphere in
the U.S. and Canada with
respect to preservatives

270

The dynamics and
frontiers of resource
recovery in different
jurisdictions
The trends and issues in
policies and programs

Other

Service Provider

Actor Group

Municipality

Type of Site/
Event

Government

Type of
Observation

Stewardship

Date

*
*
*

* * * * *

*

60

* *

60

How the WEEE windup is
planned to be conducted
in 2020

60

General ideas about
different regions and
labelling systems
requirements

*
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